Afghanistan Watch: Rubin on resolving the insurgency

October 25, 2006

Rubin on resolving the insurgency

Barnett Rubin writes today in the Wall Street Journal that "Pakistan has never fully acted on U.S. demands to fight the Taliban, not because Gen. Musharraf is "against us" rather than "with us," but because the Pakistan army sees its interests in a regional context, not as part of the U.S. war on terror." The Pakistan military sees Islamist militants as useful, both in supressing Pashtun and Baluch nationalism and in cementing its own rule within Pakistan by marginalizing mainstream political parties.

It is therefore not enough to shut down Taliban commanders; the coalition must also push Pakistan to adopt civilian rule and permit political parties in the tribal areas (where they are currently outlawed, allowing radicals a monopoly.) At the same time, donors must press the Afghan government to start discussions on the contentious border issue (which Afghanistan does not recognize) and limit India's rising influence.

Rubin argues, in essence, that because the Taliban serve as useful agents in a broader regional struggle, they cannot be defeated until there is progress on Afghan-Pakistani-Indian relations, greater political freedom in Pakistan, and economic opportunity in the tribal areas. A narrow focus on killing terrorists and suppressing the Taliban--or even on empowering the Afghan government--cannot succeed.

A Border Affair (subscr. req)
October 25 (WSJ), By BARNETT R. RUBIN: It will take more than a dinner at the White House -- such as the one held for Pervez Musharraf and Hamid Karzai last month -- to overcome the longstanding antagonism between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Of course, the political clumsiness on the part of the U.S. does not begin or end there. Had we paid more attention to pre-9/11 history, we might not face a rising Taliban insurgency with sanctuary in Pakistan.

U.S., NATO and Afghan intelligence agree that the Taliban leadership's safe haven in Pakistan, especially in the city of Quetta and some tribal agencies, is essential to the insurgency's ability to exploit Afghanistan's internal weaknesses. Gen. Musharraf admitted in Kabul on Sept. 7 that while Pakistan had worked against al Qaeda, "the focus had now shifted to the Taliban." In other words, Pakistan had theretofore done nothing to hinder them.

On Sept. 5, Gen. Musharraf's government signed an agreement in the North Waziristan tribal agency with tribal elders, local mujahadeen, Taliban and ulama (Islamic clergy), under which the Pakistani army would withdraw to bases, and the fighters would end attacks into Afghanistan. The number of such attacks, however, has tripled since the agreement.

Pakistan has never fully acted on U.S. demands to fight the Taliban, not because Gen. Musharraf is "against us" rather than "with us," but because the Pakistan army sees its interests in a regional context, not as part of the U.S. war on terror. The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the anomalous status of Pakistan's tribal areas, the contest between Talibanization and Pashtun nationalism in the borderlands, the struggle over military control of the Pakistani state, and the refuge for terrorists along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are all linked, as are the policies that could address these problems.

Except for the five years of Taliban rule in Kabul, Pakistan and Afghanistan have had largely hostile relations since Pakistan was created almost 60 years ago. Even under the Taliban, Afghanistan never accepted the incorporation of Pashtun and Baluch territories into Pakistan. This dispute had led Afghanistan's monarchy to seek Soviet military aid to counter Pakistan's U.S.-aided army, and to align itself diplomatically with India.

Pakistan's military has used jihadi militants to accomplish several goals: to wage asymmetrical warfare in Kashmir and Afghanistan; to spread Islamism among Pashtuns on both sides of the border to counter Pashtun and Baluch nationalists who it feared would break up the country; and to cement its alliance with Islamist parties, whose street power intimidates and marginalizes the centrist parties that have dominated fair elections in Pakistan. The Pashtun tribal agencies (known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA), play a key role in this strategy: The absence of national administration or political institutions creates a space where Islamist militias can organize and train, while the Pakistani state denies responsibility for it.

Pakistan's rulers depict these tribal areas as repositories of ancient traditions, but they are actually relics of colonialism. In 1901, Lord Curzon, viceroy of India, promulgated the Frontier Crimes Regulations under which FATA is still run. The "tribal elders" of whom Gen. Musharraf speaks are not representatives of traditional society, but objects of manipulation by the government's "political agents," who wield slush funds with no accountability. Elders who oppose the Taliban are summarily executed. Such murders are so common that the term used for them, "target killings," was incorporated in English into the Urdu-language text of the Waziristan agreement. Two of these supposedly banned killings took place within a week after the agreement was signed.

Pakistan thus pursues the goal, inherited from the British Empire, of using violence and manipulation to assure that no hostile forces gain a foothold along the border, or in Afghanistan. The main force that concerns Pakistan is India, which has opened consulates in Jalalabad and Qandahar, near the Pakistan border. Pakistan charges that Indian intelligence uses agents to spy on and destabilize Pakistan, for instance by fomenting unrest in Baluchistan, where Islamabad faces the fifth insurgency since its government incorporated the area in 1947.

Gen. Musharraf's ethnic charges -- that the Afghan government is dominated by Tajiks who marginalize Pashtuns like President Karzai and the majority of his cabinet and provincial governors -- are linked to the goal of purging Afghanistan of Indian influence. By "Tajiks," Gen. Musharraf means the remaining officials (head of the intelligence agency and army chief of staff) from the Northern Alliance faction that received aid from Iran, Russia and, worst of all, India, during its resistance to the Pakistani-supported Taliban. At last month's White House dinner, President Karzai refuted these erroneous ethnic charges, while President Bush pointed out that the U.S., not India, is supporting the Afghan military and intelligence services.

This archaic border arrangement has created a space for Pakistan to allow militant parties and former intelligence agents to support the Taliban. Firm pressure to shut down the Taliban command and control must be accompanied by efforts to support democracy and civilian rule in Pakistan, which would empower the centrist and nonsectarian parties that have actually won elections in Pakistan. Democratization should be extended to the tribal areas, where political parties are now outlawed, giving radical militias a political monopoly. Several mainstream Pakistani parties have proposed such reforms.

The U.S. and Afghanistan should also recognize legitimate Pakistani concerns. The sizes of Indian consulates should be limited, and the U.S, Afghanistan and India should agree to confidence-building measures about their roles. Once Pakistan acts against Taliban sanctuaries, President Karzai should also take the courageous and politically difficult step to initiate a political dialogue in both Afghanistan and across the border over resolution of all outstanding issues, including the recognition of an open border between the two countries. In return, landlocked Afghanistan will need guaranteed access to Pakistani port facilities.

The U.S. and other NATO countries would have to act as guarantors of this process and provide aid to develop the border area, where unemployment and illiteracy facilitate recruitment to armed groups. These policies would address the roots of instability and violence in this region, and make those on both sides of the frontier genuine partners in protecting both their own security, and ours.

Mr. Rubin is director of studies and senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation, New York University.

Posted by Carl Robichaud on October 25, 2006 at 10:24 AM in Pakistan, Politics, Taliban, U.S. Policy | Permalink

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October 25, 2006

Rubin on resolving the insurgency

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