In their recent NY Times op-ed "The Wars of Perception", co-authors Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney (a cosmic convergence, to be sure) note that Tet and Somalia, which have gone down as two of the great American post-war defeats, were in fact successes masquerading as failures. The Dominics draw analogies to Iraq, but I would say the lesson is much more applicable to Afghanistan. Unlike Iraq, a lot is going right there. Much of the nation remains stable, and even the recent wave of insurgent activity in the south and east has--almost without exception--resulted in the rout of Taliban forces.
Nevertheless, operations are recounted with pessimism and insurgent casualty figures are lumped in with those of Afghan and coalition forces (the frequently echoed figure of 1,500 dead this year is comprised mostly of insurgents...)
Now this is not to say that the increase in insurgent activity--and particularly the importation of suicide bombings and other tactics from Iraq--is not a foreboding sign, or to imply that all is going well. But a judicious measuring of gains and losses is in order. In leaping to conclusions about "another Vietnam" we risk another Somalia--in which a largely successful mission is marked an unmitigated disaster (with grave repercussions for the starving Somalis, the butchered Rwandans, and countless others.)
Image: Alex Nabaum
The Wars of Perception
(NYT op-ed), Nov 26. By DOMINIC JOHNSON and DOMINIC TIERNEY: In January 1968, Americans turned on their televisions to find scenes of chaos and carnage as Vietnamese communists unleashed their surprise Tet offensive. It would go down in history as the greatest American battlefield defeat of the cold war...Except that, remarkably, Tet and Somalia were not defeats...
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