On vacation...

Afghanistan Watch will be joining me on vacation until Jan. 2; there may be a few intermittent postings but nothing regular. Happy holidays to all!

Did the White House block Leverett for discussing Iran-U.S. cooperation in Afghanistan?

• 2:15 am UPDATE: The NY Times has just printed Leverett's op-ed with blacked-out sections alongside citations. Read "What We Wanted to Tell You About Iran"

This week a wave of news stories (Washington Post, New York Times, Financial Times) described how the White House allegedly intervened to block the publication of an op-ed by Flynt Leverett. Leverett has been a critic of Washington's Iran policy, and in his op-ed called for a new, comprehensive bargain with Iran. The passages in question discuss U.S.-Iranian cooperation after 9/11 (a development that had been well-documented.) But they are already documented--as Leverett noted in an interview with The NY Times: “There is no plausible claim that this is confidential stuff...There’s no detail in these paragraphs that has not already been written about by me and other officials.”

Well, the next chapter will be written tomorrow morning, according to Steve Clemons of the Washington Note:

Unless lawyers or other news get in the way, two very important pieces will be up. The first in the New York Times will be Flynt Leverett's CIA-censored op-ed based on his new paper, "Dealing with Tehran." But, op-ed page editor David Shipley will add some "graphic flair" by posting the original op-ed that the CIA reviewed after White House National Security Council staff insinuated themselves into this normally intrigue-free process. The op-ed will run with the blacked out, redacted lines "blacked out." Very cool.

So we won't know precisely what was excluded...but the Times will include a secret decoder ring: links to the citations that include many of the same arguments and data points. One of these key citations made it through the CIA review process just last week--a white paper by Leverett published by my organization, The Century Foundation (full disclosure: I worked with Leverett and others here at Century in the publishing this paper as part of our series on Iran.) You can read the entire paper here, or see the excerpt on U.S.-Iran cooperation in Afghanistan below the break...MORE

Economic opportunity from under the floorboards

"People are coming who have never seen a bank before. They are pulling their money from under the
floorboards and we are putting it into circulation through loans."
                   - Hayatullah Dayani, Azizi bank's chief of business development

"It's not like investing in Austria or the United Arab Emirates where things are pretty straightforward. Given that we are only just emerging from a postconflict situation, things are very complicated. But the possibilities are endless if you are able to adapt."

                   - Mohammad Rafi Fazil, economics officer for the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Afghanistan.

"The economy is moving forward. Afghans are hungry. We are tired of war and we want to buy. We want to build."
                  - Karim Khan, one of 60,000 Afghans in four months to open a new account at Azizi Bank

See: Capitalism Comes to Afghanistan, Time Magazine, By ARYN BAKER.

French Spec-Ops going home; fear of "nasty guerilla warfare"?

It may only be 200 troops,  but the move is symbolically huge. The alliance was already having a hard time increasing it forces to the size the commanders say they need. Then the Australians announce a draw-down of 200 special forces in September, the French are out, and nobody has ponied up for the 1,000 + rapid reaction forces that are seen as especially critical.

Why is France shipping its best troops home? There is, of course, the predictable claims that they are no longer appropriate for the task at hand or are needed elsewhere (like Lebanon or Africa) but the underlying reason is Paris's skepticism about ISAF's new role as peacemaker rather than peacekeeper. As François Géré of the French Institute of Strategic Analysis notes: "There is strong skepticism about the relevance of NATO in Afghanistan if it is not for stabilization and rebuilding of the country...If it is for waging nasty guerrilla warfare, there is no appetite in France and, I think, most European countries."

French Pulls Troops From Afghanistan
Dec 20 (AP) By ELAINE GANLEY:  PARIS -- As violence mounts in Afghanistan, France is pulling 200 of its best soldiers out. But military officials here insist France remains fully committed, with 1,100 troops still based in Kabul. Nevertheless, France's decision to withdraw its Special Forces comes amid concerns in Paris that NATO's mission in Afghanistan has grown confused and that the alliance may be overreaching in its efforts to stabilize and rebuild the nation. MORE

Photos: French military coat of arms; François Géré

Bill Richardson: redeploy troops to Afghanistan

In a speech to the New Hampshire Democratic Party, New Mexico governor Bill Richardson criticized John McCain’s Iraq strategy, and added to a growing chorus in calling to shift troops to Afghanistan. Richardson is yet undeclared as a presidential candidate, but his comments to Fox News a couple weeks ago--and his weekend stump speech in a key Primary state--are telling...

Bill Richardson Wants Troops Redeployed to Afghanistan      
Dec 16, by Daniel Maldonado: NM Governor Bill Richardson fired off his first political cannonball today and aimed it at Senator John McCain’s call to escalate troop levels in Iraq by an additional 30,000 soldiers.“There’s no military solution” Richardson, a Democrat, said. There’s got to be a political solution. Richardson lambasted McCain’s call for the additional troops saying that it would only foment sectarian violence.

Instead, Richardson suggested a fixed withdrawal date sometime in 2007 along with a redeployment of troops to Afghanistan which would aid America’s efforts to combat terrorism.

 

Rubin in Foreign Affairs

Barney Rubin's latest in Foreign Affairs draws on his congressional testimony (posted last month) to compose a sobering "big picture" of developments in Afghanistan.  Another excellent contribution to understanding and rethinking a faltering strategy. The entire article is available online:

Saving Afghanistan
Barnett R. Rubin, From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007
Summary:  With the Taliban resurgent, reconstruction faltering, and opium poppy cultivation at an all-time high, Afghanistan is at risk of collapsing into chaos. If Washington wants to save the international effort there, it must increase its commitment to the area and rethink its strategy -- especially its approach to Pakistan, which continues to give sanctuary to insurgents on its tribal frontier.

Pakistani/Afghan cooperation on a border issue--Polio

"What better way to get peace in the region than health diplomacy...As far as health is concerned, security really doesn't concern us."
                      - Pakistani Health Minister Mohammad Naseer Khan, speaking near the Khyber Pass

An encouraging, if limited, development: cross-border health cooperation...

Pakistan, Afghans aim to eradicate polio on border
TORKHAM, Pakistan-Afghan Border, Dec 12 (Reuters) By Zeeshan Haider: Shrugging off the danger of militant violence, Pakistan and Afghanistan on Tuesday launched a drive to eradicate polio from the rugged tribal lands on both sides of their border MORE

Cordesman Op-ed: More, and fast...

Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, known for his expertise on Iraq and military affairs, has just returned from Afghanistan.  In a significant NY Times op-ed this morning he writes that we have a brief window of opportunity to deliver more military and economic aid,and to do it in ways that "ensure it actually gets to Afghans, particularly in the areas where the threat is greatest," or we risk losing a second war.

Cordesman concludes that the U.S. needs at least two more infantry battalions (i.e. ~1,000-2,000 troops) and more special forces. These increases are "tiny by comparison with American forces in Iraq, but they can make all the difference." Moreover, "unless at least $1.1 billion comes immediately, aid will lag far behind need next year." He also argues that the U.S. "is carrying far too much of the burden, and NATO allies, particularly France, Germany, Italy and Spain, are falling short." The West's "political process in Kabul — rather than on the quality of governance and on services — has left many areas angry," and Congress boost funding to deliver results.  

One War We Can Still Win
Dec 13, By ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN: No one can return from visiting the front in Afghanistan without realizing there is a very real risk that the United States and NATO will lose their war with Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the other Islamist movements fighting the Afghan government. Declassified intelligence made available during my recent trip there showed that major Al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami sanctuaries exist in Pakistan, and that the areas they operate in within Afghanistan have increased fourfold over the last year. MORE

What John Waters thinks the president said...

When asked about the upcoming eradication program, John Waters, head of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy, sounded anything but decisive:

To assuage those fears, Mr Walters ruled out the use of planes and said spraying would initially use ground-based techniques. President Hamid Karzai had approved herbicide use, he said. "I think the president has said yes, and I think some of the ministers have repeated yes."

But Mr Karzai's office was less sure. One official would not confirm the change. "We are thinking about the issue and looking to see how we might proceed," he said.

Crisis Group: integrate Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Today the International Crisis Group released its latest report, "Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants"  which argues that military operations have failed because they alternated between excessive force and appeasement. Empty pledges and amnesties have not worked, and "the government has reinforced administrative and legal structures that undermine the state and spur anarchy."

The solution requires a broader strategy that deals "with the challenges of militancy, governance and extremism in FATA through the rule of law and an extension of civil and political rights."  Click here to view the full report as a pdf, of read on for the Executive Summary. MORE  

Karzai shows emotion

Karzai cries during speech, says Afghan children are dying from terrorism and NATO bombs KABUL,Dec 10 (AP): With his lips quivering and voice breaking, a tearful President Hamid Karzai on Sunday lamented that Afghan children are being killed by NATO and U.S. bombs and by terrorists from Pakistan -- a portrayal of helplessness in the face of spiraling chaos. MORE

Some friendly fire in the war on drugs?

The Pentagon has long sought to steer clear of counter narcotics operations, recognizing that to get involved would compromise its core goals of stability, force protection, and counter-terrorism. The responsibility to fight the spread of opium thus fell to Afghan authorities (who, even if they weren't co-opted by the industry, hardly have the capacity to take on well-funded drug networks) and the British (who were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem.)

Enter Congress. The L.A. Times reports that eight weeks ago, after reports that Afghanistan's cultivation had spiraled further out of control, two Illinois Republicans--Henry Hyde (who chairs the Intl. Rel Com) and  Mark Steven Kirk-- called for a larger Pentagon role in counternarcotics.

After receiving virtually no response since October, Rep. Hyde apparently went to the press:

Hyde, U.S. and U.N. counter-narcotics experts and Afghan officials told The Times that the Defense Department needed to target major drug traffickers, well-known labs that process opium into heroin, bazaars where drugs are sold openly and convoys that carry the drugs out of Afghanistan for shipment to Europe, elsewhere in Asia and, increasingly, the United States.

In response Undersecretary of Defense Eric S. Edelman, who had been tasked to the issue in October by Rumsfeld, sent a conciliatory letter to Hyde on Wednesday:

[Edelman] said Rumsfeld had authorized troops more than a year ago to embed DEA agents and other nonmilitary counter-narcotics personnel on missions in areas of known or suspected drug-related activity. And he said U.S. troops have been instructed to notify the DEA "regarding the disposition of significant drug caches discovered during operations."

It appears, however, that this "authorization" hasn't meant much in terms of a real policy shift.

"They had an ad hoc policy where the guys on the ground, a colonel here or there, would occasionally bring DEA along. What we've been pushing for is a more formal institutional policy," said a senior staff member with the House Committee on International Relations. "Right now, the DEA are like puppy dogs, scratching on the DOD door saying, 'I want a ride.' " He quoted a recent e-mail from a U.S. counter-narcotics official in Afghanistan who said he had seen virtually no cooperation between the Pentagon and the DEA on tactical operations. If Rumsfeld had ordered troops to work with drug agents, the official wrote, "it was not well known, understood or accepted."

Stay tuned: a classified briefing on the military's counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan is set for today. This will be one of the more openly contentious areas of Afghanistan policy issues for both the new Secretary of Defense and the new Congress this year...

Photo: A U.S. Army humvee passes an opium poppy field near Lashkar Gah in southern Afghanistan

"Bring on the Afghan Study Group"

The notion of an Afghan Study Group is not a bad idea, but Kempe's stark oversimplification of its mandate (including, e.g. "Fix the NATO-EU rivalry") suggests his call is rhetorical, rather than sincere. What sort of effort would give U.S. policymakers cover to change tack in Afghanistan? The genuinely multinational nature of the challenges in Afghanistan suggest no study group could be serious without high-level international participants and conveners. Yet multinational recommendations are suspect in Washington...

Bring on the Afghan Study Group
RIGA, Latvia, Dec. 7, (SLATE) By Frederick Kempe: So, while the world scrutinizes the much-anticipated report of the Iraq Study Group—and the extent to which President Bush embraces its findings—it should at the same time launch a similar and equally urgent initiative for Afghanistan.

It might already be too late to save Iraq from civil war or worse, but there's still time to save the moderate, pro-Western regime in Afghanistan...Here is an initial agenda for an Afghan Study Group... MORE

Baker-Hamilton: shift resources to Afghanistan

Given that all anyone in Washington will talk about today is the Iraq Study Group, let's take a look at what Baker, Hamilton et al have to say about Afghanistan...Their summary of Afghanistan's woes (p. 58) may be boilerplate, but their call for redeploying resources from Iraq to Afghanistan comes through crystal clear; if the impact of this report is anything like the 9-11 Commission, this should anchor the debate on Afghanistan for months to come... MORE

• Download the Iraq Study Group

US report on police training posted

The complete joint Inspector's General report on police training is available here. On the left I've inserted an interesting graphic from the report (click the thumbnail to enlarge) which shows what stage we're at in the  program (for what these projections are worth...). You can see that we've only begun to spend training money (the dark blue wedge)in earnest and that the long-term sustained expenditures (the light blue + tan layers) are substantial...

 

The Layeha: 29 strictures for Taliban conduct

NEWSWEEK obtained a copy this week of a Taliban operations manual, a "nine-page, blue and white, pocket-size pamphlet called the Layeha, which Mullah Mohammed Omar began distributing last month" and which Taliban fighters have been seen carrying. The guidebook lays down 29 strictures for conduct...

• Thanks to Peter for his comment--which includes the link to the full text--   and for pointing out the provision on NGO's which the document claims come "under the guise of helping people but in fact are part of the regime"--and thus subject to harsh treatment.

NYT Editorial: "Losing the good war"

After several years of quiet neglect Afghanistan is receiving some attention. There's nothing new, per se, in the Times editorial, but it crisply encapsulates some flaws in our strategy: insufficient attention to providing justice, inadequate oversight of mission-critical contracts, and too much focus on quantity of security forces rather than their quality (manifest through crash courses rather than sustained field training.)

The Times editorial is better than most, but it still opts for easy cynicism in concluding "so much for winning the good war." Perhaps we should not read too much into this rhetorical flourish, but is the Times implying that the war cannot be won? What would "winning" entail? 

Reconstruction of fractured nations is a daunting task, and we'd be having problems even if things had been managed well. Yet much has been achieved in Afghanistan, people remain optimistic (twice as many Afghans see the country headed in the right direction as in the wrong direction), and disaster is far from inevitable. Drawing too close a parallel to the brutal unraveling of Iraq--as it seems fashionable to do--is analytically lazy and has real consequences for a project of such importance.

Losing the Good War, NY Times Op-ed, Dec 5
...The failure to provide local security — or even a semblance of impartial justice — helps explain why so many Afghans have lost confidence in the pro-Western government of President Hamid Karzai, and why a growing number are again turning to the Taliban for protection. MORE

Echoes from Riga

"The summit did not have the character of a major breakthrough...Not all countries showed the same level of determination."
    -Polish President Lech Kaczynski, who is sending 1,100 troops in January as a mobile reserve.

"There is not the slightest reason to voice gloom and doom over Afghanistan."
    -NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

"These have been significant steps in the right direction. Have we got absolutely everything we wanted? Not yet."

   -British Prime Minister Tony Blair

Photo: General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis)

Failing Grade for Afghanistan's Police

Today, two weeks after a U.S. government report revealed Afghanistan's failing police efforts, the story hit above the fold in the NY Times. Here are some of the key failings the report highlights:

• Of the official figure of 70,000 trained police officers, fewer than half (30,395) were actually “trained and equipped to carry out their police functions.”
• The force is nowhere near self-sustaining, with an estimated $600 million required per year "indefinitely."
• Despite requiring as many trainers as Iraq, Afghanistan has received half as many.
• Of the 5,000 vehicles issued to the police only 3,000 could be accounted for.
• A new accelerated program in the south, designed to dissuade militias from forming, provides only two weeks of training, and insufficient vetting has allowed criminals to infiltrate the force.

The report was generally supported by the police experts interviewed by the Times; a common criticism was that it lays insufficient blame on DynCorp, the contractor in charge of police training. I'll try to track down the complete report--let me know if you know where it can be found...

U.S. Report Finds Dismal Training of Afghan Police
Dec 4, (NY Times) By JAMES GLANZ and DAVID ROHDE (with Carlotta Gall in Kabul): Five years after the fall of the Taliban, a joint report by the Pentagon and the State Department has found that the American-trained police force in Afghanistan is largely incapable of carrying out routine law enforcement work, and that managers of the $1.1 billion training program cannot say how many officers are actually on duty or where thousands of trucks and other equipment issued to police units have gone. In fact, most police units had less than 50 percent of their authorized equipment on hand as of June, says the report, which was issued two weeks ago but is only now circulating among members of relevant Congressional committees.

In its most significant finding, the report said that no effective field training program had been established in Afghanistan, at least in part because of a slow, ineffectual start and understaffing... MORE

Some caveats lifted, some assets pledged

Waiting to see what precisely this means...From NATO's website:

Leaders of the 26 countries agreed to remove some caveats–-national restrictions on how, when and where forces can be used--to further strengthen the effectiveness of the NATO-led forces in the country.

“About 26,000 of the total 32,000 NATO ISAF forces are now more useable than they were for combat and non-combat missions,” NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told reporters. They also confirmed that, regardless of the remaining caveats, in an emergency situation every Ally will come to the aid of the forces that require assistance.

A number of countries also pledged additional assets, including fighters, helicopters, infantry companies as well as training teams that will mentor the Afghan National Army. The Secretary General said this meant 90% of the formal mission requirements were now filled.

A telling correction?

Click here to read the Pakistan Daily Times article that prompted this correction...

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Office of the Spokesperson)
PRESS RELEASE

The Daily Times of 30 November 2006 has quoted some remarks attributed to the Foreign Minister by the Daily Telegraph. The Foreign Minister's comments have been distorted and misrepresented.

The Foreign Minister did not say that the Taliban were winning the war in Afghanistan and NATO was bound to fail nor has he advised any country against sending more troops. MORE...

Image: Pakistan' Foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri