Amb. Robert Hunter on Riga aftermath
Today Robert E. Hunter (RAND senior adviser and former U.S. ambassador to NATO,1993 to 1998) writes that "there is no ambiguity and there should be no ambivalence" about NATO countries "radically stepping up their collective commitment" to Afghanistan:
Europe's Afghan test
WASHINGTON, Jan. 2, Outside View (UPI), Robert E. Hunter:...The good news at the Riga summit was that allied heads of state and government did focus on Afghanistan. The bad news is that they came up far short of what they have to do to reverse declining fortunes. NATO's military commanders gained a paltry number of new troop pledges. Those allies unwilling to face the risks of conflict agreed to modify their so-called "national caveats" that keep them out of harm's way, but only in an emergency, and tactical airlift will still fall far short of basic needs.
Even so, the military shortfall is a small part of the overall problem. Equally consequential are the continuing inadequacies of the Afghan government (about which outsiders ultimately can do little) and severe limitations on the non-military civilian effort that is a sine qua non of Afghanistan's future.
Allies with responsibilities for police training (Germany), fostering a viable judiciary (Italy), and stemming the renewed flood of opium poppy production (Britain) have fallen far short of what they agreed to do. Worse, there is no overall coordination of civilian activities undertaken by governments, international institutions and non-governmental organizations, and far too few resources.
It is a truism that Western drug addicts are putting more hard currency into Afghanistan than Western governments. The best that could be done by NATO at Riga was to adopt a weak French proposal for a "contact group." This is an oft-used device to advise on peace negotiations, but a non-starter for mobilizing resources, pinning responsibility and exercising leadership.
Leadership should be assumed by the European Union. Its members have all the needed resources and skills in governance, education, health, agriculture, and the like. Many have vast experience in so-called "nation building."
The EU has been demanding respect from NATO and the United States for its foreign policy and security ambitions. By assuming a greater role in Afghanistan, Europeans can show Washington that they are prepared to take on serious security responsibilities in the Middle East, not just to kibitz and criticize what the United States is doing in Iraq or not doing in Arab-Israeli peacemaking.
Action won't be cheap; and the Europeans must give authority to a first-class political personality as civilian "supremo" in Afghanistan, working in tandem with ISAF and the Afghan government.
Afghanistan is put up or shut up time for European nations in general and the EU in particular in the greater Middle East. Meeting responsibilities is in their own self-interest and is needed to forestall the first-ever failure by the Western alliance.
Very interesting.
Just one question:
"Many [EU members] have vast experience in so-called "nation building.""
Which countries have successfully turned a place like Afghanistan into a nation?
Okay, "nation-building" usually just refers to "state building." Still, I don't know of any EU country which has learned how to turn a place like Afghanistan into a functioning state.
Posted by: JW | January 04, 2007 at 02:07 PM
Well put. Afghanistan has no precedent: it is arguably the most ambitious "nation building" exercise in history, and no one has much experience in these endeavors. Hunter no doubt refers to efforts in the former Yugoslavia and Africa (e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia) where Europeans developed experience. European countries also maintain certain institutions that are better suited to assist emerging states (e.g. Italy's constabulary is often cited as a model in peacekeeping operations.) Hunter's use of 'vast', however, overstates the case...
Posted by: Carl Robichaud | January 04, 2007 at 02:35 PM
Thank you for the explanation.
I think the US and EU have to either provide a lot more resources or to change their goals in Afghanistan, i.e. give up the idea of nation-building. I think nobody is willing to spend as much money, resources and peacekeppers as in the former Yugoslavia. We still have troops in Bosnia and Kosovo. And they were far more developed economicaly and in terms of political institutions than Afghanistan and the conflicts were less complex.
Sierra Leone: Britain successfully managed a minimalistic form of state-(re)building within about two years: End the civil war, disarm the rebels and train the Sierra Leone army. Unfortunately no such success in five years in Afghanistan.
The idea of a national army and government and police is perhaps unrealistic since Afghanistan never (?) really had something like that or at least nobody living today can remember it.
I remember your call for an Afghanistan Study Group. I think we urgently need one. Is there any movement towards one?
There has been a growing realization in Germany that Afghanistan isn't going well. Most of the blame goes to the war in South Afghanistan, but there is also criticism of Germany's role in the North. Unfortunately, there is not a debate about our interests in Afghanistan and our goals, which would then lead to a discussion about the means to achieve these goals.
I have linked to this post and a few others in your blog as well as to other articles that I found interesting, especially concerning Pakistan's role:
http://atlanticreview.org/archives/550-Failing-in-Afghanistan.html
Posted by: JW | January 04, 2007 at 04:04 PM