Afghanistan Watch: Gordan Adams on the "snowball effect" of Pentagon primacy

March 05, 2007

Gordan Adams on the "snowball effect" of Pentagon primacy

Last month Dr. Gordon Adams, of the Woodrow Wilson International Center gave some striking testimony before the Senate Budget committee. His express topic was the rising costs of US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the second half of his presentation focused on a serious development that has not received enough scrutiny: the expansion of the Pentagon portfolio at the expense of the organs tasked with making foreign policy.

Adams describes the "snowball effect" of this cycle: "the more we ask DOD and the military to do, the more they become responsible for our overseas relationships." Essentially, Iraq and Afghanistan have "become a test bed for a new concept in U.S. foreign and security assistance. Increasingly, the Defense Department is expanding its role in this area, altering an historic practice of State Department (and AID) policy supervision (and implementation) for security and foreign assistance."

We've seen this approach to Afghanistan, we've seen it in Iraq, and it shows no signs of waning:

"Inevitably, DOD will want to expand the authorities for which they are responsible, as they will seek this year. The more we expand DOD authorities, and underfund State and USAID for such activities, the less State and USAID have the credibility and retain the competence to carry out policy leadership and program administration in these areas. This trend risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy."

After listing components of this trend (see here) he argues that using the military as "one-stop shopping" "runs the double risk of underfunding and disempowering our diplomacy and foreign assistance agencies, and, at the same time, distracting the military from their core mission." MORE

Photo: Gen. Anthony Zinni, former head of Centcom, with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (Al-Ahram). In her book "The Mission," Dana Priest captured how Zinni was viewed by many as the de facto seat of American authority in the region.

For Adam's full analysis, read the testimony here. I've summarized below several indications of this trend that Adams cites--and their implications:

Since 2003 the training programs for Iraq and Afghan security forces (which have already amounted to over $15 b) have been funded directly through the Defense Department, even "though the State Department has historically had policy lead on such programs".
"The Defense Department is seeking authority to “globalize” and make permanent its authority to conduct such programs..." Moreover, "DOD also intends to seek permanent authority for a global version of its foreign assistance, program - the “Commander’s Emergency Response Program” (CERP)," which is delivered ouside of State and USAID authorities. These funds are massive (in FY2008 they will be approximately doubled to $1 billion.)
"DOD has spent billions of dollars since 2002 providing budgetary support for coalition governments assisting the United States in the global war with terrorist organizations. This support reimburses cooperating governments for goods, services, and the costs to them of providing basing rights for U.S. military operations against terrorists...These funds are provided outside of the Economic Support Funding (ESF) program State and AID have led for years, providing support to strategic partners around the world."

...

Adams continues:

"It seems to make sense for DOD to carry out such programs; they have the skills, logistics, equipment, large budget, and direct contacts to provide these things...The State Department is said to lack sufficient budget resources and trained personnel for such programs, is not used to administering them, and, in the case of USAID, is focused on long-term development programs, not security and reconstruction. Moreover, it is argued, Congress provides funding more readily to Defense than to State/AID, and attaches “directives” and “earmarks,” which constrain these agencies in responding to the emerging requirements of the GWOT."

There is some merit to all of these arguments. And there is some risk, as well. The military does not traditionally conduct foreign policy, and, in pursuit of the military mission, may not take into account the broad range of interests at stake in our relationship with other nations.

The State Department, in principle, has the perspective needed to embed such programs in our broader strategic relationships Historically, State has been given policy leadership; the budgets for such programs are requested as part of the international affairs budgets, not as part of the defense budget, and Defense has had major input into shaping the program and defining the requirement. Although the emergency budget request language includes the “concurrence of the Secretary of State” in these programs, initiating them and shaping the policy context will move to Defense.

...

There is another risk inherent in moving in this direction. The past four years suggests we need be cautious about the capabilities of our military forces for carrying out such missions as democratization, nation-building, or economic reconstruction. But they do and will salute and step up to the task, if asked. However, there is a down-side for our military capability when we divert our forces to these non-military missions. The more we ask them to carry out these programs, the more we risk diverting them from their principal mission and core capability: deterring and fighting the nation’s wars.

Using DOD and the military forces as “one-stop-shopping” for security, reconstruction, training, and nation-building runs the double risk of underfunding and disempowering our diplomacy and foreign assistance agencies, and, at the same time, distracting the military from their core mission.

There is a third risk. As we ask our military to become the leading edge of our international engagement, we are putting a security face on that engagement. However benign and well-intended our forces, for other nations and peoples this can create a backlash against our policies and our presence. In the end, leading with our military chin could have the effect of endangering, rather than increasing, American security.

Posted by Carl Robichaud on March 05, 2007 at 10:04 AM in Economics, Security, U.S. Policy | Permalink