Should we end the counterinsurgency and refocus?

Getting a lot of buzz is Rory Stewart's guest column in the NY Times, in which he concludes that the West has bit off more than it can chew and that "the original strategy of limiting our role was correct."

It's a thoughtful piece, and Stewart writes well; however, his own policy prescriptions are no more coherent than the muddled thinking he dissects. MORE

Stewart is spot on in his diagnosis: "we seem to be pursuing a bundle of objectives, from counterinsurgency to democratization and development, which are presented as uniform but which are in fact logically distinct and sometimes contradictory." He's right, we must be more honest--with ourselves and with Afghans--about our goals and what we realistically can achieve; as he notes, "we do not have the resources, the stomach, or the long- term commitment for a 20-year counterinsurgency campaign" which the Afghan army will not take over.

His recommendations are to abandon the counterinsurgency for a more narrow fight against international jihadists, to focus on high-profile reconstruction projects that will restore Afghan faith, and to "improve Afghan lives through development projects."

On the second count, he argues "we should focus on large, highly visible infrastructure to which Afghans will be able to point in 50 years" such as dams and roads. I can sympathize with Stewart's desires -- a lust for roads is an understandable symptom of a trek across the country -- but would succumbing to the "edifice complex" that plagued reconstruction in the 60s and 70s really win hearts and minds?

Instead we'd hear a different chorus: sure they built roads and dams, but where is my livelihood, why can't I get medicine or schooling for my children, etc, etc. Development projects would be (rightfully) castigated for not being driven by local needs and desires. People need to see results, but they need to see results that touch their own lives; in some cases this will mean roads, in other cases schoolbooks and microloans, but there is no silver bullet. Stewart cites some excellent models (Arghand, Agha Khan) but curiously they are all of the "incrementalist" approach that he dismisses.

More centrally, Stewart argues that the west should avoid counterinsurgency to refocus on counterterrorism (i.e. hunting al Qaeda) and development. He imagines we could turn over the South to a wiser cohabitation with the Taliban and tribal leaders while still conducting reconstruction. But such a strategy, even if managed well, could unleash a broader civil war as Pashtunistan asserts its independence, Pakistan asserts its influence over Taliban proxies, the current government tries to hold the state together, and northern militia leaders assert their right to pillage and settle scores. The status quo is hardly ideal, but neither is it the worst realistic outcome.

Moreover, it's implausible to expect that development goals can be "separated from our defense and political objectives." Even in the absence of a NATO counterinsurgency, Taliban authorities will view many development efforts (especially the expansion of 'secular' schools and courts) as connected to central government or foreign influence. The Dutch model is a controversial one, and its too early to say whether it's succeeding or failing.

Building a functioning state should remain a central goal because it is likely to work better than the alternatives. While Afghanistan cannot be forced into a Westphalian mold -- governance must evolve to allow greater responsiveness to tribal councils, as well as to regional and religious preferences--neither can state building be ignored. Political decentralization is a suitable goal, but there must be power to decentralize or there will be one long unraveling. Again, people are the best judge of their own desires, and Afghans have said time and time again that they trust national authority more than local authority and want international forces to stay, not leave.

I understand that Stewart's piece is deliberately provocative, and I commend him for starting the discussion. Let's hope decision makers accept his invitation to disaggregate, not his implied invitation to disengage.

Comments

[Emerson]

A very good critique. I too found Stewart's observations compelling but his policy prescription unconvincing.

[Joel Hafvenstein]

I appreciate Rory Stewart's belief that our original limited strategy was wise. I likewise don't accept the conventional wisdom that Afghanistan needed thousands more foreign troops and billions more aid dollars in 2002-2004. What Afghanistan needed and needs was not an early, massive infusion of soldiers and cash but a sustained, strategic commitment of both.

I think Stewart overlooks the reason for NATO's reluctant shift to a full-on counterinsurgency, though. The 2005 Taliban resurgence (backed by Pakistan) made development projects impossible through much of the south, and aggressively threatened to take key cities like Kandahar and Ghazni. Had NATO not stepped up its counter-insurgency efforts, Stewart is right, the Afghan Army wouldn't have stepped in. But the northern warlords would have, and as far as I can see, we'd just be back in the early '90s.

Unless the Taliban either become less aggressive or we succeed to some extent in counter-insurgency, we won't get to Stewart's step two in the south -- say, fixing Kajaki Dam so it actually generates enough power for the south again. We also won't get to step three, Sarah Chayes notwithstanding, as long as the insurgents keep hitting small development groups and schools.

We're doing a pretty poor job of counter-insurgency (though as Stewart points out, the Taliban have been alienating the people plenty as well, through suicide bombing casualties, school-burning, and doubtless "lecturing puritanically"). We need to deal wisely with rural tribes and stop our own over-brutal tactics. But if we step altogether back from counter-insurgency, we'll abandon the country to civil war. If it comes to that, seems to me, we shouldn't have any illusion that we'll be able to keep carrying out counter-terrorism or reconstruction of any sort.