Dutch defend approach

Several readers took me to task for coming down too easy on the Dutch in my previous post. One Dutch reader who was recently in Uruzgan said "I’ve spent a lot of time traveling in these areas, and devoted quite a bit of effort to finding out exactly what the Dutch were up...I can find very little to praise in the attitude that the Dutch are taking...The terrain in Uruzgan is such that they have the luxury of avoiding the larger-scale clashes that are tying the Brits down in Helmand, but this doesn’t give them the right to preach in the way that they have been doing."

Rest assured, I don't (yet) endorse the Dutch model, but I do think it is a long-term strategy and must be evaluated on its own time-frame (In citing Musa Qala I was trying to illustrate that whether something  worked or not often depends on your time-frame.) MORE

Of course, if Dutch "passivity" undermines efforts elsewhere by allowing insurgents to project power then that's not just a Dutch problem. In any case, it's going to be very hard to establish what's really working because each commander has incentives to defend his own approach.

Speaking of Dutch preaching, Bert Koenders, the Minister for Development Cooperation, spoke Monday at CSIS (with an introduction by Julie Smith). The good folks at CSIS provide the audio here.

Comments

[Péter Marton]

Thanks for the update! Actually, I have already listened to Koenders' speech and even posted on it - you may check that at http://statefailure.blogspot.com. However, it was interesting to read the Dutch reader's comments - I still have a rather negative opinion on the Dutch version of the ink blot/oil spot approach, so I tend to agree with the remark made. More harassment of insurgents is needed, so I concluded, and that's actually just what Australian special troops have recently arrived to Uruzgan for, to carry out clandestine patrols and stuff like that. I found it interesting that Koenders wouldn't mention that in his speech.
You are right that even a soft approach could work in the (potentially very) long run, however, for that NATO, including the Dutch (who will, during the summer or by September the latest, review whether to keep their troops in Uruzgan), would have to have a totally open-ended commitment. And for NATO to be able to completely leave Talibs alone in some remote valleys until there is a chance to split off the more moderate ones from among them (if there are such), the Pakistani border would have to be sealed off completely, which I don't think is a realistic option.