The Dutch model, revisited

Last weekend the Times published an insightful piece ("Dutch Soldiers Stress Restraint in Afghanistan")

on the Dutch approach to counterinsurgency in Uruzgan, best summed up by commander Col. Hans van Griensven: “We’re not here to fight the Taliban...We’re here to make the Taliban irrelevant.”

The Dutch focus on finding secure areas, keeping them secure, and allowing development to spread outward like an "oil spot". Critics argue that this approach is driven not by vision but by risk-aversion, and that it allows the Taliban to bide their time and develop strongholds.

Today the Times published a second piece, a blow by blow account of a Taliban ambush of a Dutch patrol. (Alert readers will note that today's article documents a fight that took place on April 4th--two days before the first article ran...)

The fact that it's hard to imagine a US commander saying "we're not here to fight the Taliban" illustrates that each of the coalition forces in the south (Netherlands, US, UK, and Canada) is employing distinct strategies based not only upon local conditions but also upon their particular approaches to military affairs, their philosophy of insurgency, and their tolerance for risk. We are often and wisely reminded that the insurgency is multifaceted, but the efforts to fight it may be even more diverse!

Each coalition and NATO command, each PRT -- not to mention different Afghan commands -- has a different set of goals and caveats, and different perceptions of success. Far from the Pentagon's early and heavy handed approach, military forces in Afghanistan find themselves in a laboratory of ideas, of innovation by local commanders responding to conditions around them.

This should be a good thing. The problem is that each nation and each command has incentives to proclaim that its approach is uniquely effective, and there is very little in the way of objective evaluation of results. Moreover, the "right" strategy can often only be ascertained months or years in retrospect, since today's success may become tomorrow's model of failure, or vice versa. MORE

Take Musa Qala. In September 2006, a controversial truce was negotiated between British and local forces. Some argued it was a success, and allowed the Brits to focus needed attention elsewhere. Then in Feb 2007 several hundred Taliban overran the city, jailing the tribal leaders who arranged the truce. But by massing in such numbers these forces became a rich target. A few days later the coalition took back the city and dealt heavy losses to the Taliban (as well as killing a key commander.)

So was the initial British approach -- truce backed by force if needed -- sound or flawed?

These approaches have seen debate among military leaders for years, and now in the blogosphere (for example here, here, here, and here). It's only a matter of time before they become the focus of public debate, especially as citizens grow increasingly weary of casualties.

If you’re interested in more about the Dutch approach and find yourself in Washington, CSIS has a very interesting event lined up next Monday. In the meantime, a key clip from today's Times piece:

Later, in a tent crowded with Afghan soldiers, Captain Abdul Rakhman spoke of the limits of their influence.

Several villages south of Poentjak tolerate the Dutch and the Afghan Army, and tribes have assigned young men to join the Afghan police. But in every other direction the Taliban is strong. These villages, the captain said, could never be won with such a small force. Seeing the Afghan patrol approach, the local men had ushered their families away and coordinated an attack, striking from multiple directions and with several different types of weapons.

They also maneuvered in the face of machine gun, rocket and mortar fire. And they used trickery, he said, to set up the attack. "Those people who walked under burqas, they were not all ladies," he said. 'There were men. Taliban. They went to take their firing positions."

But the Taliban had also made mistakes, he said, including firing too soon. Had the Afghan patrol been allowed to walk farther into the ambush site it would have been encircled. Instead, the Taliban left a chance for escape, and fired with such poor aim that soldiers caught in the open were able to flee unharmed.

The captain still had questions he wanted answered.

Comments

[Péter Marton]

Thanks for mentioning the CSIS event, keep us posted if you can. Dutch minister Bert Koenders has argued for many things in the past, from the restrained approach to removing the national caveats inhibiting ISAF. It'd be great to hear what he had to say.
As to the Musa Qala scenario - are you suggesting Talibs might turn out to be congregating too much in Uruzgan for their health, and that so the lax Dutch approach might actually yield gains for ISAF in the end, once there is a decisive move against the insurgency there?
Recently I've been blogging a lot about the oil spot concept, concluding mostly that its Dutch version produces 'insurgency islands' beside development islands, and might thus produce negative spillover effects to other provinces. For a change now, I'm looking to collect arguments in favour of the Dutch, so I'd be interested to hear your take.