This is Tom Perriello's first post. He says that "if you have questions, comments
or suggestions for this mission, feel free to contact me at tom@avaaz.org."First Impressions a Second Time:
Initial Thoughts on Justice and Security from KabulAs I left New York on Sunday, international headlines about Afghanistan suggested a scary scene
of escalating violence and rising anti-American sentiment. I have only been in Afghanistan for three
days, but my initial conversations with leaders in Kabul (and a number of
interviews with Afghanistan experts before leaving) suggest an environment
defined less by anxiety about security than by a dull resignation to watching a
nation slowly slide backwards. Initial meetings with both Afghans and members of
the international community betray a malaise of declining hope, lack of clear
direction or mandate for the international community, lack of political will
from the Karzai government, and rapidly shrinking expectations.
This is a shift from the last
time I was here in late 2005 for two months following the Parliamentary
elections. At that time, I was
conducting a national survey on the relationship between justice and security,
essentially asking people how the country should address atrocities from the
past 30 years, and what impact this would have on national security. In addition
to “person on the street” interviews, we met with opinion leaders in each
province, including government officials and newly elected PMs, “warlords,” NGO
leaders, journalists, academics, women leaders, and former and current
combatants. A team of 65 Afghans and internationals conducted consultations with
over 2000 indidivuals as part of this survey, and I oversaw interviews with
leaders from Kabul, Wardak, Gardez, Kandahar, Helmand, and Bamiyan.
The survey indicated two
distinct schools of thoughts, and my initial interviews this time suggest that
those divisions remain in place, though a bit less stark...MORE
On one side, the vast
majority of Afghans wanted “warlords” removed from power and preferably locked
away. Substantial majorities believed that these prosecutions would considerably
increase stability in the country and should begin immediately. On the other
side, senior Afghan government officials and international diplomats tended to
believe that the only thing keeping Afghanistan from exploding was buying
warlords into the process. Both sides tended to frame their positions primarily
as security strategies.
The survey was conducted in
part as a response to a national poll finding that 94% of Afghans wanted justice
for past crimes, and 76% believed that prosecuting warlords would increase
stability (only 8% thought it would weaken security). These figures were so high
and so at odds with the conventional wisdom in key diplomatic circles that our
qualitative survey was designed to test the national poll. Our findings were
entirely consistent with the quantitative findings. For most Afghans, the
international strategy to empower warlords, particularly in the immediate wake
of the Taliban, was the Afghan equivalent of disbanding the Iraqi
army.
These findings fell largely on
deaf ears and 18 months later, and warlords are more deeply entrenched in
Parliament and the Cabinet and overflowing with cash. In fact, the only major
story about accountability has been about the passage of a controversial
national amnesty law. So I have returned to Afghanistan now to see whether the desires of Afghans have changed.
The case for accommodation has
arguably gained strength as warlords have become increasingly powerful and
willing to join forces to disrupt any efforts at accountability. At least some
argue that the recent showdown over the amnesty law proved the destabilizing
consequences of accountability, though I have already heard radically
contrasting reads on what to conclude from this saga (subject of a future post).
Yesterday I asked an Afghan NGO
leader whether the people had changed their opinions on justice and security
since late 2005. Her answer: “Nothing has changed except the erosion of any hope
that anything will happen on this.” According to initial conversations, Afghans
continue to consider removing warlords from power a top priority, and consider
such steps a necessary precursor to serious progress on development, fighting
the insurgency and drug trade, and establishment of the rule of law.
Despite this bleak picture, one
potential bright light that has already come up in several conversations is the
Advisory Panel for Presidential Appointments (APPA), which would be empowered to
vet senior officials for competence and a lack of culpability for past
atrocities. Though not without significant barriers, the APPA has a serious
chance of becoming operational within the year. Key decisions may be made within
the next two weeks about the rules of procedure and binding authority of these
panels, so I will probably write about this in more detail later in the trip.
If you happen to know people involved in
this process, the next few days may be a good time to weigh in.
The paralyzing equation of a
weak international mandate plus lack of political will in the Karzai government
plus real or perceived threat of instability from warlords can deflate even the
most dedicated Afghanistan advocate. But does the APPA – and its promise of a
broader vetting agenda – offer a winnable victory with meaningful consequences –
a priority on which the accountability and accomodationist camps can agree? Is
there any reason to believe the US will get behind this effort and
that Karzai’s Chief of Staff will concede the kind of binding authority
necessary to make this process work? Could a few concrete examples of accountability have a broader ripple
effect? These will certainly be something to focus on in the weeks
ahead.
The trip is young, but so far
what seems clear is that people are focusing less on grand shifts than concrete
marginal change. That may prove to be a better strategy for producing the kind
of results Afghans need to see to start believing their desire for justice might
one day be realized.
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