Reports of first surface-to-air missile attack in Afghanistan

One of the nightmares that keep Western planners up at night is the possibility that insurgents might get a hold of some MANPADS (Man-portable air defense systems). The most prominently discussed is the Stinger missile -- after all, many of the missiles the US provided to mujahideen for use against the Soviets have never been accounted for -- but there are plenty of Russian built surface-to-air missiles floating around that could prove disastrous in the wrong hands. Until this week, the threat of shoulder-launched missiles was the dog that hasn't barked.

Then on Sunday a C-130 transport plane was reportedly attacked in Nimroz province with a surface-to-air missile. NATO will neither confirm nor deny the incident, but the London Telegraph (by way of the Washington Times) reports that "The crew reported that a missile system locked on to their aircraft and that a missile was fired. It closed in on the large C-130, pursuing it as the pilots made a series of violent evasive maneuvers and jettisoned flares to confuse the heat sensors in the nose of the surface-to-air missile, or SAM." The article continues: "The C-130 attacked in Nimroz was flying at 11,000 feet at the time of the attack, which is within the 1.5- to 3.4-mile range of a shoulder-launched missile system such as the SAM-7."

The million dollar question is whether this will prove an isolated incident, or the start of a trend. Speculation has begun as to where these weapons are coming from; apparently there was a SAM-7 among the arms that was intercepted along the Iran border in April.

Taliban's failed first use of SAM still worrisome  KABUL, July 29 (Washington Post/LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH): Taliban militants used a heat-seeking, surface-to-air missile to attack a Western aircraft over Afghanistan for the first time last week, coalition military sources say. The attack with a weapon thought to have been smuggled across the border with Iran represents a worrisome increase in the capability of the militants that Western commanders had long feared.

Photo: DOD: An Afghan Mujahideen demonstrates positioning of a hand-held surface-to-air missile. 26 Aug 1988

"Cops or Robbers?" AREU's must-read report on police reform

Donors are finally realizing the importance of police reform. Unfortunately, some of the response has been to throw money at the problem--the latest infusion of funding, for example, focuses on training and equipment, as if the police problem were primarily a technocratic challenge rather than a political one.

Andrew Wilder, research director at Tuft's Feinstein Center, is the author the AREU's remarkable new report on the topic entitled "Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police". He argues that there is still no consensus about the role of police, and too little appreciation that the Ministry of the Interior is part of the problem. The paper highlights five challenges. Donors will need to:

Just because we don't speak about things publicly...

The recent back and forth from Washington and Islamabad--sparked by White House statements that it would unilaterally strike Al Qaeda in Pakistan's territory if necessary--has been one whirlwind of a show. A string of spokesmen have made each side's position absolutely clear (depending, of course, upon which audience that particular message is intended for...) Frances Townsend, a White House homeland security adviser, summed it up when she fielded a question on FOX about why the US wasn't already engaged in operations in Pakistan: "Just because we don't speak about things publicly doesn't mean we're not doing things you talk about."

Pakistan responded that such operations would be an inconceivable infringement of sovereignty (wink, wink) and that it's in a better position to shut down AQ--if only the US would pass along its intel.

Bill Arkin, writing for the Washington Post's Early Warning blog, gets to the heart of the matter: "lost amid the back and forth is an interesting question: If Pakistan is indeed not getting intelligence information from the United States, why not?" He suggests "Is it because we found it was making its way back to the bad guys?" MORE 

Photo: Source: White House. Frances Townsend (right) meets with President Bush and the Homeland Security Team at the National Counterterrorism Center in McLean, Virginia.

Hostage incidents--Reuters

With the Taliban's deadline for killing the South Korean aid workers approaching, Reuters has compiled a timeline of hostage incidents in Afghanistan since 2006. MORE

An appeal for the release of the South Korean aid workers

The following is a global appeal from Avaaz (founded by Ricken Patel and Tom Perriello, who have commented for this site) for the Taliban to release the Korean hostages unharmed.  They remind us that "global pressure helped free BBC reporter Alan Johnston from his captivity in Gaza." Please take a moment to read it (they have accumulated 10,000 signatories already and are seeking 50,000.)

Dear friends, 23 South Korean aid workers, most of them young women, have just been taken hostage by Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, who are threatening to execute them this week. The situation is desperate, but there is hope. The Taliban are all from the 'Pashtun' ethnic group, and observe a strict code called Pashtunwali – the "way of the Pashtuns". This code demands, above all else: "hospitality to all, especially guests and strangers". There are rumours of infighting among the Taliban over these kidnappings, because they clearly violate the code.

A global outcry for the Taliban to follow their own code would certainly be covered by media in Afghanistan and Pakistan where the Taliban are based. Sign the petition below, forward this email, and let's report a truly powerful outcry to local journalists: http://www.avaaz.org/en/honour_the_afghan_code
MORE

"Father of the Nation" passes

"When I saw the mountains of my country, my people, my friends - what is better than this? I wish just to be able to do things for my country and serve it."

                     -Former Afghan king Mohammad Zahir Shah (1914-2007), upon his arrival in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

The nation enters three days of mourning for King Zahir Shah, the last of the Pashtun Barakzai dynasty, who passed away yesterday at 92. I've posted clips from a couple obituaries below...

Art: King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan by Tapand (artist)

Is less more?

Rory Stewart's piece in the Times today has it right and wrong. He's right in his assessment that a major infusion of troops, committed now, is not the answer to the insurgency. He's right that we should focus more of our energies in the stable areas of Afghanistan where money goes further and that we need more modesty in what we seek to achieve.

But Stewart is wrong on several counts. First, his assertion that the situation in Helmand (and Uruzgan, and Kandahar) has deteriorated because of the NATO presence is highly speculative. To wit:

Britain decided in 2005 to bring good government, security, rule of law and economic growth to Helmand Province. At the time, there were few Taliban attacks in the area. The British deployed some 4,000 soldiers last year and more civilian advisers to replace a few hundred international troops who had been in the province since the fall of the Taliban. The British effort failed. A year and a half later, with 7,000 British troops in Helmand, the provincial government is more corrupt, the streets less safe for citizens, the poppy crop larger and the legal economy and infrastructure more eroded.

Stewart essentially argues that "the foreign presence has provoked a wide Taliban insurgency". In fact, the insurgency was on the rebound well before the arrival of NATO expansion (which was implemented in response) and attributable to a mix of factors, including the increase of cross-border support, narcotics revenues, disillusionment with government corruption, etc. This is not to say that resentment doesn't fuel the Taliban, but to blame NATO for the intensification of the insurgency is akin to arguing that ambulances tend to cause car crashes.

Stewart argues that the counterinsurgency cannot succeed because "Afghan officials are simply not committed to state-building in southern Afghanistan, and many are connected to the drug trade." While accurate, this account omits mention that many of these officials were installed or permitted to retain power precisely because of a minimalist Western strategy (of which Stewart approves) that was adopted to avoid confrontation so the United States could keep its focus on counterterrorism/counterinsurgency goals. In other words, the reason southern leaders don't support state-building and drug control is because they are doing just fine, thank you very much, under the system that the West facilitated.

As an alternative, Stewart has an appealing plan: he writes that we can conduct development in the north and counterterrorism in the south without conducting counterinsurgency operations. A new counterterrorism strategy comprised of "intelligence, pragmatic politics, savvy use of our development assistance and on special forces operations" can combat the threat of jihadism not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan and Iraq. In other words, we can do more with less sacrifice if only we do it smarter.

This is precisely the message that Washington, Ottawa, and London are keen to hear. It may also be true. But Stewart has been pushing this line for several months now, but I have yet to hear how this approach might be operationalized. Do military experts believe they could do counterterrorism without creating a permissive environment? Can progress in the north, center and west be maintained if the Taliban are given latitude to operate the south? Can the government retain credibility and authority if the ballast of international support is withdrawn?

Where Less is More. KABUL: July 23, 2007 (NYT Op-Ed) By RORY STEWART: America and its allies are in danger of repeating the mistakes of Iraq in Afghanistan. Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and even some Republicans are insisting on withdrawing from Iraq and sending more troops and resources to southern Afghanistan. The Bush administration’s gloomy National Intelligence Estimate last week on the fight against Al Qaeda will only lead others to make such calls.

But they should think again. The intervention in Afghanistan has gone far better than that in Iraq largely because the American-led coalition has limited its ambitions and kept a light footprint, leaving the Afghans to run their own affairs. MORE

USIP event on civil society

USIP has posted a report from their June 21 panel on civil society in Afghanistan, which featured George Devendorf (director of Public Affairs for Mercy Corps), Tilly Reed (chief of party in Afghanistan for Counterpart International) and Scott Worden (USIP program officer with Rule of Law). The summary is available here.

Tom Perriello: Comments on Security

With news of another major suicide bomb attack in the South making headlines, I wanted to pass along an unofficial summary of a dozen or so interviews with security experts from various Embassies, UN offices, NGOs, and the Afghan government.

Overall, most security experts agree that the insurgency has shifted its emphasis from the bolder frontal attacks on international forces that we saw in summer 2006 to asymmetric tactics, i.e. “shoot and scoot” operations, suicide bombings, and IEDs. This is a regression for the insurgency, and NATO and OEF operations have driven much of this shift. Most analysts credit the successful targeting of mid-level insurgent leaders (top leaders assumed to be safely in Quetta) with hindering Taliban operations. MORE

Harper: No extension without evolution

Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper, in an interview with a Calgary radio show:

"I think Canadians are expecting that if we're in Afghanistan after 2009, it would be a new mission...Canadians have been fairly clear that if we were to be in after 2009, that they would expect our participation to evolve in some way."...

"The truth of the matter is NATO still is not putting in near the amount of forces that are necessary to really bring permanent stability to Afghanistan. Canadians have been clear they want to see a more equitable burden-sharing in Afghanistan."