Bridging the expectations gap

In an op-ed this week, George Davendorf and Brian Grzelkowski -- part of a recent Mercy Corps delegation to Afghanistan -- argue that "the most serious threat to the fledgling Afghan state may be lurking in an unexpected place; not in the strife-ridden streets of Kandahar or the flourishing poppy fields of the countryside, but in the unfulfilled aspirations of average Afghan citizens."

To the Afghan government and donors, Davendorf and Grzelkowski make two specific recommendations that would make a big difference:

1. "Expedite the provision of reconstruction and development assistance at the local level by adopting both a top-down and bottom-up approach...(and) finding ways to inject additional resources at the provincial and district levels where they can quickly benefit average Afghans."
2. "Develop a credible, effective communications strategy to better guide and manage public expectations...to rebuild public confidence in the nation-building effort now underway."

Read the full op-ed below...

 Bridging the Expectations Gap in
Afghanistan. By George Devendorf and Brian Grzelkowski: The US and its allies are in danger of losing Afghanistan. Recent events, from the recent tragic killing of two International Rescue Committee staff members to this summer’s assassination attempt against Afghan President Hamid Karzai, serve as vivid reminders that things are not going so well in America’s other “hot” war. In Afghanistan’s downward spiral of violence, not even unarmed humanitarian workers are safe.

It’s difficult to assign blame for Afghanistan’s troubles to any single factor. But it’s increasingly apparent that the most serious threat to the fledgling Afghan state may be lurking in an unexpected place; not in the strife-ridden streets of Kandahar or the flourishing poppy fields of the countryside, but in the unfulfilled aspirations of average Afghan citizens. Unless President Karzai’s government and its international partners can address unmet public expectations of improved security, economic opportunity, and competent governance, a lack of popular confidence may ultimately doom Afghanistan’s nation-building efforts.

During our recent visit to Afghanistan as part of a Mercy Corps humanitarian delegation, we saw directly the challenges now confronting this fragile nation: an emboldened Taliban insurgency; a burgeoning narcotics trade; increased attacks on aid workers; weak governance; rampant corruption and mounting civilian casualties. But what struck us most was the growing sense of frustration that has settled over much of the population. 

The Afghan government and its international backers, already locked in a pitched battle with Taliban forces, now find themselves fighting a war of public opinion. A December 2006 ABC/BBC poll traces the steady decline in public satisfaction since 2005: Those believing that the country is headed in the right direction decreased from 77% to 55%, that security is better from 75% to 58%, and that the future will improve from 67% to 54%. 

It’s easy to understand the lack of public confidence. After billions of dollars in aid money and the deployment of tens of thousands of foreign troops, Afghanistan remains a grindingly poor nation with a weak central government that cannot provide its people with basic services, jobs or security. The resultant “expectations gap” is vast, daunting, and if unchecked, promises to undermine international efforts to build a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

While significant progress has been made in building the capacity of the Afghan National Army and some of the central ministries, the reality is that state institution building is a slow and painful process – and one that will invariably struggle to keep pace with public aspirations. To bridge this gap, the Afghan government needs to work with international donors to aggressively speed the delivery of basic services, such as health, education, and economic opportunities, to the local level. Simultaneously, it must clearly communicate to the public a realistic set of expectations of what can be done to address the country’s key challenges. With this in mind, the US and other concerned nations should immediately undertake two critical steps.

First, help the Afghan government to expedite the provision of reconstruction and development assistance at the local level by adopting both a top-down and bottom-up approach. This means not just focusing on the important task of expanding government capacity at the national level, but finding ways to inject additional resources at the provincial and district levels where they can quickly benefit average Afghans. Such a dual approach will be difficult to manage given the lack of government capacity in many areas of the country, but efforts such as the National Solidarity Program, which combines government and NGO resources to assist local communities, demonstrate what is possible.

Second, work with Afghan authorities to develop a credible, effective communications strategy to better guide and manage public expectations. The Afghan government needs to explain, in consistent and realistic terms, how it intends to address the primary security, reconstruction and economic problems facing the country. By further engaging key constituencies like tribal elders, religious leaders, and even local government officials, Kabul and its allies can help to rebuild public confidence in the nation-building effort now underway.

In all likelihood, Afghanistan is going to remain an impoverished and chaotic country for some time to come.  But by rapidly expanding development assistance at the local level, and by more actively informing the Afghan public of what has and will be achieved in the coming years, the growing expectations gap can be narrowed – and with it, the window for success opened wider.

George Devendorf is the Director of Public Affairs at the global humanitarian agency Mercy Corps. Brian Grzelkowski is Mercy Corps’ Senior Policy Advisor.

 

Comments

[sayke]

The questions raised by this then are - why doesn't Afghanistan have better communications/PR or more effective subnational governance?

The answer there seems pretty straightforward to me. Afhganistan is ineffective and doesn't have coherent strategies in areas where there's serious discord in the international community. Subnational governance is a great example - the US doesn't want to devolve power any lower then Karzai, because they figure that making Karzai into a dictator is good for stability. The EU disagrees, and as a result progress on subnational governance (and the bottom-up possibilities for improving the lives of less-urban Afghans) is extremely slow.

Many of the problems (subnational governance, aid effectiveness, anti-corruption, counter-narcotics, electoral law, police reform, etc) faced by Afghanistan are made much more difficult to solve by the fact that there's no consensus in the international community on how to proceed. In fact, there are serious and substantial policy differences between major actors, and till those are resolved the political will to move forward will remain elusive.

One potential avenue of resolution follows from the fact that the US is contributing so much more money and resources to the Afghan project then anybody else is - unless the EU steps up to the bat and starts bearing more of the load, they're going to find themselves seriously sidelined in disagreements over policy. I think that's too bad, because the EU approach seems quite foresightful in some areas, but money talks and unless the other players get on the ball then we may see the US policy agenda override even the most principled of objections.