Comments on the South Korean hostage situation

The following are comments I made to a South Korean reporter covering the hostage crisis. If you have additional insights for him -- or corrections for me -- drop me an email and I will pass them along.

1. What is the security situation in Afghanistan as a whole?

It very much depends on the region. Several provinces in the south and southeast (e.g. Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, Ghazni) are quite dangerous and have become more so. But in the rest of the country, especially in the north and the west and in major cities such as Kabul, is fairly safe. Afghans and foreigners living and working there must take precautions, but are not at risk in the same way that aid workers in Kandahar would be.

After incidents like these, the international community must reconsider where and how it operates. The OECD has estimated that fully half of all development assistance has been spent in four of the most dangerous provinces in the south. It is extremely difficult and expensive to do development work in this environment. A decision was made to concentrate development work in these contentious areas in order to “win hearts and minds,” but it’s not clear that this approach is working. On the other hand, there are many stable regions in Afghanistan that are languishing from a lack of attention. So a wiser approach, especially in light of these recent kidnappings, is to pick some of the low-hanging fruit that is currently rotting on the vine. MORE

2. How influential is Taliban, especially outside of Kabul? Do they earn the "hearts and minds" of people?

The Taliban are widely unpopular. Nationwide, 89 percent of Afghans view the group unfavorably, and even in the southeast--where their support is strongest--only 10 percent say that they themselves support the Taliban (on the other hand, 22 percent say that “other people in the area” support the Taliban at least “fairly strongly”.)

So only a minority of the population supports the Taliban, but among this minority are powerful men who have been strengthened by drug revenues and—especially--funding and assistance from Pakistan. So even Afghans who don’t want to see a return to Taliban rule are afraid of standing against them. Moreover, many Pashtuns in the south and east may not like the Taliban but would prefer them to foreign occupiers or to corrupt officials in the Afghan police. That’s why it’s essential to build good local governance in these regions as a counterweight to the Taliban. We’ve done far too little to achieve this.

3. How influential are tribal elders on Taliban insurgents? Is it a good approach for Afghan government to leverage tribal elders in negotiation?

Winning the support of tribal elders is absolutely essential because they have a legitimacy that the Taliban and local warlords cannot match.  Having said this, the traditional structures of governance in Afghanistan have been eroded after so many years of the "rule of the gun". While elders are seen as legitimate leaders, they are weak in compared to commanders from the Taliban or other militias.

4. Do you see any possibility for Afghan government to accept -- completely or partially/conditionally -- the request from the captors?

I see it as a strong possibility. The government has consistently said—as it must—that it will never negotiate with kidnappers. But it also made similar statements before it negotiated a deal for the release of kidnapped Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo. So there is a precedent.

Of course, the government said that Mastrogiacomo was a “one time deal” and that negotiations would never happen again. But the scale of the Korean kidnapping is such that the government could make an exception in light of such extraordinary circumstances. It may do so under international pressure.

Of course, doing so would reaffirm a dangerous precedent. Remember that one of the three hostages released in return for Mastrogiacomo was Shah Mansoor Dadullah--the brother of slain Mullah Dadullah and currently a to commander--who, according to one report may have had a role in ordering the kidnapping of the Korean aid workers.

5. What kind of action from each party could lead the deadlocked negotiation to breakthrough?

Breakthroughs usually occur when a) one side is willing to make concessions that they were previously unwilling to make or b) when new bargaining chips are added to the deal. In this case, one or both sides will have to make concessions, since I can't imagine new chips being added to escape a zero-sum negotiation.

6. Do you think the Afghan National Army has the capacity by itself to conduct a rescue operation?

I doubt it. A couple of Afghan ‘commando’ units have been trained and they are apparently passable. But they don’t have the training or maneuverability to conduct a rescue operation of this scale. If there’s a rescue, it will be led by coalition forces.

7. I think use of power to free the hostages should be the last resort. What is your opinion about that?

I’m sure there are plans on the table for this. But this is very difficult to do, and likely to end badly.

Comments

[Chintu]

Taliban support from Pakistan is a major issue which needs to be settled firmly. The amount 'spent' on development is a debatable issue- a huge percentage of what comes goes back in pays and allowances and the ground level penetration of what is spent is below average. The Afghans value physical presence more than fiscal support and hence this kidnapping is a surprising development

[peace]

Why not warning Taliban: if they don't release the 19 Korea hostages within 24 hours, the Afghan government will kill all the Taliban prisoners? If they wouldn't see that, they should do so.