Afghanistan could fail as a state

A new independent study by retired Marine Corps Gen. James Jones and former U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering has a dire warning for Afghanistan, according to The Associated Press which obtained an advance copy.

Study: Afghanistan could fail as a state, Anne Flaherty (The Associated Press), 29 January 2008. Afghanistan risks sliding into a failed state and becoming the "forgotten war" because of deteriorating international support and a growing violent insurgency, according to an independent study.
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"Afghanistan stands at a crossroads," concludes the study, an advance copy of which was obtained by The Associated Press. "The progress achieved after six years of international engagement is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country."

A major issue has been trying to win the war with "too few military forces and insufficient economic aid," the study adds.

Among the group's nearly three dozen recommendations: increase NATO force levels and military equipment sent to Afghanistan, decouple U.S. management of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, establish a special envoy to coordinate all U.S. policy on Afghanistan, and champion a unified strategy among partner nations to stabilize the country in five years.

You can read the study here.

Also read the Atlantic Council report released the same day, Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action. It states bluntly that "NATO is not winning in Afghanistan" and urges quick changes in course, including a coherent security and reconstruction assessment, appointment of a UN high commissioner, and the creation of a comprehensive regional strategy including all neighboring actors like Pakistan and Iran.

A third interesting report comes from Oxfam which recommends changing the "centralized, top-heavy and insufficient" aid-distribution process to a more indigenous approach that emphasizes "more even distribution of aid, greater alignment with national and local priorities and increased use of Afghan resources" and focuses more on rural development and agricultural aid.

Elections in Afghanistan could be problematic

As talk swirls over whether Zalmay Khalilzad will run for Afghan president and Karzai attempts to project his authority to prepare for what could be a possible re-election bid, a U.S. Army report finds cause for worry about national elections in Afghanistan. Michael J. Metrinko, of the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, looks at problems with future Afghan elections in the face of deteriorating security.

Never mind, Ashdown

Lord Paddy Ashdown has withdrawn his name from consideration as the UN envoy to Afghanistan, after President Hamid Karzai and other officials expressed opposition last week, concerned about the extent of his power. 

Briton Opposed by Afghans Won’t Take U.N. Post, by Carlotta Gall (The New York Times) 28 Jan. 2008: The Afghan foreign minister, Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, said Mr. Ashdown had been rejected because of negative press and public reaction to his appointment, but diplomats said it had more to do with Mr. Karzai’s desire, one year before Afghan elections, to improve his image by standing up to Western powers. In addition to opposing Mr. Ashdown’s appointment, Mr. Karzai has also opposed a plan to widen the position’s authority.

The Afghan UN Ambassadar Zahir Tanin told the BBC that the preferred candidate is NATO’s deputy commander in Europe, Gen. John McColl.

James Bone of the London Times sees it as “part of an old-fashioned power-struggle that would be instantly recognisable to any village khan - or UN bureaucrat.” NATO wants better “coordination” in the face of soaring opium production and insurgency, but the Afghan government wants to retain control. Karzai may also have been worried about Ashdown’s far-reaching powers in Bosnia – where he could fire officials and overturn laws -- trickling into his position in Afghanistan.

Rifts within the Taliban

Syed Saleem Shahzad of Asia Times reports some striking news in the development of the Taliban insurgency, which could point to increasing internal rifts. He cites anonymous Taliban sources who claim that Taliban chief Mullah Omar has fired Baitullah Mehsud, the alleged mastermind of the Bhutto assassination who had been in charge of stepping up attacks against the Pakistani state.

Now, apparently, Omar is trying to return the focus of the insurgency back to Afghanistan, to fight NATO forces and the nascent Afghan state. The divide apparently came over a difference in opinion about who to focus attacks on. “Mehsud was expected to provide valuable support to the Taliban in Afghanistan, but instead he directed all his fighters against Pakistani security forces,” writes Shahzad.

This shift in Taliban strategy was evident, Shahzad says, with the recent attack in Pakistan’s Balochistan province that destroyed oil tankers headed to NATO’s Kandahar airfield.

Independent panel calls for troops, equipment to keep Canadian troops in Afghanistan

A Canadian independent blue-ribbon panel sets two conditions if Canadian combat troops are to stay in Afghanistan past February 2009. First, other ISAF countries have to send 1,000 combat troops to Kandahar province to reinforce ISAF’s “clear, hold and develop” strategy and train local armed forces.  This apparently is a response to Canadian resentment of many NATO countries sending troops to Afghanistan under caveats that protect them from combat.

Holbrooke on Bush's "ineffective" counter-narcotics plan

Former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke tackles the thorny issue of the Bush administration’s counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan -– calling the billion-dollar-per-year plan the “single most ineffective program in the history of American foreign policy.” According to him, in addition to wasting money, the policy only strengthens the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As most of the poppy crops destroyed are in the insecure south, it pushes penniless farmers with no other options into the arms and influences of the Taliban. Meanwhile, little effort is made to tackle the drug lords and corrupt government officials who enable the trafficking trade.

Holbrooke recommends first boosting security, providing free agricultural support to farmers and building access roads to markets to ensure successful alternate livelihoods, before launching on a complete poppy eradication plan in insecure areas.

Torture of Canadian-transferred detainees continues

The Globe and Mail reports that Afghan detainees turned over by Canadian forces are still being tortured in Afghan prisons, according to governmental documents just released by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

The Globe and Mail has established that the report of the case is recent, written after a Nov. 5, 2007, inspection of the National Directorate of Security prison in Kandahar. That was six months after a supposedly improved transfer agreement was put in place to monitor detainee treatment. The agreement was designed to address problems raised by critics about the ill treatment of prisoners taken by Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan and handed over to Afghan authorities with insufficient follow-up.

See the released documents here.

New Report on the ‘Forgotten War’

The European Council on Foreign Relations has a new report out calling for U.S. and European governments to “overhaul their strategies and strike a 'grand bargain' to stabilise the country.” Significantly, it urges enticing moderates into the fold of governance and legitimacy through money and other incentives.

There will be no stability in Afghanistan unless “moderate” insurgents embrace constitutionalism and enter democratic politics. Since the Bonn Agreement in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the coalition has supported the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alliance, which brought together the main Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara groupings. For obvious reasons it had no significant links to the Pashtuns who make up 42% of Afghanistan’s population.22 After 2001, despite Karzai’s Pashtun background, Pashtun tribal leaders were largely excluded from government and have been ever since. Many have thus aligned themselves with the resurgent Taliban. The coalition and the Afghan government must work to convince them that they can pursue their interests democratically.

There have already been signs that this is at least possible. Though President Karzai’s overtures to reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were rebuffed, the Taliban, while insisting on a number of conditions, have been receptive to the idea of negotiations as proposed within Karzai's "Peace Jirga". The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently gave his backing to these negotiations, again with conditions attached, but the US administration remains sceptical.

Political agreements - like the failed Musa Qala deal in 2006 overseen by the then ISAF commander, General David Richards – should aim to isolate the “hard-core”, many of whom are foreigners, from more moderate, indigenous groups. Such political agreements would also help avoid the violent tactics that may have won NATO military victories last year but cost vital public support because of high civilian casualties.

An effective policy in the short term would be to identify insurgent leaders willing to cut a deal. The coalition could then operate a system of “divide and rule”, whereby intransigent insurgents would see their erstwhile comrades rewarded with a package of financial and other incentives which add up to a better deal than that offered by the Taliban. (emphasis added by editor).

The report urges European governments to send more troops to Afghanistan, eliminate or reduce the national caveats on their troops, and reverse their “underperformance” by increasing reconstruction aid. On the flip side, the report pushes the U.S. to shift its combat strategy to a more political one and abandon its counter-narcotics plans of aerial spraying or buying up opium crops. It recommends the U.S. shift the onus of the problem onto traffickers and concentrate on arresting and prosecuting drug lords and their governmental supporters.

Ashdown’s Challenges

The Asia Times has an insightful look at the challenges that Paddy Ashdown will face as he begins his new role as the UN envoy to Afghanistan. Pakistani bureau chief Syed Saleem Shahzad opines that Ashdown will have to talk with “the real players” – Mullah Omar and al-Qaida -- notwithstanding the recent expulsion of European diplomats for allegedly talking to the Taliban.

Latest Afghan export: How to produce opium

Intrepid reporter Patrick Cockburn finds that Afghans are helping Iraqi farmers grow poppy and produce opium, as traditional crops of oranges and pomegranates prove to be insufficient to provide a living wage. This trend has now moved to Diyala province, where al-Qaeda has a strong hold and has successfully fought back U.S. and Iraqi military forces.

In the absence of governmental support, local farmers have been unable to compete with cheap imported fruits and vegetables and rising cost of fertilizer. Al-Qaeda is apparently in charge of many of the new opium farms, sometimes taking the land of farmers that it has killed.

Retaining young Afghan refugees who have returned

AREU studies the situation of returning second-generation young Afghans who grew up in neighboring Pakistan and Iran (PDF downloads on your computer). It finds that these young men and women find a degree of strength from the fact that they are now in their watan (homeland) even though they know very little about Afghanistan. But they are open to leaving Afghanistan if they face severe material or emotional misery – i.e. they don’t have a strong sense of attachment to Afghanistan.

The report has a few recommendations for retaining these youth, since many have skills, knowledge and worldly experience often lacking within Afghanistan. It urges the Afghan government to extend moral, physical and employment support to the returnees, especially those without established much-needed social networks, improve their access to quality education, and develop a realistic and consistent plan to manage the return of highly-skilled youth and their families.

Gates irks NATO allies

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has irked NATO allies after telling the LA Times that European allies do not know how to fight insurgencies, often using inappropriate tactics and overly forceful airstrikes, which could be helping the Taliban’s cause. Ironically, as The Guardian points out, this argument is often used by British defense officials to attack American military operations.

This episode stirs up latent tensions and disagreements on how best to fight the burgeoning Taliban insurgency and keep the NATO mission afloat. NATO officials have in the past blamed insufficient U.S. troops at the beginning of the 2001 invasion for the current Taliban resurgence.

Paddy Ashdown to be new UN Rep

It’s official. Paddy Ashdown, the former EU-UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, has accepted the post as the new UN envoy to Afghanistan, according to a source quoted by Reuters. The UN Security Council is expected to approve and publicly announce this on Monday. Ashdown's biggest challenge will be coordinating and reconciling military and civilian efforts from all the various countries involved in Afghan reconstruction and security, while ensuring that the Afghan government is not left behind in these efforts. See Afghanistan Watch’s earlier post on this.

Pakistan’s intelligence services

The New York Times has an excellent piece on Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency losing control over some of the groups of militants that it fostered since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These militants have now turned against the military and are contributing to attacks directed at the army, intelligence agencies and the government.

The article also sheds light on the ISI’s role in rigging the 2002 national election, and the defection of intelligence officials to the extremist militant cause.

Development of media in Afghanistan

An interesting look into the development of news media in post-Taliban Afghanistan. This U.S. Institute of Peace report explores the rapid rise of local media, especially radio, and offers a useful case study to study the development of vibrant media in post-conflict societies and their inherent fragility after initial successes.

A disheartening account of Afghan Police

New York Times reporter C.J. Chivers has a disheartening account of the state of Afghan police. He finds overworked and grossly underpaid and under-equipped policemen on the verge of mutinying, in charge of enormous swaths of land.

In its simplest distillation, the strategy driving this American-led war is straightforward. Western troops are an interim force to provide security, spur development and mentor indigenous security forces until the Afghan leadership can govern alone.

But in the past two years, the insurgency has blossomed, making control of many provinces a contest. The Afghan Army, under American tutelage, has made considerable progress, American officers say.

The police lag far behind. Lightly equipped, marginally trained, undermined by corruption and poor discipline, they remain weak, though their expected role is daunting. They are not asked merely to police a country that lacks the rule of law. They are being used to fight a war.

Meanwhile, former Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann is recommending a draft to build up the Afghan National Army.

More troops to Afghanistan

The Pentagon has asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates for 3,000 more troops to be sent to Afghanistan, to counter a potential Taliban spring offensive.

Gates has in the past criticized NATO members for not providing more combat troops and equipment and has said that 7,500 additional troops are required to fulfill all command requirements. If approved, this infusion of American troops would indicate that the U.S. is agreeing to shoulder some of the extra troop burden. William H. McMichael of the Army Times writes:

If Gates decides to approve the new request, the troops — a Marine Air-Ground Task Force and a battalion that would focus on the training of Afghan army and police units — would be in place by April and spend seven months operating in southern Afghanistan, the area most vexed by Taliban attacks. It would be a “one-time-only” deployment and the troops, who would be assigned to Regional Command South, would not be replaced by additional U.S. forces, (Gates spokesman Geoff) Morrell said.

Morrell also said that troops would not be drawn from Iraq.

Jan. 15 update: 3,200 Marines are being told to prepare to be sent to Afghanistan, according to The Associated Press. Secretary Robert Gates is expected to sign the formal “one-time, seven-month” deployment orders soon.

“Greatest military threat to Pakistan”?

Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban leader of the newly formed coalition Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, who has been accused by Pakistani intelligence of masterminding Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, is getting some media interest.

Blast from the past

President of the Afghanistan Foreign Press Association Vanni Cappelli writes about an American diplomat raising questions about the threat of the Pakistani military – almost 40 years ago. Cappelli digs up a 1970 New York Times op-ed by Chester Bowles who predicted that Pakistani military would be the strategic threat of the future, not the then-burning Vietnam.

Afghans killed “needlessly”

A few U.S. Marines shot and killed 19 Afghan civilians “needlessly” after a suicide bomb struck their convoy in March, a former member of the Marines unit testified at a military court yesterday.

Nathaniel Travers testified that only a few gunners fired until the captain ordered the firing to stop. None of the marines were seriously injured in the suicide blast, which killed one bystander.

This testimony is interesting because the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has earlier claimed that the marines had in fact used “indiscriminate and excessive force” in shooting into the crowd after the attack.

Shortly after the shootings, an army commander apologized and paid condolence money to families of the victims, but this apology was later denounced by senior Marine officials as premature. This was one of a spate of civilian casualty incidents last spring that elicited severe condemnation from the Afghan government and international observers.

Bagram holds more than twice as many as Guantanamo

The secretive American detention center at Bagram base now holds more than twice as many prisoners as Guantanamo Bay, according to a New York Times report. Despite American efforts to shut down the base prison and transfer detainees to Afghan facilities and oversight, the number of prisoners has continued to grow as Guantanamo stopped taking in detainees.

The Afghan facility can only hold half the people that it was initially designed for, and construction has been slowed down by security and legal issues. Meanwhile human rights groups say treatment of detainees at Bagram, which was formerly abysmal culminating with the beating deaths of two detainees, has improved overall, but overcrowding complaints persist.

Intrigue of expelled diplomats deepens

The intrigue surrounding the expulsion of EU acting representative in Afghanistan, Mervyn Patterson, and UN diplomat Michael Semple, is deepening. A London Times report over the weekend quoted Afghan government sources claiming that the two were trying to “turn” the brother of the late Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah.

New covert US push in Pakistan?

The US is considering sending the CIA on more aggressive, covert missions into the chaotic tribal regions of Pakistan. The New York Times article quotes anonymous senior administration sources saying that the possible missions would be very secretive but would involve CIA cooperation with Special Operations forces. These options are being discussed in response to intelligence reports that see new Taliban efforts to destabilize the Pakistani government. (Also see the earlier Afghanistan Watch post on this)

Blogger “Charlie” who writes for the respected “Abu Muqawama” counterinsurgency blog thinks that Pakistan lacks two conditions that could make these missions successful:

1) A welcoming and cooperative government, whose armed forces take the lead in ground operations.
2) Little in the way of media coverage or Pentagon/Foggy Bottom meddling.

Islamist split in Pakistan

Nicholas Schmidle writes on the split within the Islamist movements in Pakistan in this week's New York Times Magazine. The hard-line Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, reportedly the political front for jihadi groups including the Taliban, seems to have toned down its anti-American and pro-jihadi rhetoric, as it prepares to contest the upcoming Pakistani parliamentary elections. This issue of whether to participate in the elections or boycott them has caused the powerful Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal alliance to split. This alliance won 10 percent of the popular vote last time around and formed provincial governments in two of the four Pakistani provinces.

In the past year, the J.U.I. chief (Maulana Fazlur Rehman) has tried to disassociate himself from the new generation of Taliban wreaking havoc not only across the border in Afghanistan, as they have for years, but also increasingly in Pakistan. At the same time, Rehman has been trying to persuade foreign ambassadors and establishment politicians here that he is the only one capable of dealing with those same Taliban. In the process, some Islamists maintain that Rehman has sold them out. Last April, a rocket whistled over the sugarcane fields that separate Rehman’s house from the main road before crashing into the veranda of his brother’s home next door. A few months later, Pakistani intelligence agencies discovered a hit list, drafted by the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, with Rehman’s name on it.

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Rehman doesn’t pretend to be a liberal; he wants to see Pakistan become a truly Islamic state. But the moral vigilantism and the proliferation of Taliban-inspired militias along the border with Afghanistan is not how he saw it happening. The emergence of Taliban-inspired groups in Pakistan has placed immense strain on the country’s Islamist community, a strain that may only increase with the assassination of Bhutto.

Afghans’ Experience with Corruption

With Afghanistan often at the bottom of international corruption lists and indices, an interesting report from Integrity Watch Afghanistan studies what Afghans consider to be corrupt behavior. It finds that while Afghans tend to have higher patience with petty corruption, justifying them on the grounds of low civil salaries, there is no social tolerance for large bribes and greed, which are considered morally wrong and un-Islamic. Many find corruption as more pervasive now than in previous administrations and regimes and see it as the most de-legitimizing factor in government.

People often emphasized with a certain resignation that due to the strong and interwoven spider web of illicit networks, which are closely collaborating from district to provincial and central level, it was difficult to identify feasible solutions. Aware of the fact that the whole administrative and political system needs to be changed, interviewees believed that small steps, like strengthening the provincial councils, aiming at behavioural change through religious education, and awareness raising via media could build the ground for reform programs and a slow change in culture.

This report follows a previous study done in January 2007 that examined the Afghan perceptions of corruption. It found that in 2006, half of the 1250 Afghan respondents reported paying bribes while two-thirds faced family financial problems due to corruption – alarming numbers, indeed.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan

Col. Dennis Young of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College adds to the chorus of voices urging the Bush administration to divert troops, effort and financial aid to Afghanistan. He also suggests five adjustments to current ISAF and U.S. strategies:

2007 – a year of records

2007 was a year of records in Afghanistan – most of it violent: the highest US military toll, most suicide bombings and record production of opium. More than 6,500 people, including 110 US troops and almost 4500 militants, were killed last year. Poppy production soared to 93 percent of the world’s supply. The Taliban also seems to be growing more sophisticated in its attacks and targets.

Record level of violence in Afghanistan, by Jason Straziuso (The Associated Press) 1 Jan. 2007:  Taliban fighters avoided head-on battles with US, NATO and Afghan army forces in 2007, resorting instead to ambushes and suicide bombings. But militants did attack the weakest of Afghan forces to devastating effect.

More than 925 Afghan policemen died in Taliban ambushes in 2007, including 16 police killed Saturday in Helmand province during an assault on a checkpoint.

"The Taliban attack who they perceive to be the most vulnerable, and in this case it's the police," said Lt. Col. Dave Johnson, a spokesman for the US troops who train Afghan police and soldiers. "They don't travel in large formations like the army does. That puts them in an area of vulnerability."

Taliban suicide attackers set off a record number of attacks this year — more than 140 — and in many ways they became more sophisticated.

In February a suicide bomber killed 23 people outside the main US base at Bagram during a visit by US Vice President Dick Cheney. A suicide bomber in June killed 35 people on a police bus. And in November a suicide bombing that killed six lawmakers also left a total of 77 people dead after security guards opened fire on a crowd of onlookers. Sixty-one school children were killed.

Expelling Diplomats

The expulsion of two senior diplomats from Afghanistan last week is causing much consternation. Irishman Michael Semple, the EU acting representative in Afghanistan, and Mervyn Patterson, from Northern Ireland, working with the UN assistance mission, were accused of jeopardizing national security after reportedly talking to the Taliban during a trip to Musa Qala in Helmand Province. They were stripped of their diplomatic immunity and expelled from Afghanistan last week.

Rory Stewart writes in the London Times that “it would seem that they have been expelled for precisely what made them uniquely useful to Afghanistan and the international community: their courage, relationships, energy and skills, which took them to the most remote and dangerous areas.”

What makes the expulsion particularly galling, says Stewart, is that diplomats are normally expelled by hostile dictatorships, not budding democracies.

(Afghanistan) is supposed to be a constitutional state with an elected parliament, financed with billions of dollars of international aid and supported by more than 40,000 foreign troops. There is supposed to be no difference between the Afghan government and its western allies.
Why, then, would the Afghan government insult its closest and most powerful partners by expelling their senior diplomats? Why does the Afghan government not want highly informed foreigners to meet locals in Musa Qala?
The unprecedented western investment in Afghanistan assumes that the Afghan government is serious about eliminating drugs and defeating the Taliban. Did Semple and Patterson discover something different? Or is the Kabul government simply fed up with foreigners who micromanage and second-guess their decisions?
Whatever the reason, both Afghanistan and the international community lose by this expulsion.

Bhutto assassination reverberates across Afghanistan

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto last week continues to ring across Afghanistan, as American officials worry that it heralds the rise of a more virulent extremism against the Pakistani government that could undermine the Afghan mission. It could also damage the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two neighbors, and hurt efforts to fight cross-border terrorism.

A roundup from December

Here’s a short news roundup of significant developments in or concerning Afghanistan from December:

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
The House approved the 2008 defense authorization bill, which in addition to providing $189.4 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, creates an office for a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and a bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting for more oversight of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The SIGAR is a much-needed agency to track down corruption and mismanagement in Afghanistan, much as its equivalent has done in Iraq. With this extra level of oversight and ensuring that reconstruction aid is invested properly, it will hopefully help get Afghan reconstruction back on track.

Brown's Plan for Afghanistan
UK prime minister Gordon Brown outlined his new plan for Afghanistan that included increasing aid by £450 million and tough benchmarks for Afghan security forces, encouraging Afghans to take responsibility for their own security.

Brown told MPs that aid would be given for "high impact" projects such as better roads, power supplies and clean water, as well as loans for small businesses and funding for civic groups and community development projects to improve local and national government.

You can read a transcript of Brown’s plan here. His emphasis on Afghans taking “ownership” and responsibility for their future and security is important.

In testimony before the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence on Dec. 10, RAND analyst Seth Jones explained the fast growth of the Afghan insurgency, thusly:

“The answer is simple,” one senior Afghan government official told me in October 2007. “The people are losing faith in the government. Our security forces cannot protect local villages, and our institutions struggle to deliver basic services.”

He testified that people are turning to the Taliban, not because they believe in extremism but because they are losing patience with the government’s inefficacy and corruption.

Indeed, the primary challenge in Afghanistan is one of governance. Governance includes the set of institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.11 It involves the government’s ability at the national or sub-national level to establish law and order, effectively manage resources, and implement sound policies. An insurgency reflects a process of alternative state building, where insurgents compete to provide governance to the population. Insurgents take advantage of weak governance and assume state-like functions. They tax and set up administrative structures for the population they control.

A Key Test for the Afghan National Army
The Afghan National Army seems to have proven itself in a key test last month – retaking the small dusty, but strategic toehold town of Musa Qala from the Taliban. Its symbolism was tied mainly to the fact that it was the only significant town controlled by the Taliban. As Guardian reporter Jason Burke put it, “For both sides, the struggle for the small country town represents in microcosm the battle for the country as a whole.”

But the offensive also spotlights the fact that despite its success, the Afghan National Army remains severely under-equipped and under-helped.

While U.S. officials cite the achievements of the Afghan military, the force has historically suffered from high attrition rates. It has also lacked sufficient military aid and trainers, and has been hobbled by old weaponry, Afghan defense officials say.