Retaining young Afghan refugees who have returned

AREU studies the situation of returning second-generation young Afghans who grew up in neighboring Pakistan and Iran (PDF downloads on your computer). It finds that these young men and women find a degree of strength from the fact that they are now in their watan (homeland) even though they know very little about Afghanistan. But they are open to leaving Afghanistan if they face severe material or emotional misery – i.e. they don’t have a strong sense of attachment to Afghanistan.

The report has a few recommendations for retaining these youth, since many have skills, knowledge and worldly experience often lacking within Afghanistan. It urges the Afghan government to extend moral, physical and employment support to the returnees, especially those without established much-needed social networks, improve their access to quality education, and develop a realistic and consistent plan to manage the return of highly-skilled youth and their families.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan

Col. Dennis Young of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College adds to the chorus of voices urging the Bush administration to divert troops, effort and financial aid to Afghanistan. He also suggests five adjustments to current ISAF and U.S. strategies:

Assessing Afghanistan: NATO's 63 new metrics

Reuters reports yesterday that NATO has drawn up a "standardized system" of 63 metrics it will use to track progress in Afghanistan. U.S. Army Gen. John Craddock said that "I would submit to you that, to date, most of the assessments of progress have been against anecdotal information," or measured in terms of outputs such as schools built or roads paved. "All good things," he notes, "But the question in my mind is: What's the effect it's produced?" Were the roads blocked? Were the classrooms empty?

I find it more than a little bit troubling that NATO is only getting to this discussion six years in to the intervention. This sort of thinking should have been integrated from day one. In their defense, they probably had metrics, and are now revisiting them to make them meaningful.

It is, of course, a devilishly complicated undertaking. Which metrics to choose? How to weight one against another? And how to gather reliable data from the multitude of unverified sources that include donor countries, the UN, GOA, NGOs? Everyone is keeping score, but based on a different set of rules. Just thinking about it makes my head spin. I would love to see the 63 metrics NATO settled on, and hear how it plans to measure them (if anyone has insights on this, drop a line or a comment...)

NATO revamps measures of Afghan progress, by Andrew Gray (Reuters) 5 December 2007: WASHINGTON -- NATO has developed a standardized system for tracking progress in Afghanistan because the war so far has been judged largely using anecdotal evidence, the alliance's top commander said on Tuesday.

             

Quoteboard

"I'm not in the business of turning down jobs I haven't been offered."
  - Paddy Ashdown

"I can put a guy out on a ridge with an AK-47 and have him take a couple of shots. The Americans will shoot back with their big guns and disrupt the whole valley...Being an insurgent would be so easy."
  - Sgt. Jacob Stockdill

"All you have to do is not screw up, and, even if you do, you just blame it on the Americans."
  - Capt. Chris Rowe
MORE

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE

Exports up 13 percent in first two quarters

Every year, Afghanistan imports about $5 billion dollars in goods and exports just $500 million. But this year, according to a government spokesman, exports are at least on the rise. In the first two quarters, exports have gone up 12% and 13% respectively when compared with last year.

Afghan exports include handcrafts, fresh and dry fruit, minerals, leather products, cotton and precious stones and have gone to  India, China, Pakistan, UAE, Europe and the US. The rise in exports is attributable, to some extent, on the removal of customs, barriers, and other red tape. A good trend, but obviously still a long way to go.

Afghanistan's exports up by 13pc in 2nd quarter. (Pajhwok Afghan News) by Zainab Muhammadi, KABUL, Oct 21: Afghanistan's exports had registered 13 percent increase during the second quarter of the current Afghan year as compared to the same period during last year, officials said on Sunday.

A look inside the Asia Foundation survey

The Asia Foundation released it's third survey of the Afghan people today. Polling in Afghanistan should by no means be seen as dispositive, but this data can provide insights unavailable elsewhere (especially compared with prior baseline surveys by the Asia Foundation in 2004 and 2006). Here's a look inside...

Predictably, media reports framed the poll as a referendum on security (see AFP: “Security fears up sharply among Afghans: survey”) It’s true that pessimism about security rose among Afghans--with 32 percent citing security as their top concern (up from 22 percent last year.)

But the picture is more complicated, since security concerns vary significantly by region and two thirds of Afghans felt that security in their area was good. Moreover, among those who believe the country is headed in the right direction, good security is cited as the second most important reason (34%) after development.

So the Survey paints a nuanced picture and provides some fascinating data on everything from support for traditional institutions (such as Shuras and Jirga) to democracy and women’s rights. A few trends worth noting:

Right Direction / Wrong Direction:

• People are still optimistic, even if there was a slight decline in those who said the country was headed in the right direction (from 44 percent to 42 percent).
• Three-quarters of Afghans continue to assess government performance positively (i.e. either strongly (25%) or somewhat strongly (55%).)
• Afghans continue to espouse confidence in national security forces (both army and police) as well as in traditional institutions such as Shuras and Jirgas. However, “less than half of the respondents had confidence in the government's justice system, political parties and local militias.”
•  Corruption is an issue for many Afghans, but it is not clear that it has grown more acute. Some poll questions suggest an increase in perceptions of corruption while others suggest a decrease.
  

Security:

• Among people who felt the country was going in the wrong direction, security was cited as the top reason. This may seem unsurprising, until you realize that even in last year’s survey security was only rarely mentioned as a reason for a “wrong direction” response.
• On the other hand, among those who said the country was going in the right direction, good security was cited as the second biggest reason (34%).
• Perceptions of security varied greatly by region. Nationwide, “sixty-six percent of the respondents felt that security in their area was good or quite good, and 50 percent said they rarely or never feared for their own or their family's safety. Eighty-two percent said no one in their family had been a victim of any crime or violence during the last one year.” 

Reconstruction:

• Last year, respondents cited “rebuilding of the country” as only the fourth most important reason why the country was headed in the right direction; this year it became the most important reason for believing so (39%). It’s not clear whether people feel reconstruction is going better, or that the other trends they cited as reasons for optimism last year (security, peace, disarmament) are simply going worse. MORE
  

Latest Kajaki Dam cost estimates

The latest USAID estimate for the Kajaki Dam appears in today's International Water Power: $150m for the first year, and up to $500m total. Actual cost will probably be much higher -- and still worth every penny.

Progress on the dam is the bellwether of efforts in Helmand: restoring hydroelectric power would have massive symbolic and pragmatic consequences (not to mention create 4,000 jobs...) So it's a huge reconstruction priority--but one which requires sustained security to implement...

• Upgrade planned for Afghan dam International Water Power, UK 09/26/2007.

By the Numbers

Some interesting (and encouraging) figures from Ann Marlowe's Wall Street Journal commentary last month:

• Afghan mobile phone subscribers, September 2006:    2 million
• Current subscribers:                                                 3 million
• Approximate percent of Afghans this comprises:       10%
• Percent of Nangarhar residents with a mobile phone: 31%
• Percent of Laghman residents with a mobile phone:    77%

• Approximate population of Khost province:            1,000,000
• Estimated people from Khost living overseas:           200,000
• Annual remittances sent back to Khost :                   $6-12 million
• USAID spending in Khost, 2002-2006:                        $10 million

Source: Ann Marlowe, On the Road to Jalalabad

Afghanistan's "land mafia"

A 200 word piece today by the BBC highlights an important trend and leaves us wanting more details. The emergence of the so-called "land mafia" (a term that probably makes it sound more centrally organized than it us...) has broad repercussions, especially since Afghanistan lacks enforceable, consistent land rights. Multiple land registries allow well-connected strongmen to stake claims with impunity, and the lack of a functioning legal system leaves victims with no recourse.

The lack of security vis a vis land and property rights remains one of the major impediments to investment in Afghanistan. This briefly received some attention in 2003 when refugees streamed home -- only to find someone else there. It's still a big issue today, but the last serious work I've seen on this is the AREU's 2003 report ( Land Rights in Crisis). Sounds to me like a prize-winning expose just waiting for the right journalist...

Powerful 'grab Afghanistan land' By Stephanie Irvine (BBC)  Sept 6: The Afghan urban development minister says land is being appropriated illegally by powerful individuals at a rate of two sq km (0.8 sq miles) a day. Former military commanders, members of parliament and senior officials are seizing land and then selling it on illegally, says Yousaf Pashthun.

Image: Urban Development Minister Mohammad Yousaf Pashthun. BBC.