Assessing Afghanistan: NATO's 63 new metrics

Reuters reports yesterday that NATO has drawn up a "standardized system" of 63 metrics it will use to track progress in Afghanistan. U.S. Army Gen. John Craddock said that "I would submit to you that, to date, most of the assessments of progress have been against anecdotal information," or measured in terms of outputs such as schools built or roads paved. "All good things," he notes, "But the question in my mind is: What's the effect it's produced?" Were the roads blocked? Were the classrooms empty?

I find it more than a little bit troubling that NATO is only getting to this discussion six years in to the intervention. This sort of thinking should have been integrated from day one. In their defense, they probably had metrics, and are now revisiting them to make them meaningful.

It is, of course, a devilishly complicated undertaking. Which metrics to choose? How to weight one against another? And how to gather reliable data from the multitude of unverified sources that include donor countries, the UN, GOA, NGOs? Everyone is keeping score, but based on a different set of rules. Just thinking about it makes my head spin. I would love to see the 63 metrics NATO settled on, and hear how it plans to measure them (if anyone has insights on this, drop a line or a comment...)

NATO revamps measures of Afghan progress, by Andrew Gray (Reuters) 5 December 2007: WASHINGTON -- NATO has developed a standardized system for tracking progress in Afghanistan because the war so far has been judged largely using anecdotal evidence, the alliance's top commander said on Tuesday.

             

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE

Fighting hunger in Afghanistan

Rick Corsino, Country Director of the World Food Programme in Afghanistan, argues today in the National Post that citizens and the media tend to overlook humanitarian work in Afghanistan.  "Most journalists," he notes "are more interested in going on 'embeds' with military forces than hanging out with -- superficially at least -- the less fascinating humanitarians. If journalists were to embed with the World Food Programme in Afghanistan, they would find another, less dramatic Afghan war -- the war on hunger -- and the large and innovative international effort that is fighting it."

Afghanistan Watch is guilty of this "security bias," as are the various media outlets. I know we'd like to feature more stories and analysis on humanitarian and development work, but it tends to be harder to learn of new developments in these fields. If you see some good pieces, or have ideas for what you'd like to see, please send them along...

Fighting Afghanistan's other war  by Rick Corsino: I was recently in Kandahar City, where the news bulletins will tell you the heart of the Afghan insurgency lies. Certainly, security is a major issue, but I was most struck by the literacy projects I visited, where I spent time with some of the poorest women in Afghanistan -- and that means the poorest in the world. MORE

A look inside the Asia Foundation survey

The Asia Foundation released it's third survey of the Afghan people today. Polling in Afghanistan should by no means be seen as dispositive, but this data can provide insights unavailable elsewhere (especially compared with prior baseline surveys by the Asia Foundation in 2004 and 2006). Here's a look inside...

Predictably, media reports framed the poll as a referendum on security (see AFP: “Security fears up sharply among Afghans: survey”) It’s true that pessimism about security rose among Afghans--with 32 percent citing security as their top concern (up from 22 percent last year.)

But the picture is more complicated, since security concerns vary significantly by region and two thirds of Afghans felt that security in their area was good. Moreover, among those who believe the country is headed in the right direction, good security is cited as the second most important reason (34%) after development.

So the Survey paints a nuanced picture and provides some fascinating data on everything from support for traditional institutions (such as Shuras and Jirga) to democracy and women’s rights. A few trends worth noting:

Right Direction / Wrong Direction:

• People are still optimistic, even if there was a slight decline in those who said the country was headed in the right direction (from 44 percent to 42 percent).
• Three-quarters of Afghans continue to assess government performance positively (i.e. either strongly (25%) or somewhat strongly (55%).)
• Afghans continue to espouse confidence in national security forces (both army and police) as well as in traditional institutions such as Shuras and Jirgas. However, “less than half of the respondents had confidence in the government's justice system, political parties and local militias.”
•  Corruption is an issue for many Afghans, but it is not clear that it has grown more acute. Some poll questions suggest an increase in perceptions of corruption while others suggest a decrease.
  

Security:

• Among people who felt the country was going in the wrong direction, security was cited as the top reason. This may seem unsurprising, until you realize that even in last year’s survey security was only rarely mentioned as a reason for a “wrong direction” response.
• On the other hand, among those who said the country was going in the right direction, good security was cited as the second biggest reason (34%).
• Perceptions of security varied greatly by region. Nationwide, “sixty-six percent of the respondents felt that security in their area was good or quite good, and 50 percent said they rarely or never feared for their own or their family's safety. Eighty-two percent said no one in their family had been a victim of any crime or violence during the last one year.” 

Reconstruction:

• Last year, respondents cited “rebuilding of the country” as only the fourth most important reason why the country was headed in the right direction; this year it became the most important reason for believing so (39%). It’s not clear whether people feel reconstruction is going better, or that the other trends they cited as reasons for optimism last year (security, peace, disarmament) are simply going worse. MORE
  

Independent study shows strong gains in Afghan health

The World Bank announced today that the preliminary findings of a Johns Hopkins University (JHU) household survey suggests that infant mortality rates dropped from 165 per 1,000 live births in 2001 to 135 per 1,000 live births in 2006 -- meaning that 40,000 fewer infants are dying each year now compared to when the Taliban were in power.

That's a lot of lives saved. And the number is significantly higher, since health care for adults has improved markedly as well. A parallel study assessing Afghanistan's health facilities, and observed a "25 percent improvement in overall quality of health services since  2004." The Hopkins assessment "surveyed more than 600 health facilities each year since 2004 and used a Balance Score Card (BSC) to measure different aspects  of quality of services (and) found improvements in virtually all aspects of care in almost every province."

Access to care also improved substantially: in its survey of 8,000+ households nationwide, Hopkins found that "the proportion of women receiving antenatal care increased from 5 percent in 2003 to 30 percent in  2006" and "the proportion  of pregnant women who received attendance by a skilled health worker increased 5 percent to nearly 19 percent." MORE

More aid for Afghanistan--or just better aid?

How can we improve the quality of aid delivery in Afghanistan? Many people would point to specific concerns vis a vis Afghanistan's economy, security situation, etc, but it's also worth taking a step back and asking: What are the criteria for successful aid in any country?

There are nearly as many theories on this as there are development economists. But one of the best concise summaries can be found in an important article in Foreign Affairs by Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik, and Arvind Subramanian.

In it Birdsall, Rodrik and Subramian, three top scholars on the impact of foreign assistance, highlight areas in which aid has been successful: eradicating smallpox, lowering infant mortality, increasing school enrollment, etc. Then comes the rub: in each case, they note that “What these successes share is that they were narrowly targeted at specific objectives. Assistance does work well, but only when the recipient countries do the right things to help themselves and have the capacity and the leadership to spend the money wisely.”:

But aid has not been associated with the sustained increases in productivity and wages that ultimately matter. . .There are many reasons for the mixed performance of foreign assistance. Donors themselves cause many of the problems. Recipient countries can be overwhelmed by the multiplicity of donors pursuing many, even inconsistent, objectives, disbursing aid to innumerable projects and imposing a plethora of conditions on its use. These factors contribute to rather than offset a poor country's lack of institutional capacity. On top of that, there is the natural volatility and uncertainty of foreign aid, which make it difficult for recipient governments to plan their budgets. For more than a decade, the bureaucracies of donor states and organizations have been unable, despite good intentions and constant resolve, to change the political incentives and constraints that impede the reform of their aid-delivery apparatuses.

Probably more important, however, are institutional deficiencies on the recipients' side. Aid is only as good as the ability of a recipient's economy and government to use it prudently and productively. Thus, the fundamental dilemma: countries most in need of aid are often those least able to use it well. That sets limits on the extent to which large infusions of foreign funds can make a difference.The greatest example of the success of aid -- the Marshall Plan -- illustrates the importance of homegrown institutional competence. Because the institutions and capabilities of the United   Kingdom, France, and Germany survived the war to a large extent, even their war-ravaged economies were able to exploit fully the potential of financial assistance.

Read the complete article for more...

Pakistani/Afghan cooperation on a border issue--Polio

"What better way to get peace in the region than health diplomacy...As far as health is concerned, security really doesn't concern us."
                      - Pakistani Health Minister Mohammad Naseer Khan, speaking near the Khyber Pass

An encouraging, if limited, development: cross-border health cooperation...

Pakistan, Afghans aim to eradicate polio on border
TORKHAM, Pakistan-Afghan Border, Dec 12 (Reuters) By Zeeshan Haider: Shrugging off the danger of militant violence, Pakistan and Afghanistan on Tuesday launched a drive to eradicate polio from the rugged tribal lands on both sides of their border MORE

Oxfam report: Serve the Essentials

This Oxfam report, subtitled “What governments and donors must do to improve,” approaches South Asia's development from a comparative perspective which, according to Jean Drèze of the Delhi School of Economics, “has been overlooked.” According to Drèze, the report “makes excellent use of this perspective by scrutinizing regional contrasts in South Asia -– between as well as within countries.”

There are some good insights and data here, but the recommendations tend to be overbroad to usefully apply to individual countries.  Below are a few of the useful prescriptions: 

Afghan women still have little voice in family planning

Family planning increased in some provinces, according to USAID figures, but women still have little say in these decisions, according to a Tufts study:

Contraception use at 10% (St. LouisPost-Dispatch) by Phillip O'Connor, DASHT-E QAL'EH — …Only 10 percent of married Afghan women aged 15 to 49 use any method of contraception, according to the Population Reference Bureau in Washington.

Voices of Afghanistan

Voices of Afghanistan: An Evaluation Study
by Seema Patel

The initial findings of the CSIS 2006 Measures of Progress report? "Afghans are less hopeful today than they were a year ago" and "The state-building mission has lost ground, and is slipping further into the 'danger zone'." 

To this end, six Afghan interviewers (three men and three women), trained in social science research, conducted 1,000 qualitative interviews over a six-week period covering the five pillars of reconstruction: security, governance, justice, economic opportunity, and social well-being.  The interviewers covered thirteen provinces—encompassing all five regions of Afghanistan—and captured a balanced sampling of ethnic groups...