Eradicating opium through development

More disconcerting news coming out of an international Afghanistan donors conference in Tokyo this week. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime issued its annual winter survey of poppy planting patterns and predicted a poppy harvest close to last year’s record.

Afghanistan could fail as a state

A new independent study by retired Marine Corps Gen. James Jones and former U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering has a dire warning for Afghanistan, according to The Associated Press which obtained an advance copy.

Study: Afghanistan could fail as a state, Anne Flaherty (The Associated Press), 29 January 2008. Afghanistan risks sliding into a failed state and becoming the "forgotten war" because of deteriorating international support and a growing violent insurgency, according to an independent study.
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"Afghanistan stands at a crossroads," concludes the study, an advance copy of which was obtained by The Associated Press. "The progress achieved after six years of international engagement is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country."

A major issue has been trying to win the war with "too few military forces and insufficient economic aid," the study adds.

Among the group's nearly three dozen recommendations: increase NATO force levels and military equipment sent to Afghanistan, decouple U.S. management of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, establish a special envoy to coordinate all U.S. policy on Afghanistan, and champion a unified strategy among partner nations to stabilize the country in five years.

You can read the study here.

Also read the Atlantic Council report released the same day, Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action. It states bluntly that "NATO is not winning in Afghanistan" and urges quick changes in course, including a coherent security and reconstruction assessment, appointment of a UN high commissioner, and the creation of a comprehensive regional strategy including all neighboring actors like Pakistan and Iran.

A third interesting report comes from Oxfam which recommends changing the "centralized, top-heavy and insufficient" aid-distribution process to a more indigenous approach that emphasizes "more even distribution of aid, greater alignment with national and local priorities and increased use of Afghan resources" and focuses more on rural development and agricultural aid.

Never mind, Ashdown

Lord Paddy Ashdown has withdrawn his name from consideration as the UN envoy to Afghanistan, after President Hamid Karzai and other officials expressed opposition last week, concerned about the extent of his power. 

Briton Opposed by Afghans Won’t Take U.N. Post, by Carlotta Gall (The New York Times) 28 Jan. 2008: The Afghan foreign minister, Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, said Mr. Ashdown had been rejected because of negative press and public reaction to his appointment, but diplomats said it had more to do with Mr. Karzai’s desire, one year before Afghan elections, to improve his image by standing up to Western powers. In addition to opposing Mr. Ashdown’s appointment, Mr. Karzai has also opposed a plan to widen the position’s authority.

The Afghan UN Ambassadar Zahir Tanin told the BBC that the preferred candidate is NATO’s deputy commander in Europe, Gen. John McColl.

James Bone of the London Times sees it as “part of an old-fashioned power-struggle that would be instantly recognisable to any village khan - or UN bureaucrat.” NATO wants better “coordination” in the face of soaring opium production and insurgency, but the Afghan government wants to retain control. Karzai may also have been worried about Ashdown’s far-reaching powers in Bosnia – where he could fire officials and overturn laws -- trickling into his position in Afghanistan.

Independent panel calls for troops, equipment to keep Canadian troops in Afghanistan

A Canadian independent blue-ribbon panel sets two conditions if Canadian combat troops are to stay in Afghanistan past February 2009. First, other ISAF countries have to send 1,000 combat troops to Kandahar province to reinforce ISAF’s “clear, hold and develop” strategy and train local armed forces.  This apparently is a response to Canadian resentment of many NATO countries sending troops to Afghanistan under caveats that protect them from combat.

New Report on the ‘Forgotten War’

The European Council on Foreign Relations has a new report out calling for U.S. and European governments to “overhaul their strategies and strike a 'grand bargain' to stabilise the country.” Significantly, it urges enticing moderates into the fold of governance and legitimacy through money and other incentives.

There will be no stability in Afghanistan unless “moderate” insurgents embrace constitutionalism and enter democratic politics. Since the Bonn Agreement in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the coalition has supported the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alliance, which brought together the main Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara groupings. For obvious reasons it had no significant links to the Pashtuns who make up 42% of Afghanistan’s population.22 After 2001, despite Karzai’s Pashtun background, Pashtun tribal leaders were largely excluded from government and have been ever since. Many have thus aligned themselves with the resurgent Taliban. The coalition and the Afghan government must work to convince them that they can pursue their interests democratically.

There have already been signs that this is at least possible. Though President Karzai’s overtures to reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were rebuffed, the Taliban, while insisting on a number of conditions, have been receptive to the idea of negotiations as proposed within Karzai's "Peace Jirga". The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently gave his backing to these negotiations, again with conditions attached, but the US administration remains sceptical.

Political agreements - like the failed Musa Qala deal in 2006 overseen by the then ISAF commander, General David Richards – should aim to isolate the “hard-core”, many of whom are foreigners, from more moderate, indigenous groups. Such political agreements would also help avoid the violent tactics that may have won NATO military victories last year but cost vital public support because of high civilian casualties.

An effective policy in the short term would be to identify insurgent leaders willing to cut a deal. The coalition could then operate a system of “divide and rule”, whereby intransigent insurgents would see their erstwhile comrades rewarded with a package of financial and other incentives which add up to a better deal than that offered by the Taliban. (emphasis added by editor).

The report urges European governments to send more troops to Afghanistan, eliminate or reduce the national caveats on their troops, and reverse their “underperformance” by increasing reconstruction aid. On the flip side, the report pushes the U.S. to shift its combat strategy to a more political one and abandon its counter-narcotics plans of aerial spraying or buying up opium crops. It recommends the U.S. shift the onus of the problem onto traffickers and concentrate on arresting and prosecuting drug lords and their governmental supporters.

Gates irks NATO allies

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has irked NATO allies after telling the LA Times that European allies do not know how to fight insurgencies, often using inappropriate tactics and overly forceful airstrikes, which could be helping the Taliban’s cause. Ironically, as The Guardian points out, this argument is often used by British defense officials to attack American military operations.

This episode stirs up latent tensions and disagreements on how best to fight the burgeoning Taliban insurgency and keep the NATO mission afloat. NATO officials have in the past blamed insufficient U.S. troops at the beginning of the 2001 invasion for the current Taliban resurgence.

Paddy Ashdown to be new UN Rep

It’s official. Paddy Ashdown, the former EU-UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, has accepted the post as the new UN envoy to Afghanistan, according to a source quoted by Reuters. The UN Security Council is expected to approve and publicly announce this on Monday. Ashdown's biggest challenge will be coordinating and reconciling military and civilian efforts from all the various countries involved in Afghan reconstruction and security, while ensuring that the Afghan government is not left behind in these efforts. See Afghanistan Watch’s earlier post on this.

Intrigue of expelled diplomats deepens

The intrigue surrounding the expulsion of EU acting representative in Afghanistan, Mervyn Patterson, and UN diplomat Michael Semple, is deepening. A London Times report over the weekend quoted Afghan government sources claiming that the two were trying to “turn” the brother of the late Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan

Col. Dennis Young of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College adds to the chorus of voices urging the Bush administration to divert troops, effort and financial aid to Afghanistan. He also suggests five adjustments to current ISAF and U.S. strategies:

Expelling Diplomats

The expulsion of two senior diplomats from Afghanistan last week is causing much consternation. Irishman Michael Semple, the EU acting representative in Afghanistan, and Mervyn Patterson, from Northern Ireland, working with the UN assistance mission, were accused of jeopardizing national security after reportedly talking to the Taliban during a trip to Musa Qala in Helmand Province. They were stripped of their diplomatic immunity and expelled from Afghanistan last week.

Rory Stewart writes in the London Times that “it would seem that they have been expelled for precisely what made them uniquely useful to Afghanistan and the international community: their courage, relationships, energy and skills, which took them to the most remote and dangerous areas.”

What makes the expulsion particularly galling, says Stewart, is that diplomats are normally expelled by hostile dictatorships, not budding democracies.

(Afghanistan) is supposed to be a constitutional state with an elected parliament, financed with billions of dollars of international aid and supported by more than 40,000 foreign troops. There is supposed to be no difference between the Afghan government and its western allies.
Why, then, would the Afghan government insult its closest and most powerful partners by expelling their senior diplomats? Why does the Afghan government not want highly informed foreigners to meet locals in Musa Qala?
The unprecedented western investment in Afghanistan assumes that the Afghan government is serious about eliminating drugs and defeating the Taliban. Did Semple and Patterson discover something different? Or is the Kabul government simply fed up with foreigners who micromanage and second-guess their decisions?
Whatever the reason, both Afghanistan and the international community lose by this expulsion.

A roundup from December

Here’s a short news roundup of significant developments in or concerning Afghanistan from December:

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
The House approved the 2008 defense authorization bill, which in addition to providing $189.4 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, creates an office for a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and a bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting for more oversight of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The SIGAR is a much-needed agency to track down corruption and mismanagement in Afghanistan, much as its equivalent has done in Iraq. With this extra level of oversight and ensuring that reconstruction aid is invested properly, it will hopefully help get Afghan reconstruction back on track.

Brown's Plan for Afghanistan
UK prime minister Gordon Brown outlined his new plan for Afghanistan that included increasing aid by £450 million and tough benchmarks for Afghan security forces, encouraging Afghans to take responsibility for their own security.

Brown told MPs that aid would be given for "high impact" projects such as better roads, power supplies and clean water, as well as loans for small businesses and funding for civic groups and community development projects to improve local and national government.

You can read a transcript of Brown’s plan here. His emphasis on Afghans taking “ownership” and responsibility for their future and security is important.

In testimony before the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence on Dec. 10, RAND analyst Seth Jones explained the fast growth of the Afghan insurgency, thusly:

“The answer is simple,” one senior Afghan government official told me in October 2007. “The people are losing faith in the government. Our security forces cannot protect local villages, and our institutions struggle to deliver basic services.”

He testified that people are turning to the Taliban, not because they believe in extremism but because they are losing patience with the government’s inefficacy and corruption.

Indeed, the primary challenge in Afghanistan is one of governance. Governance includes the set of institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.11 It involves the government’s ability at the national or sub-national level to establish law and order, effectively manage resources, and implement sound policies. An insurgency reflects a process of alternative state building, where insurgents compete to provide governance to the population. Insurgents take advantage of weak governance and assume state-like functions. They tax and set up administrative structures for the population they control.

A Key Test for the Afghan National Army
The Afghan National Army seems to have proven itself in a key test last month – retaking the small dusty, but strategic toehold town of Musa Qala from the Taliban. Its symbolism was tied mainly to the fact that it was the only significant town controlled by the Taliban. As Guardian reporter Jason Burke put it, “For both sides, the struggle for the small country town represents in microcosm the battle for the country as a whole.”

But the offensive also spotlights the fact that despite its success, the Afghan National Army remains severely under-equipped and under-helped.

While U.S. officials cite the achievements of the Afghan military, the force has historically suffered from high attrition rates. It has also lacked sufficient military aid and trainers, and has been hobbled by old weaponry, Afghan defense officials say.

Video: Interview with Gen. McNeill, Rashid, MacDonald

Yesterday, the NewsHour with Jim Leherer ran a good segment on Afghanistan featuring commentary by Gen. Dan McNeill, Ahmed Rashid, and Norine MacDonald (from Senlis Council). The transcript, along with streaming video, is available here.

Assessing Afghanistan: NATO's 63 new metrics

Reuters reports yesterday that NATO has drawn up a "standardized system" of 63 metrics it will use to track progress in Afghanistan. U.S. Army Gen. John Craddock said that "I would submit to you that, to date, most of the assessments of progress have been against anecdotal information," or measured in terms of outputs such as schools built or roads paved. "All good things," he notes, "But the question in my mind is: What's the effect it's produced?" Were the roads blocked? Were the classrooms empty?

I find it more than a little bit troubling that NATO is only getting to this discussion six years in to the intervention. This sort of thinking should have been integrated from day one. In their defense, they probably had metrics, and are now revisiting them to make them meaningful.

It is, of course, a devilishly complicated undertaking. Which metrics to choose? How to weight one against another? And how to gather reliable data from the multitude of unverified sources that include donor countries, the UN, GOA, NGOs? Everyone is keeping score, but based on a different set of rules. Just thinking about it makes my head spin. I would love to see the 63 metrics NATO settled on, and hear how it plans to measure them (if anyone has insights on this, drop a line or a comment...)

NATO revamps measures of Afghan progress, by Andrew Gray (Reuters) 5 December 2007: WASHINGTON -- NATO has developed a standardized system for tracking progress in Afghanistan because the war so far has been judged largely using anecdotal evidence, the alliance's top commander said on Tuesday.

             

Ashdown headed to Kabul as "super-envoy"?

According to new reports, Paddy Ashdown, the former EU-UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been offered a newly created position in Kabul as a "super envoy" that would head Afghanistan efforts by NATO, the UN, and perhaps the EU as well.

According to a NATO diplomat quoted yesterday in the Financial Times, “Ashdown’s name seems to be the only one in play. I understand that Karzai is comfortable with that and it seems as if the ball is now in Ashdown’s court.” Other names floated for the position have included Joschka Fischer and Hikmet Cetin, former foreign ministers of Germany and Turkey.

Ashdown's name has been bandied about since June, but he was reluctant to consider the job unless he had the endorsement of the United States. Then recently the dual-hatted position was championed by Nicholas Burns, the number three man in the US State Dept. There remains disagreement over the nature of the role, according to Karzai spokesman Hamayun Hamidzada, who notes in The Scotsman that "Britain wants a Kabul-based envoy, who would co-ordinate people here, and also in the capitals. The US thinks you need a roving envoy going from capital to capital." 

Will Ashdown accept? In June, he said there was the need for such a post:  "My view, for what it is worth, is that there needs to be a single figure out there pulling all the strands together. At the moment there is little or no co-ordination and the country is starting to work against itself." 

The change could greatly improve coordination and elevate the status of the UN in Afghanistan. It would require a tremendously skilled  manager and coordinator to make it all work -- something Ashdown was able to do quite well in Bosnia. In a WSJ op-ed last month, Hans Binnendijk argued that "a new, high-profile European High Representative under U.N. auspices should be appointed to pull together the diverse national contributions in Afghanistan and to coordinate military and economic approaches into a comprehensive and coherent whole. Paddy Ashdown provides a good example with his work in Bosnia. Such a High Representative could also help convince European publics to stick with the Afghan effort." The challenge will be coordinating with the US and with the Afghan government, which as a sovereign state would never grant Ashdown the level of authority he had in Bosnia.

Photo: Paddy Ashdown (aka Jeremy John Durham Ashdown, Baron Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon...) 

Thinking like an insurgent: the Army's new academy

The Wall St Journal has a front page, 2,300 word piece this morning on the U.S. Army's "Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy", which was established this April to improve tactics. Last year the Army unveiled a new counterinsurgency doctrine, but its dissemination has been slow; when one of its authors, Lt. Col. John Nagl went to Afghanistan he saw "uneven understanding of counterinsurgency principles."

Capt. Dan Helmer, the 26-year old Rhode Scholar who set up the 'school' in six weeks notes that "We're trying to win an argument that supporting the government is worth risking your life for." That's a tough sell right now, and requires an approach which is 80% military and 20% political, according to Helmer. 

The Army says they've made great progress this year in giving troops Afghanistan-specific training before deployment, but current deployment patterns aren't providing enough time for learning. "There isn't enough time between being told that they're going and getting them through the training," says Lou Gelling, deputy commander of the Army's battle command training program. "That's the reality of it." Sounds like a lot of the training right now is supplemental, not comprehensive: five day courses for 60 soldiers at a time in a makeshift classroom.

As usual, one of the central problems ties back to Afghanistan's status as America's "second war":

The counterinsurgency training sometimes seems targeted more toward Iraq, according to Capt. Helmer and Col. Nagl. Of the 90 men under Col. Nagl's command, almost all are Iraq veterans and just one has served in Afghanistan. Even Capt. Helmer's orders to Afghanistan included the mistaken, but telling, instruction to take a course in Arabic -- a language spoken in Iraq, but not in Afghanistan.

The article is subscriber only content, but here are a few excerpts:

In Counterinsurgency Class, Soldiers Think Like Taliban, Wall Street Journal, By MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS, Nov 30, KABUL:A natural-born insurgent, Sgt. First Class Jacob Stockdill was brimming with malicious suggestions when a group of American soldiers and Afghan security men sat down last month to plot their own defeat. MORE

Sarah Chayes on Arghandab, the Taliban, and GoA meddling

Sarah Chayes has a piece today in the Washington Post in which she recalls, from her front row seat, the Taliban incursion into Arghandab in the wake of Mullah Naqib's heart attack.

Her verdict is deeply troubling: despite a successful coalition counterattack, the Taliban operation  "was a deft, successful psychological operations action":

It said that, despite the likelihood that they would attack after the death of Mullah Naqib, no obstacle was thrown up to oppose them, and they were able to walk into the district. The targeting of the mullah's house was a deliberate affront. It said: "You see, o men of no honor? You can't even protect his house. You are nothing now." The sum of these messages was aimed at the ordinary people who are the prize in any insurgency: Our encroachment is inevitable, the Taliban said. You should align yourselves with the inevitable.

Equally troubling is the Government of Afghanistan's response. Immediately after Mullah Naqib's death, President Karzai, along with his two brothers and the governor of Kandahar, "interfered in the recent selection of a new elder, sidelining a man who had been Mullah Naqib's deputy during the anti-Soviet jihad." "If anyone knew how to fight the Taliban in Arghandab, it was he," argues Chayes, "And yet the government's machinations were plainly aimed at shutting him out" in favor of a more pliable replacement, the untried son of Mullah Naqib. Their goal, she implies, is to ram through an alluring -- but dangerously flawed  -- reconciliation with the Taliban.

A Mullah Dies, and War Comes Knocking, By Sarah Chayes, Nov 18, KANDAHAR: Wednesday, Oct. 31: I woke to the sound of artillery thudding -- like the beat of a heavy heart. It was Afghan army batteries firing into Arghandab, at new Taliban positions there. Through several nights, I had been listening, my ears pricking like a dog's, to the faint popping of gunfire, the clattering of helicopters, the whine of personnel carriers speeding along the roads, falling asleep only when the morning call to prayer rang out in the pre-dawn chill.

I can't explain how this felt, the penetration of war to this crucial part of Kandahar, where I have lived for six years. Arghandab district, with its riot of tangled fruit trees, is the lung of Kandahar province; its meandering, stone-studded river is the artery of the whole region. Arghandab is shade and water, and mud-walled orchards, and mulberries and apricots, and pomegranates the size of grapefruits hanging from the willowy branches. MORE

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE

Updates on fighting in Kandahar and Farah

Coalition forces continue to fight on two fronts this week against Taliban offensives in both Arghandab (Kandahar Province) and Gulistan (Farah Province).

Kandahar:  The Taliban have been driven from Arghandab for now, with the loss of fifty men (“They have received heavy casualties, faced humiliation, and they are gone,” assured Assadullah Khalid, governor of Kandahar Province.)

But will they be gone for long? The big question mark is the longer term implications of the loss of Mullah Naqib, the  Alokozai leader who died of a heart attack two weeks ago. Abdul Rahim Jan, a tribal elder from Panjwai, was quoted by the Globe and Mail saying “Mullah Naqib protected Kandahar...This is a big loss. It’s like a thousand people died.” In the same story, Sarah Chayes noted that “Arghandab was the finger in the dike. Now you have a wall of water bearing down on the city.”

Chayes argues, in a comment on Registan.net, that Mullah Naqib was "the recognized and universally respected 'elder' of one of the most important tribes in the Afghan south. His moral authority was accorded him by his tribesmen, based on his human and leadership qualities." She notes that "Over the next few weeks, Mullah Naqib’s tribe will put forth a new leader, and he is someone whom, along with government officials, it would make sense for international officials to have contact with, since he will be the democratically selected representative of a large and crucial segment of the population of this region." It is a promising sign that the local population rejected the Taliban when they sought to move into the power vacuum.

Farah: The other front making news this week is in westerly Farah province, where a Taliban force (estimated by one official at 700 men) raided a police outpost and held some terrain. Fighting has gone on for five days now.

In Farah, skirmishes have been commonplace since February between rebels and the British troops. The province is arid and sparsely populated with marginal strategic value outside of its proximity to Iran.  Are the recent attacks receiving attention because of their significance or their timing? In any case, the local authorities featured in this Reuters story were alarmed by the scale of Taliban attacks, and have called for coalition airstrikes.

"Gulistan district is still controlled by the Taliban," Ikramuddin Yawar, the police chief for western Afghanistan, told Reuters. "We want assistance from NATO to support us from the air."...in the west, the chief of a district near Gulistan and Bakwa warned his area would also fall to the rebels unless foreign air power was brought into play

Taliban occupy Arghandab district after Mullah Naqibullah's death

Today the Times reports that Taliban militants have occupied a strategic area north of Kandahar city for the first time since 2001. While we shouldn't make too much of the tactical implications of this advance (especially since a counterattack is already underway) there are other reasons to be concerned.

According to Sarah Chayes, who knows the region as well as anyone, the Taliban offensive has demonstrated that the fatal heart attack two weeks of Mullah Naqibullah --  an influential former mujahideen in Afghandab who had thrown his support behind the Karzai government -- has had major repercussions:

Over the last several years, Mullah Naqibullah survived multiple attempts by the Taliban to kill him, she said, and was “the bulwark” that blocked the hard-line Islamic group from entering Kandahar from the north. But in a sign of the weakness of President Hamid Karzai’s government in the area, joyous Taliban fighters seized control of Mullah Naqibullah’s home village in Arghandab within two weeks of his death.

In her book, The Punishment of Virtue, Sarah Chayes details  Mullah Naqib's on-again, off-again collaboration with the Taliban, and his rivalry with Gul Agha Shirzai. Naqib was a major player in the region, and his absence has already been felt.

WPR piece on private security contractors

Below is a piece I wrote, published today in the World Politics Review (an online foreign policy daily.)

Private Military Contractors in Afghanistan, Carl Robichaud | 30 Oct 2007

After the Sept. 16 Blackwater scandal, which drew unprecedented attention to the role played by private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq, these firms have increasingly come under scrutiny in other theaters of war, such as Afghanistan. But while efforts in Afghanistan to rein in PSCs seem to parallel those in Iraq, they are driven by different dynamics -- and have very different implications. MORE 

Karzai's primetime appeal: curtail the airstrikes

President Karzai made a primetime appearance on CBS's 60 Minutes this Sunday to call for a rollback of airstrikes in Afghanistan.

When 60 Minutes asked whether Karzai had directly requested that President George W. Bush end the airstrikes he said "Absolutely. Oh, yes, in clear words."  He implied that his appearance on 60 Minutes was part of an attempt to go public now that direct conversations have failed to get results: "I want to repeat that, alternatives to the use of air force. And I will speak for it again through your media."

"You're demanding that?" - Pelley (in reference to a rollback of airstrikes)
"Absolutely," - Karzai.

• Watch the video

The rest of the piece is worth watching, if only because it is the first time a camera team was permitted into the Combined Air Operations Center, America's high-tech command post situated in an undisclosed Persian Gulf country (Qatar?) It is a scene that is both surreal and yet somehow mundane: walls lined with massive monitors, people seated at rows of desks with computers. It is here that decisions are made on each airstrike in Afghanistan and Iraq -- decisions that will mean life or death for people hundreds or thousands of miles away. MORE

NATO leases out? Helicopters to be rented...

In an unprecedented move, NATO this weekend approved money to lease cargo helicopters for the alliance's transport needs --  a move made necessary because members of the alliance again refused to provide airlift out of their own military assets.

The diplomats were careful not to assign blame, but Canada's Globe and Mail notes that  "Italy, Spain and France are among the Western European countries with large numbers of big, modern helicopters protected by sophisticated anti-missile defences and flown by highly trained crews." Canada, which has relied upon it allies' helicopters to support its operations in Kandahar, would stand the most to gain from a boost in transport capacity.

The airlift shortfall has long been an issue, and came to a head this summer when the US extended the tour of a helicopter unit in Kandahar until the end of the year. The helicopters -- which may be leased from Ukraine and Russia -- will mostly fill this gap and permit the coalition's other helicopters to transport troops and evacuate the wounded.

Some argue that having additional airlift will make coalition troops safer, since many of the casualties in Afghanistan have come from roadside bombs. However, using helicopters is often just as risky: since 2001, 18 helicopters have gone down in Afghanistan, resulting in 110 deaths. So it should come as no surprise that many NATO allies are reluctant to risk their airmen.

The alternatives, however, come at a high cost, both in Euros and credibility. According to the Globe and Mail:

The cost of chartering large helicopters is expected to be very high. At standard commercial rates, an Mi-17 - the civilian version of the widely used and rugged Russian workhorse capable of lifting four tonnes - could exceed $100,000 a week, yet fly far less than the punishing days endured by U.S., British and Dutch crews. Given the high costs of maintenance and the premium civilian pilots can be expected to demand for risking their lives, the cost could easily soar. A flock of 20 Mi-17s or a smaller number of the even larger Mi-26s, might cost more than $100-million a year, one industry source said.

Secretary Robert Gates resigned himself to the move, even if his frustration showed in responding to reporters that "it's not the best option. It may be the only option." (More excerpts from his transcript below...) MORE

Image: Troops board a CH-47 Chinook helicopter in Daychopan district on their way back to Kandahar Army Air Field on Sept. 4, 2003. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Kyle Davis.

Germany's Afghan conundrum

Last week Germany voted by a 2 to 1 margin to sustain the deployment of its 3,000 strong forces in Afghanistan--for now. But how sustainable is this mission when the public at large opposes the deployment by the same margin?

Ulf Gartzke, in an op-ed today in the Globe and Mail argues that Angela Merkel (along with other NATO heads of state) "can no longer afford to avoid engaging in a fundamental public discussion of why losses in Afghanistan are justified in terms of our core national security interests." Merkel has stayed out of the Germany's Afghanistan debate, but this "defensive, reactive strategy ultimately carries huge political and security risks, both at home and abroad."

So long as the mission is seen in Germany as George Bush's war, it will remain unpopular and could be a liability in 2009.  But there is no better reminder in the threat a failed Afghanistan would leave for Germany than the recent -- derailed at the last minute -- to set off a series of massive car bombs in a Frankfurt airport that handles 5 million passengers a month. The terrorists plotting that attack, Gartzke notes, were Islamic terrorists trained along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

German lessons: the Afghan conundrum (The Globe and Mail) by Ulf Gartzke, Special to Globe and Mail Update, Oct 16: Last Friday, the German parliament extended the Bundeswehr's 3,100-strong ISAF mandate in Afghanistan for another year. ...For Chancellor Angela Merkel and her conservative allies, the Bundeswehr's bloody, seemingly open-ended Afghan engagement is a political time bomb that could go off in the run-up to the next federal elections, to be held by 2009.

Two police chiefs sacked. Problem solved, right?

Tip of the iceberg:

Afghan police chiefs sacked for negligence (Reuters) By Jon Hemming, KABUL:   The Afghan government sacked two provincial police chiefs for negligence, the Interior Ministry said on Saturday, highlighting problems in a force often accused of corruption and which is key to security in Afghanistan...The Interior Ministry said it had sacked the provincial police chiefs of Dai Kundi in the centre of the country and Wardak just southwest of the capital, Kabul....The police chief in Wardak stands accused of pocketing officers' salaries, leading many in his force to abandon their posts...

Wardak, only an hour's drive from Kabul, is among provinces previously regarded as safe which have witnessed a rise in Taliban violence in the last few months. Only a few hundred Turkish troops from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are stationed there and they are not allowed by their government to conduct offensive operations. MORE

Korb and Wadhams: Five steps

Larry Korb and Caroline Wadhams argue today in a Newsday op-ed that "the United States and NATO must increase troop levels by at least 20,000" in Afghanistan. This rise in troop levels is part of a five-point plan that includes bolstering reconstruction assistance, focusing on rule of law, and reforming U.S. aid channels to Pakistan. The steps they sketch out will be supported by a more comprehensive report in the coming months -- keep your eyes peeled ...

U.S.

must put more focus on Afghan insurgency, Oct 9, 2007: Sunday marked the sixth anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaida....But the mission in Afghanistan is going alarmingly awry, and the United States must refocus and re-energize its policy. The administration and Congress cannot allow the sinking ship of Iraq to take Afghanistan down with it...

To achieve our security objectives, the United States, and especially Congress, must provide increased funds, attention and manpower - both civilian and military. U.S. leaders must also engage the American people, as they may become increasingly pessimistic about U.S. involvement in the Muslim world as a result of the war in Iraq. There are five concrete steps Congress and the administration should pursue immediately. MORE

Part II of the Rubin/Marshall talk

Canada calls for special UN envoy to Afghanistan

After 30 bilateral meetings last week on the subject, Canada's foreign minister today addressed the United Nations General Assembly and called for the appointment of a "special UN envoy to Afghanistan." Not clear exactly how this post would differ from the SRSG. According to reports, would be "modeled on the work of former British prime minister Tony Blair in the Middle East peace process."

Canada issues Afghan rally cry, (Globe and Mail Update) by Tenille Bonoguore, Oct 2, 2007:Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier issued a rallying cry Tuesday to the United Nations, calling on member nations to support the bid to appoint a special UN envoy for Afghanistan…

Latest Kajaki Dam cost estimates

The latest USAID estimate for the Kajaki Dam appears in today's International Water Power: $150m for the first year, and up to $500m total. Actual cost will probably be much higher -- and still worth every penny.

Progress on the dam is the bellwether of efforts in Helmand: restoring hydroelectric power would have massive symbolic and pragmatic consequences (not to mention create 4,000 jobs...) So it's a huge reconstruction priority--but one which requires sustained security to implement...

• Upgrade planned for Afghan dam International Water Power, UK 09/26/2007.

The serpents of Medusa's hair

The latest epilogue to Operation Medusa: Canadian forces have re-established control in Zhare and Panjwai (in August, Taliban militants overran local authorities when Canadian troops rotated...) However, this week’s victory was hardly decisive -- the Taliban mostly ceded ground, as has been their modus operandi in recent months -- and will retaliate against the lightly armed police force left behind to consolidate NATO’s gains.

A spokesman for the Canadian forces argued that incorporated learning and new approaches -- e.g. joint checkpoints -- will ensure that this time is different. Army and police training has advanced, and Canada even forced the resignation of a corrupt police chief in Zhari district. Patience is key, as General Champoux has argued: "This has been a shaping year,'' he said, "I think next year will be a decisive year."

But we’ve heard this before. The Canadians have a lot of terrain to cover and a low density of force -- is it realistic to expect the ANA and ANP to hold this area on its own? Can this week’s gains be anything more than ephemeral without additional resources or a new approach?

Canadian Forces Regain Part of Strategic Area in Southern Afghanistan KABUL, Sept. 14, by David Rohde — Canadian forces this week regained control of roughly half of a strategic area outside of the southern city of Kandahar that fell to the Taliban in August, according to Afghan and Canadian officials…Seven hundred Canadian troops, backed by airstrikes and Leopard tanks, met little resistance from Taliban fighters…The Taliban generally have avoided direct clashes with heavily armed NATO forces and instead attacked lightly armed Afghan police forces or carried out suicide and roadside bomb attacks. MORE

Image: Tête de Méduse by Rubens

Controversy over direct US military action in Pakistan misses the point

The latest of Richard Weitz's excellent articles on Afghanistan and Pakistan is available at the World Politics Review (a great new site that provides exclusive daily foreign policy analysis from contributors across 40 countries.)

Weitz argues that the discovery, during the Tillman investigation, of specific US rules of engagement for when US forces are authorized to enter Pakistan -- along with Barack Obama's remarks that "if President Musharraf won't act, we will" -- leaves the impression that US efforts to capture the Big Three (bin Laden, al-Zawahri, and Mullah Omar) are primarily about direct military action. The assumption that seriousness of purpose against the Taliban and Al Qaeda can be measured by one's willingness to cross the border is mistaken and counterproductive. Moreover, as Weitz notes, a focus on what the Pentagon is doing threatens "to obscure the small role that such direct military operations play in the overall U.S. effort to prevent Taliban insurgents from using Pakistan as a support base for their operations in Afghanistan."

Non-Military Tools Neglected in Debate Over Afghan-Pakistani Border Operations, by Richard Weitz 31 Aug 2007 World Politics Review Exclusive

London confronts Beijing over Chinese weapons in Taliban hands

The BBC reports today that London has privately complained to Beijing that Chinese-made weaponry has being found in the hands of the Taliban. Normally this is not news -- Afghanistan is awash in small arms, much of it manufactured in China. However, the article implies (citing conversations with experts) that because the type of weaponry includes HN-5 anti-aircraft missiles and armor piercing ammo it is unlikely that it was provided by the traditional channel (Pakistan's ISI) and may instead be coming through Iran.

I'm not sure I buy the assumption that the ISI wouldn't provide high-tech weaponry to the Taliban simply because these arms could be used against them -- weapons transfers went to militants in the past under similar circumstances. Moreover, the flow of arms through any of these nations does not guarantee official complicity -- there are lots of smugglers and corrupt officials willing to run guns to make a buck.

Nevertheless, there is an interesting story here. It is not that Chinese weapons are in the hands of the Taliban or that the Taliban is getting arms from across the Iranian border (which US officials have credibly demonstrated). It is instead why Britain chose this moment to raise these questions for the first time with Beijing. Has the nature of these transfers changed? Is this conversation a function of the tensions surrounding Iran and its nuclear program?

Taleban 'getting Chinese arms' By Paul Danahar, (BBC): The BBC has been told that on several occasions Chinese arms have been recovered after attacks on British and American troops by Afghan insurgents. The authorities in Beijing have promised to carry out an investigation. This appears to be the first time Britain has asked China how its arms are ending up with the Taleban. At a meeting held recently at the Chinese foreign ministry in Beijing, a British official expressed the UK's growing concern about the incidents...MORE   

Image: A Chinese-made HN-5 (Hongying 5 "Red Cherry") shoulder launched missile (an improved version of the Russian-made SA-7). FAS.

A Taliban leader behind kidnapping reported killed

The AP reports that "Afghan security forces killed a Taliban commander they alleged Tuesday to be behind the July kidnappings of 23 South Korean church workers." The government raid is one of several military operations in Ghazni since the hostages were released (another was conducted by the coalition) and is part of a strategy to reassert authority there and to save face after the hostage crisis. The timing suggests the coalition knew where these guys were quartered and were just waiting for the conclusion of the hostage standoff before striking.

American military officials also reported that a dozen Taliban were killed in a separate five-hour battle in Sha Wali Kot district in Kandahar.

Firefight at a drug lab in Daychopan, Zabul

The AP provides today one of the first reports I've heard of fighting at a drug lab. The report says the guards were "suspected Taliban" but I wonder how accurate this is...Wish there were more detail on this raid.

In the southern Zabul province, Afghan and coalition troops clashed with insurgents in Daychopan district Sunday, killing four suspected Taliban and wounding four others, said Fazel Bari, the Daychopan district chief.

Also Sunday, Afghan and coalition troops destroyed a heroin laboratory after battling Taliban fighters guarding the facility, a separate coalition statement said. The lab in Helmand contained large amounts of opium-processing chemicals as well as weapons, insurgent propaganda and explosive materials, it said.

Map: BBC.

British commander opens fire on US Special Forces

For the first time, a British commander has openly (if anonymously) criticized the US military approach in Helmand, which he claims has led to most of the civilian deaths in the area and has jeopardized the British-led mission in the area. Official spokesmen from both the US and Britain rushed to dispute the claim.

The US retains a Special Forces presence in Helmand--they ostensibly advise the Afghan National Army and operate alongside the larger NATO deployment led by the British and numbering over 6,000 troops. The British commander, who apparently gave the interview a couple weeks ago, argues that "There aren’t large bodies of Taliban to fight anymore; we are dealing with small groups and we are trying to kick-start reconstruction and development,” and that therefore the Special Forces approach--with its reliance on airpower--is counterproductive in this context. Whether this claim is accurate, it is sure to add kindling to the smoldering debate over the US vs the European approach to counterinsurgency...Excerpts from the article follow...MORE

Possible hostage outcomes

The Associated Press ran a piece today about possible outcomes of the hostage standoff. Here are the options, along with the AP assessment:

• RELEASE TALIBAN PRISONERS

The Taliban has submitted an initial list of eight prisoners to the government, most of whom are related to the kidnappers and are not senior in the Taliban hierarchy. ...But the Afghan government appears unlikely to agree after it was heavily criticized earlier this year for releasing five Taliban in exchange for an Italian reporter...One high-ranking Afghan official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, said the government "is not ready to make any deal with terrorist kidnappers, even if they kill all the hostages."

Photo: Shah Mansoor Dadullah was one of five prisoners released this year for the Italian journalist. He is currently a top Taliban commander in the south and may have had a hand in the Korean hostage crisis. (Source: Afgha)

Reports of first surface-to-air missile attack in Afghanistan

One of the nightmares that keep Western planners up at night is the possibility that insurgents might get a hold of some MANPADS (Man-portable air defense systems). The most prominently discussed is the Stinger missile -- after all, many of the missiles the US provided to mujahideen for use against the Soviets have never been accounted for -- but there are plenty of Russian built surface-to-air missiles floating around that could prove disastrous in the wrong hands. Until this week, the threat of shoulder-launched missiles was the dog that hasn't barked.

Then on Sunday a C-130 transport plane was reportedly attacked in Nimroz province with a surface-to-air missile. NATO will neither confirm nor deny the incident, but the London Telegraph (by way of the Washington Times) reports that "The crew reported that a missile system locked on to their aircraft and that a missile was fired. It closed in on the large C-130, pursuing it as the pilots made a series of violent evasive maneuvers and jettisoned flares to confuse the heat sensors in the nose of the surface-to-air missile, or SAM." The article continues: "The C-130 attacked in Nimroz was flying at 11,000 feet at the time of the attack, which is within the 1.5- to 3.4-mile range of a shoulder-launched missile system such as the SAM-7."

The million dollar question is whether this will prove an isolated incident, or the start of a trend. Speculation has begun as to where these weapons are coming from; apparently there was a SAM-7 among the arms that was intercepted along the Iran border in April.

Taliban's failed first use of SAM still worrisome  KABUL, July 29 (Washington Post/LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH): Taliban militants used a heat-seeking, surface-to-air missile to attack a Western aircraft over Afghanistan for the first time last week, coalition military sources say. The attack with a weapon thought to have been smuggled across the border with Iran represents a worrisome increase in the capability of the militants that Western commanders had long feared.

Photo: DOD: An Afghan Mujahideen demonstrates positioning of a hand-held surface-to-air missile. 26 Aug 1988

Is less more?

Rory Stewart's piece in the Times today has it right and wrong. He's right in his assessment that a major infusion of troops, committed now, is not the answer to the insurgency. He's right that we should focus more of our energies in the stable areas of Afghanistan where money goes further and that we need more modesty in what we seek to achieve.

But Stewart is wrong on several counts. First, his assertion that the situation in Helmand (and Uruzgan, and Kandahar) has deteriorated because of the NATO presence is highly speculative. To wit:

Britain decided in 2005 to bring good government, security, rule of law and economic growth to Helmand Province. At the time, there were few Taliban attacks in the area. The British deployed some 4,000 soldiers last year and more civilian advisers to replace a few hundred international troops who had been in the province since the fall of the Taliban. The British effort failed. A year and a half later, with 7,000 British troops in Helmand, the provincial government is more corrupt, the streets less safe for citizens, the poppy crop larger and the legal economy and infrastructure more eroded.

Stewart essentially argues that "the foreign presence has provoked a wide Taliban insurgency". In fact, the insurgency was on the rebound well before the arrival of NATO expansion (which was implemented in response) and attributable to a mix of factors, including the increase of cross-border support, narcotics revenues, disillusionment with government corruption, etc. This is not to say that resentment doesn't fuel the Taliban, but to blame NATO for the intensification of the insurgency is akin to arguing that ambulances tend to cause car crashes.

Stewart argues that the counterinsurgency cannot succeed because "Afghan officials are simply not committed to st