New This Week From Afghanistan Watch

• Iraqi Elections: Does the Afghan Example Give Reason for Optimism?
• Unobserved? No International Observers to be Present for Iraq Elections
• News Update for January 26

January 28, 2005

Iraqi Elections
Does the Afghan Example Give Reason for Optimism?
Carl Robichaud

Qalat—U.S. Soldiers enter a school compound being used as a polling place in preparation for the Oct. 12, 2004 national election in Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Joseph P. Collins, Jr.

In the weeks preceding Afghanistan's presidential elections on October 12, dire predictions punctuated the news. Journalists observed that registration in some areas exceeded population by 40 percent, reported cases of vote buying and intimidation, and predicted election-day violence. After all, the Taliban had vowed to launch massive and coordinated attacks, and the international presence was spread thin. Many observers braced themselves for an electoral disaster.

And yet when election day came to a close, the worst concerns had not been borne out. Eight million Afghans had turned out to the polls, many waiting hours to cast their ballots. The day was largely free of violence. Yes, there were allegations of fraud and intimidation, as well as the much publicized ink snafu, and opposition candidates were calling for a re-vote even before the sun had set. But it soon became clear that the Taliban had failed to disrupt the elections, and that the predictions of massive vote fraud had been dispelled (while some fraud occurred at the margins, it was made moot by the scale of Karzai's victory.) Afghanistan had weathered the test of its first election, and President Karzai emerged with a decisive victory that bolstered his legitimacy, and that of the Afghan government.

So will the dire predictions about Iraqi elections that are issuing from virtually every non-official source prove to be equally off-the-mark? The Afghan model might seem to suggest that things will be better than anticipated—but don't wager on a successful outcome.

As difficult a logistic challenge as the Afghan election posed, Sunday's voting presents a challenge of a different magnitude. In Afghanistan, Taliban insurgents hovered at the fringes; in Iraq, they are a constant presence, with redoubts in the core cities. In Afghanistan, people wondered if insurgents could make good on its promises; in Iraq, people know they can. While actually disrupting the vote on election day would require great logistical precision, perhaps beyond the capacity of Iraq's well-coordinated insurgents, the threat of post-election retaliation could lead many voters in the Sunni triangle to stay home on Sunday.

Second, Afghanistan had the patience to time its elections better. Remember that the international community—wisely, as it turned out—twice delayed Afghan elections, and decided to split the vote, holding the complicated and contentious parliamentary elections six months after the more straightforward presidential vote. In contrast, the U.S. has rebuffed the pleas of Iraqi authorities to delay elections. As a result, Iraqis will go to the polls on Sunday with an insufficient voting infrastructure, too few security personnel, and no international observers. Many Sunnis will likely boycott the vote or stay home to avoid violence, a scenario that would result in a volatile preponderance of power in the hands of Shiites, who comprise 60% of the population but may end up with a greater share of seats in the legislative body that will write the Iraqi constitution and determine the role of minority voices in the state.

The ballot that will be used in the January 30 Iraqi election. State Department Photo

Third, Sunday's election in Iraqi is far more complicated than the Afghan election poll, which simply required voters to identify the name (or picture) of one candidate from a list of eighteen. On Sunday, Iraqi voters will face what Britain's Telegraph terms "the mother of all ballots," with a choice of "257 parties and individuals, 111 of them competing for the national elections, the rest for a score of different regional and local assembly votes." Compounding the confusion is the fact that many of the slates have similar names or symbols, making it hard to tell them apart. Each ballot sheet will be huge (3 feet long by 2 feet wide), and each voter will receive either one or two (depending on the region); they then must find their choice, and mark at most one box on each sheet.

Violence has had two additional consequences: the United States will keep the location of some polling sites a secret until the last minute and the Iraqi election commission will allow slates to keep their member's identities hidden. As a result, many voters will not know where to cast their ballot, and 7,000 candidates on the national election remain nameless and faceless. The system seems almost designed to create confusion. (for more details, see Tova Wang's "Democracy for Iraq?")

Fourth is the difference in monitoring procedures in the two countries. When opposition candidates challenged the results of the Afghan election, impartial experts were on hand to evaluate their claims. As reporter Robin Wright notes, "When 8 million Afghans voted in October, at least 122 international observers from across Europe and Asia monitored the presidential election -- and declared it an 'orderly and transparent process.'" On the other hand, "there will be no neutral outside group deployed across Iraq to determine whether voters are impeded, ballot boxes are stuffed, any party tries to interfere with the process or votes are counted fairly." How will challenges be dealt with when they inevitably arise?

The differences between these two elections reflect a broader set of differences between [how the United States has approached reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan . The Afghan elections, which were crafted with robust United Nations involvement, were seen less as the result of U.S. mandated rules, and more as the product of a participatory process. Local authorities had more input into structure and timeline, and consequently greater ownership of the result.

Most significantly, Afghans and internationals agreed that elections should be postponed to allow for more thorough preparation and better polling conditions. There are many cases in which free and fair elections can help consolidate legitimate authority and transform military struggle into political struggle. But there are also cases when unfree and unfair elections heighten antagonism—precisely what could happen if Sunday's elections endow Shiites with a preponderance of power.

President Bush made a strong case for democratization last week. What is becoming increasingly clear is how much the U.S. and the international community did to advance liberty through Afghanistan's elections, and how few of those lessons have been applied to Iraq.

For more on the Iraq elections, see:

The Key Parties
Election Politics
Iraqi views

For more on Afghan elections, see:

Afghan elections by the numbers
Parliamentary election preview

January 27, 2005

The President has made the promotion of liberty the central theme of his foreign policy, and three successful elections in three months (in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and the Palestinian territories) have helped make the case that "freedom is on the march."

Now a successful election in Iraq could be a turning point in countering the insurgency and restoring control of Iraq to Iraqis. But are the conditions right for a free and fair election? Even putting aside the concerns of violence, a comparison of the conditions in these four cases is not promising—particularly the absence of international observers, which are considered essential to ensuring an election's legitimacy.

See also Tova Andrea Wang's January 27th piece, Democracy for Iraq?

RECENT NOTABLE ELECTIONS

Bush requests $80 billion more for Iraq and Afghanistan

WASHINGTON, Jan 26, 2005 (SF Chronicle) - "The administration said $75 billion of the $80 billion request, which won't be formally sent to Congress until after the president unveils his budget for fiscal 2006 on Feb. 7, would go for military operations. Most of the money would pay for equipment and to train Iraqi security forces... [and] most of the remaining $5 billion would go to the State Department, in part to pay for a new embassy in Baghdad and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan…Passage in the Republican-controlled Congress seems certain. It would be the third special appropriation for Iraq, following $87 billion in September 2003 and $25 billion approved in May. It's estimated the United States is spending $4.6 billion a month in Iraq and $800 million in Afghanistan, where 20,000 soldiers are based. Before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, estimates of the war's cost were $50 billion, with assurances from administration officials that Iraqi oil revenues would pay for much of the effort."

More on this via NPR audio

U.S. drops Afghanistan opium spraying plans

WASHINGTON, Jan. 25, (Associated Press) - "Facing opposition from Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the United States has set aside plans to use spray planes to fumigate opium crops in Afghanistan, the world's largest drug producing country. Karzai's opposition to spraying has frustrated some U.S. officials who doubt that the vast amount of opium produced in Afghanistan can be significantly reduced without spraying… The State Department's top anti-drug official, Robert Charles, said Karzai has indicated that he might allow aerial spraying if other eradication and interdiction strategies fail."

Afghan Army: Regional commands will boost security

KABUL, Jan 25 (IRIN) - "'The ANA's capacity and quality has significantly increased and with its new regional divisions, it will be deployed in major Afghan cities,' Baz Mohammad Jauhari, Deputy Defence Minister, told IRIN. . .Prior to the new regional commands, troops and units from the ANA's central corps, located in the Kabul region, were frequently deployed wherever needed around the country. They also carried out combat operations alongside US-led Coalition forces in the east and south. 'Now the ANA has new regional commands in the north, southeast and west of the country, there are command and control headquarters in each region of Afghanistan, as well as troops assigned to carry them out,' he said."

No Foreign Observers to Monitor Iraq Vote

Washington Post, Jan 22-- "When 8 million Afghans voted in October, at least 122 international observers from across Europe and Asia monitored the presidential election -- and declared it an 'orderly and transparent process.'. . .There will be no neutral outside group deployed across Iraq to determine whether voters are impeded, ballot boxes are stuffed, any party tries to interfere with the process or votes are counted fairly. No congressional delegation will monitor the polls, and the European Union announced last week that it had declined an invitation from Iraq to send observers. The Carter Center, which has monitored more than 50 elections overseas, also decided not to send observers."

See also Democracy Fellow Tova Andrea Wang's January 27th piece, Democracy for Iraq?

Imports Threaten Afghan Industries

KABUL, Jan 20 (IWPR) - "Clothing and shoe manufacturers complain that they're unable to compete with lower cost goods imported mainly from China… Saifuddin Saihoon, an economics professor at Kabul University, complained that government's current trade policy favours foreign businessmen and local merchants who sell foreign goods. 'Our neighbours and the traders are taking advantage of our demand. They supply us with poor quality goods, so our money goes abroad... instead of to our producers,' he said."

In a trend common throughout the developing world, the availability of cheap foreign imports has led to a displacement of local production -- even in low wage countries such as Afghanistan that should have a relative advantage in exporting goods. Afghanistan's particular situation provides several other obstacles. First, prevalent smuggling impedes the potential effectiveness of tariffs and reduces the government's leverage and revenues. Imported goods are officially subject to taxes of between 2.5 and 16 percent, but these fees often go unpaid or are pocketed by warlords. Second, the infusion of dollars from the international presence and the opium trade have shown signs of inflating wages, making foreign goods less expensive relative to those locally produced. From 2002-03, imports rose to $2.3 billion, compared with $100 million in exports. Higher wages and cheaper imports are a good thing in the short run for Afghan workers and consumers who have access to cheaper goods, but they could impede the development of local industries.

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Afghanistan Watch is prepared by Carl Robichaud, a program officer at The Century Foundation.

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