October 26, 2004

An Afghanistan Watch Interview with Dr. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy

In Afghanistan, illegal opium is, along with foreign aid, the country's primary source of national income. Opium fuels turf wars between regional strongmen, finances their personal armies, and empowers them to defy the central government. The opium trade is considered by many observers inside and outside Afghanistan as the greatest threat to the country's peace, prosperity and political development.

But is this conventional wisdom correct? And how is the international community doing when it comes to reining in opium production in Afghanistan?

In this edition of Afghanistan Watch, we interview Dr. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, one of the world's leading experts on international drug trafficking. Dr. Chouvy is a Research Fellow at the French National Scientific Research Center (CNRS); his website geopium.org is a must-read for those interested in the causes and consequences of opium production in fragile states. He is an author of numerous books and articles on the subject, and is a frequent contributor to Jane's Intelligence Review.

Afghanistan Watch: How would you evaluate the international community's counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan so far?

I don't think there has been any counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan so far. Even the term "counternarcotics strategy" suggests the opium question is a military issue.

To overcome both opium production and terrorism in Afghanistan, the government and the international community should focus less on waging wars on drugs and terrorism and more on implementing a broad program of alternative and integrated development in the whole country.

Within this, a multi-level strategy involving effective sanctions on criminal activities is critical. This program should be implemented in gradual phases so as to secure political and territorial stability. As I have written, long-lasting peace, combined with political and economic development, must be achieved if Afghanistan is successfully rid itself of the drug economy/war economy nexus.

Afghanistan Watch: The Pentagon has made statements that it plans to embark, in the near future, on a 'master plan' to deal with the drug problem in Afghanistan. What advice would you give to Pentagon planners as they set out to devise a counternarcotics strategy?

I doubt any Pentagon plan, "master" or not, could work, as opium production is not a military issue. A military solution to a developmental problem can only be counter-productive.

To favor a largely military approach is to address the consequences of a phenomenon rather that its causes. De-linking the opium economy (or terrorism) from their contexts will only lead to ignoring causal factors and could result in tactical and strategic failure (see Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan, Terrorism Monitor, March 2004). My advice, then, would be to refrain from dealing with opium production with military means, but to favor integrated economic and political development.

Afghanistan Watch: Some have argued that now that the presidential election has come and gone, Afghanistan and the international community should focus on dealing with the drug trade. Is now the time to address Afghanistan's drug problem?

Now is the time to address the reconstruction of Afghanistan, its economic and political development. The Afghan economy has grown steadily since the fall of the Taliban, and over time the opium economy will become a smaller share of economic activity. A growing legal economy will drive up the price of hired labor, which in turn will make opium harvests (a labor-intensive activity) increasingly expensive and opium farming economically less attractive. But, as shown by opium reduction in Thailand and Pakistan, addressing the opium issue will take time—most likely fifteen to twenty years.

Afghanistan Watch: We've all read the figures about the magnitude of the drug trade in Afghanistan: 30-50 percent of GDP, tenfold increase in cultivation since the Taliban era, etc. You have written that Afghanistan's expanding opium economy has many implications, not all of them negative. Could you elaborate?

What has been widely presented as a major expansion of production in 2002 and 2003 consists mainly of a restoration of previous normal levels of production. (For more on this, see my October article in Jane's Intelligence Review) However, opium production is clearly rising in Afghanistan, as opium poppy cultivation has spread to new provinces and districts across the country, and the 2004 opium harvest will likely surpass even the 4,600 tons produced in 1999.

Opium is frequently denounced as the greatest threat to Afghanistan's stability, peace and forthcoming democracy. But the opium economy is not just a source of instability. As noted in a recent report to USAID by Frank Kennefick and Larry Morgan, opium in Afghanistan can be seen as a "good evil": while the opium trade plays a significant role in perpetuating instability, it is also vital for Afghanistan's broader economy, generating an estimated income for farmers and traffickers equal to half of the country's legitimate gross domestic product (GDP). On one hand, opium trafficking has given warlords the means to perpetuate conflict. On the other hand, the opium economy has made survival possible for many farmers and helped stabilise a country coming out of over two decades of war and facing a derelict economy.

Afghanistan Watch: You've written that the opium economy is a consequence of the Afghan crisis and not its cause. To what extent is the insecurity and instability in Afghanistan today linked to the drug trade?

If we look back at recent Afghan history we can see that there was no large commercial opium production in the country before the war with the Soviet Union. Large-scale opium cultivation occurred only after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the consequent cut back in funding from the West to the mujahideen. Many of these mujahideen turned to the opium economy to pay for their protracted and internecine wars. Thus the war economy favoured the growth of the drug economy, as opium trafficking gave warlords the means to perpetuate their conflict.

In Afghanistan, as in Burma (Myanmar), the world's second largest opium producer, drug production is closely linked to territorial control and political legitimacy. Opium has long been at stake in Afghanistan's conflicts, since potential opium profits increase the value of a given territory. One can say that opium economy fuels territorial instability, but this link is mainly because of the overarching war context (or post-war context). Let us not forget that opium production has also promoted stability by providing the country with a much-needed income.

Afghanistan Watch: Were there missed opportunities in confronting the drug trade, or was the current situation virtually inevitable? For example, could the Taliban-era opium ban have been extended? Were there better options in terms of eradication or crop substitution?

I don't think there has been any missed opportunity in confronting the drug trade. But there were most likely missed opportunities to prevent its development: missed opportunities to prevent the war with the Soviet Union and help Afghanistan's political and economic reconstruction after the war. There were also missed opportunities to refrain from resorting to "drug proxies" during the Afghanistan war.

Let us remember that some former US allies in the war against the Soviet Union were clearly engaged in the illegal drug economy. While some of these have since become 'terrorists,' even more recent allies in the 'war on terror' have been said to use opium and heroin for funding. In post-Taliban Afghanistan, opiates continue to be produced both in areas traditionally controlled by the United Front, such as Badakhshan, and in areas held by various local commanders allied with the U.S. in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Even more official allies of the US 'war on terror' seem to be engaged in, or benefiting from, the drug economy. Indeed, as was testified under oath on March 20, 2003 by Wendy Chamberlain, former US ambassador to Pakistan, before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, ISI involvement in opium trafficking across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has been "substantial" during the last six years. (For more detail, see Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan, Terrorism Monitor, March 2004).

Insofar as the Taliban-era opium ban is concerned, one can say that it was detrimental and counter-productive. In the context of the Afghan economy, where many farmers depend on the opium economy and sell their harvest in advance, the ban simply put many of them deep in debt. Ironically enough, the magnitude of the recent increase can be partly attributed to the economic consequences of the ban itself, which was economically and politically unsustainable.

Without proper alternative development, a ban is clearly not the right approach. Crop substitution is preferable to eradication as the poorest are always the first victims of eradication. As I wrote in a February article in Jane's Intelligence Review, this is not only the case in Afghanistan but also in Burma where an ongoing ban is threatening the survival of many tribal communities. If opium production must be dealt with through a security approach—as is frequently and erroneously the case—it should be mostly about food security. Opium production is the outcome of deep rural poverty occurring mostly in war-torn regions.

Afghanistan Watch: Are there other readings you would recommend for those interested in the problem?

I would advise reading the following well-informed and insightful works:

• "Road to Ruin: Afghanistan's Booming Opium Industry", by Barnett R. Rubin;
• "Opium in Afghanistan: People and Poppies, the Good Evil" (PDF), by Franck Kenefick and Larry Morgan;
• "The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality" (DOC), by David Mansfield.

For more articles, in English and French, visit Dr. Chouvy's website, www.geopium.org.