October 5, 2004

Campaigning Ends—Does Anyone Notice?
Carl Robichaud

Tuesday marked the close of the Afghan presidential campaign, which was lackluster even by the standards of an emerging democracy. Security concerns prevented candidates from campaigning outside of their home regions. This, combined with short timelines (4 months from registration to election) and media limitations (opposition candidates received only twenty minutes of airtime), made it nearly impossible for candidates to get their message out. President Karzai, relying on what appears to be an overwhelming incumbency advantage, left Kabul only twice to promote his candidacy, with one of those rallies cancelled due to a rocket attack on his helicopter.

Absentee Candidate?

Meanwhile, the Associated Press reports that Karzai's visit to Germany this week "raised eyebrows as thousands of Afghan and international workers struggled to prepare for the Saturday vote amid threats by the Taliban and al-Qaida that they will try to block it. The president's opponents have charged his frequent trips out of the country—and virtual shunning of the campaign trail—show he is fearful of his own nation and is out of step with ordinary people." Karzai was among those absent from a presidential political debate yesterday, for which only two of eighteen candidates showed up. Afghanistan did figure prominently in at least one presidential debate—that between President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry. Afghanistan was mentioned 14 times during the 90 minute debate.

Will the election teams be ready?

This week, the Joint Electoral Management Board reports that 120,000 Afghan citizens have been recruited and trained to staff the country's 4,893 Polling Centers and 21,924 Polling Stations. There will be 280 independent international observers to monitor these stations, along with 4,000 local independent observers from Afghan NGOs. Will this level of oversight be sufficient to overcome efforts at fraud and intimidation? Over-registration in certain regions and the electoral climate suggests that some degree of fraud is inevitable; the question remains whether it is widespread enough to interfere with the legitimacy of the elections.

October 5, 2004

On The Eve Of The Election, Are The U.S. And Karzai Too Close For Afghans' Comfort?
Jeremy Barnicle

According to Afghanistan's election commission, Interim President Hamid Karzai's running mates are Ahmed Zia Massoud, brother of the legendary Tajik commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, and Karim Khalili, an ethnic Hazara leader.

But the casual Afghan observer could be forgiven for thinking another man, Zalmay Khalilzad, was joining Karzai on the ticket.

Last week, Khalilzad and Karzai cut the ribbon on a $9 million dormitory for female university students in West Kabul. Later, the duo stood together and expressed optimism for Afghanistan's future as they opened the country's National Museum. They are said to dine together several times a week. At every turn, Khalilzad sings the president's praises and pledges his support for the regime.

Alas, Khalilzad is not a candidate. He's not even an Afghan citizen. But he does have a big stake in the outcome of Saturday's poll: he is the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan.

As in any political campaign, these joint appearances are not accidental. Khalilzad was helping demonstrate to voters that Karzai is a leader who can bring home the bacon. Douglas Birch, covering the campaign for the Baltimore Sun, reported: "The message seemed clear. Karzai is a friend of the United States, and the United States is generous with its friends." Rumors of Khalilzad's cajoling rival candidates on Karzai's behalf have become so prevalent that the ambassador recently had to tell the Associated Press "Never have I said to someone that you should withdraw [from the campaign] in favor of President Karzai."

There is little doubt that Karzai will win the election, if not in the first round most certainly in the run-off. But how will Afghan voters interpret Karzai's close public relationship with the U.S.?

One possibility is that U.S. support strengthens Karzai's appeal to Afghans. Afghans recognize their dependence on the West for security and reconstruction and will support Karzai to keep the international donors happy. Foreign favoritism in their first-ever direct election of a president isn't exactly welcome among Afghans, but it's a necessary evil on the road to stability, prosperity, and robust democracy.

A darker possibility is that Karzai is seen as a foreign puppet, like so many Afghan leaders in the past. His campaign rivals—and Taliban propagandists—have marked Karzai as weak, ineffective, out-of-touch with Afghans, and, most disparagingly, beholden to foreigners. One of Karzai's opponents complained to the New York Times a few weeks ago, "Mr. Karzai can go with American helicopters and American bodyguards to 10 provinces in one day. What can we do?" The result: Karzai could win big with the help of his foreign sponsors but lack the legitimacy with common Afghans to assert more control over his lawless country.

Reality probably falls somewhere between these two scenarios. As the Times article concluded, if Afghans see the election "as American-directed political theater designed to impress American voters instead of Afghan ones, a landslide could undermine Mr. Karzai's legitimacy rather than enhance it."

Both Karzai and the U.S. need to be mindful that their relationship could be too close for the comfort of many Afghans.