December 1, 2004

New report makes recs for "complicated" Afghan poll
Jeremy Barnicle

The parallel Islamic democracy-building experiments in Afghanistan and Iraq beg comparison, however different their problems and personalities may be.

Therefore it is natural, given the high-volume chatter this week about the wisdom of proceeding with Iraq's scheduled January election, to consider whether Afghanistan's parliamentary election, slated for April, should take place as planned.

On one level, prospects look quite promising for the parliamentary poll. The October presidential ballot saw extraordinary voter turn-out, a relatively peaceful election day, and a decisive winner—all pleasant surprises for international observers. If elections went smoothly once, one might wonder, why can't they just do it again?

In its new report, "Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections," the International Crisis Group contends that the parliamentary election could be far more complicated and gives some stern but sensible recommendations to all involved in the planning and execution of the poll. The report charges that an election delay could "seriously tarnish" new president Hamid Karzai's legitimacy—which makes meeting the current schedule all the more urgent. Here are a few actions ICG recommends:

• The boundaries of legislative units—at the national, provincial, and district levels—need to be reviewed as soon as possible, based on a new population survey to be conducted by the Central Statistics Office. Karzai needs to issue decrees defining the powers and duties of the provincial and district councils, which will also be elected in April.

• Voters need to be educated on the vastly more complicated set of choices they have in this election (which involves multiple political parties and independent candidates running to be representatives for the national assembly, provincial councils, district councils) than they did in the previous one, in which they simply chose one candidate for president.

• The Joint Election Management Body (JEMB) needs to re-double voter registration efforts in areas that experienced low turn-out in the presidential election.

• The United Nations must make election preparation a top priority, as it was for the presidential ballot. Specifically, it needs to lend its full support to the census, voter registration, and public information efforts.

• The international community—in the form of the major donor countries has to insist that the election takes place on schedule, and should provide the necessary technical and financial support the Afghans need make it happen.

• ISAF and NATO need to line up troops commitments as soon as possible to ensure that the security footprint is broadened for this election.

Provided that these and other conditions are met, the parliamentary election could be an important force in consolidating the hopeful Afghan democracy. For the full ICG report, click here.

December 1, 2004

Stabilization through Administration
Carl Robichaud

Building bureaucracies is not sexy. It lacks the bricks-and-mortar utility of highway and bridge construction or the testosterone-tinged appeal of putting uniformed soldiers and cops on the street. But creating a bureaucratic infrastructure is one of the most urgent and critical steps Afghanistan can take toward preventing the recurrence of civil strife.

At least that's the premise of the Afghan Stabilisation Programme (ASP), a multi-donor $312 million dollar investment to rebuild the country's bureaucratic infrastructure, which kicks off this week. The money—a sizable chunk considering Afghan aid budgets—will mostly be spent on rehabilitating district offices, which provide the only direct interaction with government for most Afghans. As the deputy Interior Minister noted this week, "only a proper local administration can bring stability and build people's trust in the government."

Right now trust is low. According to the best available public opinion data, collected in April by The Asia Society, Afghans were generally satisfied with their current government but felt "extremely disconnected from their leaders":

Almost six citizens in ten (58%) did not feel the government cares about what people like them think and another 30% did not know. A mere 11% said the government does care about what they think—an extremely low percentage. Those regions reporting the greatest political alienation are the Northeast (where 71% say government doesn't care), Northwest (74%) and Central East/Kabul (76%). (From page 65 of the Full Report)

The government of Afghanistan faces the unenviable task of replacing this system of personal patronage with a bureaucratic system based on what Max Weber termed the 'rational-legal' claim to authority, in which merit is rewarded, practices are routinized, and leaders scrutinized and held accountable. The ASP plays a key role, as it will provide training for civil servants and construct standard public facilities for government departments, post offices, and banks. The fund would also provide a communications infrastructure, as well as vehicles for administrators and housing for senior civil servants stationed in the hinterland. The ASP relies on the premise that infrastructure and inducements will make it possible for districts to attract qualified administrators, and to supplant district bosses—who typically lack competency, loyalty, or both—with more effective and responsive leaders.

This is a tall order. Administrative facilities, if they exist at all, are decrepit, and communications remain unreliable. Afghanistan cannot take for granted any of the technologies or institutions—from telephone service to a functioning post office to working courts—that make government work elsewhere. Only six of Afghanistan's 364 districts have received services as part of the pilot phase; the program is expected to expand to 150 districts by the end of next year and to all districts within three years.

Will all this make a difference?

Not if the ASP ends up just being a series of construction projects. The hardest and most critical component, which will take many years to achieve, is finding and deploying skilled administrators, training them in new practices, and then providing them sufficient authority and resources so they can start delivering services. The Government of Afghanistan must focus its efforts on human, as well as physical, infrastructure, and it's not yet clear how the ASP will achieve this.

Afghanistan will never reach the level of centralization of Western states, and that's a good thing-a federalist model promoting greater regional autonomy is probably a better fit. Therefore, the key to a strong, stable national government in Afghanistan is a far-reaching, competent, and fair network of local government officials. On that effort, the Afghan Stabilisation Programme is a good start, but there is much to be achieved.