December 8, 2004

Karzai Inaugurated, Cabinet Decisions Loom Large
Carl Robichaud

On Tuesday, Hamid Karzai was inaugurated as President of Afghanistan. In the next two weeks he is expected to make one of the biggest decisions of his tenure: picking a cabinet.

Though Article 71 of Afghanistan's new constitution declares that cabinet members "are appointed by the President and shall be introduced for approval to the National Assembly," the absence of a Parliament gives Karzai a free hand to select whomever he wishes. Yet this may be a mixed blessing, as he will bear full responsibility for the new government. His victory, split along ethnic lines, presents an unenviable challenge: he must foster ethnic unity while striving to fulfill his promise of keeping warlords out of the new government. For more on this, see Inside Karzai's Shrinking Tent.

Pentagon Pledges Support, Contemplates Cuts

At the inauguration, the U.S. pledged continued support for Afghanistan, but troop requirements will make it difficult to retain the current force level (18,000) for long.

"There are still groups, extremists, that would like to take this country back," said Secretary Rumsfeld, appearing beside Karzai on Tuesday, "But it's not going to happen."

The expectation, however, is that troop levels will drop within six to nine months, especially if Parliamentary elections go smoothly and some sort of armistice is reached with Taliban insurgents. Earlier, Lieutenant General David Barno suggested that U.S. forces, which "are sized against the security threat", could be reduced if there is "significant reconciliation with large numbers of Taliban."

But even if things don't go so smoothly, Army recruitment and retention levels mean that there will soon be pressure to 'bring the boys home'—or send them to Iraq. For more details on the pressures facing the US army, see U.S. Army needs a long-term commitment to Afghanistan and Legions Stretched Thin, both by Jeremy Barnicle.

Toward a "Plan Afghanistan": Counternarcotics Plan Emerges

At a recent press conference, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Charles provided some details on the new $780 million U.S.-led counternarcotics initiative, which patterns itself on the Plan Colombia effort initiated five years ago under Clinton. Colombia reduced its cultivation by 21 percent in 2002 and 15 percent in 2003.

According to the briefing, the Afghanistan plan was the result of five months of behind-the-scenes work and reflected a "consensus of a lot of both our own agencies and the Afghan government and the British and other allies." It focuses on Afghan ownership of the process, and describes a 'five pillar strategy' to simultaneously raise the costs of cultivation and trafficking while improving alternatives.

The Five Pillar Strategy

1. Effective public information

Involves a "major public information and awareness campaign designed to discourage poppy cultivation and the drug trade, by driving messages including…the danger and the effect of heroin and drugs in general on the health and well-being of the Afghan people and families." The campaign will also seek to inform people that cultivation is risky and will be penalized.

2. Tough law enforcement

A "centerpiece" of the plan is the allocation of additional funds to "rapidly build out the justice sector" (a process which has been moribund). The supposition is that "by raising the risks and costs of growing and processing poppy, which is quite doable, you end up creating an equilibrium in which the other legitimate market begins to flow." Rebuilding rule of law capacity is a tall order: while police training has moved forward, justice sector reform has been stalled.

3. Enhanced alternative livelihoods

Last year, the U.S. invested only $26 million (and the U.K. $5 million (USD)) in alternatives to poppy cultivation. This year, the U.S. plans a bigger and more diverse package of assistance, from fertilizer to micro-credit to irrigation and roads. The plan is to provide aid both to farmers who eliminate their crops and to villages that sign and fulfill contracts to remain drug free. There will be accountability measures in place to prevent this assistance from diversion toward corrupt ends.

4. Aggressive interdiction

The US will allocate funds to "increase the capacity and ramp-up of efforts to destroy clandestine labs," opium warehouses, and pre-cursor chemicals. Interdiction efforts were the only component of last year's counternarcotics program that had a discernable impact, and the briefing cited a "fairly substantial uptick in the takedown of labs and stores of heroin" over the past few months. Without a more comprehensive program, however, interdiction has been ineffective and even counterproductive (see Afghanistan's Latest Drug Report: The Hidden Story).

5. Expanded eradication

Additional resources will be devoted to support government-led eradication efforts this coming growing season (which starts in February). Afghan authorities may choose to focus eradication on certain regions over others, or to focus on larger tracts first. The biggest decision is how to approach provincial governors, who usually have a stake in the drug trade. "But however [the central authorities] choose to do it, we are going to be there full bore, 100 percent to support them."

Secretary Charles suggested that a system of "auto-eradication," which has seen success in Peru, would be used:

"you go into a small village, you have a contract with that village…to eliminate a crop in a given area.…You go in and verify it. And if it is true that they've done that, then they get a combination of sort of a Chinese menu, if you will, of infrastructure capabilities…It's the way that it always should have been, and I think now is."

The blueprint for the "Plan Afghanistan," which focuses on Afghan ownership and an integrated program of incentives and penalties, looks sound on paper. Yet our war on drugs in Latin America has produced mixed results—U.S. drugs czar John Walters admitted recently that the billions invested over many years had not reduced availability of cocaine. Even if we accept the premise that Plan Colombia has yielded progress (and many critics do not) it has cost $7.5 billion dollars and taken five years to get those results. The $780 million Afghan initiative is a promising start, but there is a long road ahead.

(Read the complete briefing. See also: The Opium Economy and Trends in Opium Production and Trafficking)