February 17, 2006

This week in Afghanistan Watch:

• Joshua Wright: Warlords in Parliament: How it Happened
• Karzai, in Islamabad, presses Musharraf on militants
• Afghanistan’s army: a cup half full
• The Army’s cultural awareness program: lessons learned
• New UNAMA head arrives

“It is crucial to understand that, contrary to what has often been denounced here and there, opium production is more a consequence of Afghanistan's lawlessness, instability and poverty than its cause. Opium production clearly proceeds from poverty and food insecurity, from Afghanistan to Myanmar and Laos, where it is a coping mechanism and livelihood strategy.”

“While the Complaints Commission’s priority was upholding the Electoral Law and facilitating a fair election operation, the Disarmament Commission’s priority was disarming as many warlords as possible.”

"Most of the attackers are non-Afghans…We have proof, we have prisoners…We have addresses, we have cassettes."

"Those who are in the military know how difficult it is to make an army self-sufficient…if we are fighting alongside foreign forces, we have the capability to fight against guerrillas, but we can't do it alone."

“A national army should serve the people, not one ethnic group, not one person, or one province."

Afghanistan Watch Exclusive:

Warlords in Parliament: How It Happened

By Joshua Wright

Joshua Wright, former spokesman of the Electoral Complaints Commission in Kabul, has worked for international election administrations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Press coverage of Afghanistan’s recent election was largely positive: “the successful Afghan parliamentary elections” has become a stock phrase in recent commentaries on Central Asian politics and the American-led war on terrorism. Yet some in Afghanistan—both expatriates and Afghan nationals—take a more ambivalent view. They point out that despite provisions in the Electoral Law stating that no individual who was a “commander or member of an illegal armed group” would be allowed to run for office, numerous such individuals found their way onto the candidate lists and into the parliament. Pandering to anti-internationalist sentiment among Afghans, the local press ran numerous editorials accusing the UN-backed election administration of sitting on its hands while the warlords waltzed into parliament.

There seems a temptation to paint the election with too broad a brush. Perhaps it is just the perennial time constraints of the media, but few popular commentators have expressed an interest in the subtleties of how Afghanistan ’s election and disarmament processes became entangled, or what specific lessons policy makers should draw from them.

Janie Sitton, Electoral Complaints Commissioner and Attia Ali, Translator for the ECC, explain the electoral law and process during a workshop promoting women’s political participation. Source: UNOPS

More than They Bargained For

The task of determining which candidates had links to illegal armed groups fell to the Electoral Complaints Commission, a joint Afghan-UN institution mandated to adjudicate all formal allegations of violations of the Electoral Law. Many of the complaints it received bore little or no relevance to the election itself, alleging theft, murder, and war crimes that took place years or even decades ago. It was evident that the years without a functioning government or judicial system had left many Afghans hungry for justice, and they took the Complaints Commission as an opportunity to at last file their grievances.

The Complaints Commission was obliged to investigate each of these thousands of complaints pouring in from all over the country, regardless of their origin or motivation. However, with only 45 staff in Kabul , the commission did not have the capacity to investigate each complaint on its own. To lighten the load, it outsourced certain technical determinations to Afghan national institutions. It relied on the Ministry of the Interior, for instance, for information on criminal records. In determining links to illegal armed groups, the Complaints Commission relied on a joint Afghan-international body called the Joint Secretariat of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, composed of representatives from several Afghan government security offices, as well as NATO and Coalition leaders. Together, the Complaints Commission and the Disarmament Commission would determine whether or not to disqualify warlords from the candidate lists. But while the Complaints Commission’s priority was upholding the Electoral Law and facilitating a fair election operation, the Disarmament Commission’s priority was disarming as many warlords as possible.

A Variable Course

At the beginning of July 2005, the Complaints Commission initially announced that 216 applicants would be excluded from the candidate lists for having links to illegal armed groups. Yet after just two weeks of reviewing responses from these 216 applicants, the Complaints Commission announced that there would be only 11 final exclusions on these grounds. Then in September—just weeks before the election itself—the Disarmament Commission advised the Complaints Commission to disqualify a further 21 candidates already listed on the ballots. Why so many reversals?

First, there was legitimate concern about the way disqualifications could affect the security of the elections. Disqualifying a large number of armed individuals in July would have taken away a major incentive—the chance to get elected to the parliament—for them to support a peaceful election. In fact, early disqualification would have given armed candidates an incentive to attack or otherwise undermine election operations, since the provincial elections threatened their positions in local power structures. Second, the Disarmament Commission wanted to disarm as many warlords as possible and rightly saw that the election provided an opportunity to further its own work. In cases where the Disarmament Commission felt it could make more progress with a warlord if it had more time, retaining the threat of disqualification was a powerful weapon in continuing negotiations. Simply cutting warlords off in July would have taken away this weapon while it still might be used.

But while reducing the number of disqualifications had advantages for security and disarmament issues, it presented significant problems for the elections. The candidate lists needed to be finalized in July in order for all 40 million ballots to be printed and distributed in August for use in September. Written warnings about the September disqualifications were posted outside of polling stations, but given the low literacy rate in Afghanistan, many Afghans undoubtedly wasted their votes on these disqualified candidates (exact numbers aren’t available because votes for disqualified candidates were not counted). In addition, the fluctuating numbers of disqualifications undermined the public credibility of the candidate vetting process and the election administration as a whole.

Lessons Learned

As noted by the European Union’s monitoring mission, the simplest solution to some of these issues would have been to write the Electoral Law in a way that prevented the Complaints Commission from disqualifying candidates after the printing of ballots. This would have precluded the last minute confusions and conflict with the disarmament process.

Even with a tighter Electoral Law, though, the Complaints Commission was not given enough time or staff to investigate the thousands of complaints it received. It was the lack of resources, in fact, that led the Complaints Commission to rely on the advice of outside bodies like the Disarmament Commission.

The Complaints Commission’s lack of investigative resources was compounded by the overwhelming response of the Afghan public, which attempted to use the complaints process to resolve long-standing non-electoral disputes. Like many societies pulling out of an extended period of conflict, Afghanistan has a great need to address the many war crimes and other misdeeds committed in the absence of an effective, stable government or a functioning court system. For better or for worse, the architects of Afghanistan ’s reconstruction decided to put off any serious transitional justice project until after the establishment of democratic institutions. Whatever the benefits to Afghanistan ’s overall long-term political development, it came at the cost of more effective candidate vetting and complaints processes in the parliamentary elections.

Given the security risks and the logistical challenge, Afghanistan ’s elections were indeed an outstanding success. On the other hand, the parliament’s image has been tarnished by an association with warlords and both the Afghan government and the international community have lost credibility regarding their commitment to transitional justice and disarmament. This may have contributed to the low voter turnout in the last election—just barely over 50 percent—and bodes ill for the future of Afghan attitudes towards the government.

What effect the reputed warlords will have on the parliament itself remains to be seen. Hopefully, they will exert a stabilizing influence on the provinces, which have often been only loosely connected to the central government. On the other hand, they are unlikely to support a rigorous transitional justice program with appropriate funding or legislation.

Afghanistan watchers won’t have to wait long to find out, though. The UN’s human rights program is preparing a conference to plan transitional justice programs—we’ll soon see how far their proposals get.

Karzai presses Musharraf on militants

ISLAMABAD , Feb 15 (AP) by Rod McGuirk—Afghan President Hamid Karzai pressed his Pakistani counterpart on Wednesday to root out militants Afghanistan claims have launched a spate of recent cross-border suicide bombings. Karzai asked for a "more intensive pursuit of terrorists wherever they may be, in Afghanistan or Pakistan ."

Gen. Pervez Musharraf, after meeting with Karzai in Pakistan 's capital, Islamabad , called on "all the progressive political elements" in Pakistan to cooperate to suppress elements who may be abetting the Taliban.

Both leaders agreed more cooperation was needed between the military and intelligence agencies to stop terrorism along their shared border.

"The question of terrorism, the question of the Taliban, the question of the bomb blasts in Afghanistan - we are in this fight together against terrorism," Karzai told reporters after what he described as a "brotherly" two-hour meeting with Musharraf.…

Bilateral relations have long been touchy because of Afghan assertions that Taliban rebels find sanctuary in Pakistan , but they've soured in recent months, with Afghan officials becoming increasingly outspoken in blaming Islamabad for an upsurge in violence.

In Kabul , Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman Yousuf Stanezai said Wednesday that security forces have arrested "a large number" of Pakistanis and others linked to the spate of over 20 suicide attacks in the last four months. Many of the detainees have admitted during questioning that they received training at militant bases in Pakistan and were given money, explosives and other equipment there to launch attacks in Afghanistan , he said.

"The terrorists who come here for suicide attacks are attending training bases in Pakistan and are getting all their equipment there," Stanezai said. "We've arrested a large number who are either Pakistani or came from Pakistan ."

He said some of the leaders of the Taliban regime before it was ousted in 2001 are now living in Pakistan and are orchestrating the attacks. He declined to name them.

Pakistan , a former supporter of the Taliban but now a key U.S. ally in the war on terror, has deployed 70,000 troops along the Afghan border, and says it does its best to stop cross-border attacks.

Pakistan has complaints of its own about the situation along the frontier. The issue of Pakistani civilian casualties from rockets and artillery fire originating from Afghanistan would be raised with Karzai , Pakistan 's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Tasnim Aslam said Monday.

Relations in recent days have been anything but "brotherly." Anti-Pakistan sentiments continue to rise, recently resulting in protests. The leak of several video tapes on Sunday showing Pakistani involvement in suicide bombings was orchestrated by an Afghan official, presumably to set the stage for Karzai’s demands.

Afghan Suicide Bombings, Tied to Taliban, Point to Pakistan

KANDAHAR , Feb. 12 (NYT) by Carlotta Gall—Arrests and interrogations of suspects in a recent series of suicide bombings in Afghanistan show that the attacks have been orchestrated from Pakistan by members of the ousted Taliban government with little interference by the Pakistani authorities, Afghan officials say.

In taped interviews by an Afghan interrogator, two Afghans and three Pakistanis who were among 21 people arrested in recent weeks described their roles in the attacks, which have killed at least 70 people in the last three months, most of them Afghan civilians but also international peacekeepers, a Canadian diplomat and a dozen Afghan police officers and soldiers…

In the tape, the men described a fairly low-budget network that begins with the recruitment of young bombers in the sprawling Pakistani port city of Karachi . The bombers are moved to safe houses in the border towns of Quetta and Chaman, and then transferred into Afghanistan , where they are provided with cars and explosives and sent out to find a target.

The tape appears to confirm Afghan officials' suspicions that the suicide bombings, which are largely a recent phenomenon in Afghanistan , were generated outside Afghanistan , and in particular from neighboring Pakistan . It was shown to The New York Times by an Afghan official who asked not to be identified because of the diplomatic implications of the contents…

Pakistani officials in the past have said the Pakistanis arrested in Afghanistan are usually illiterate laborers looking for work.

Judging by the tape, Pakistan appeared to be the base for the terror network, however. In the interviews, all of the men appeared to speak freely, some expressing regret for what they had done. Only one showed some nervousness, though the interrogations seemed relatively relaxed.

A 'half full' Afghan army

KABUL, Feb 10 (CSM) By Scott Baldauf—Another excellent piece by Scott Baldauf. More could have been said about the implications of ethnic divisions within the force. For example, Ambassador to Afghanistan Robert Finn, in an October Afghanistan Watch piece, noted that:

The new national army and the new national police are achieving respectable numbers, and the army in particular has been able to operate with Coalition forces. There remains, however, the question of where the ultimate loyalties of those forces will lie, especially in a future when they are not coupled with Coalition forces. The early battalions were formed in cooperation with a Ministry of Defense dominated by Tajiks, but difficult negotiations by Coalition military staff brought about a more balanced superstructure.

Minister of Defense Wardak is capable and well-intentioned, but electoral results, which show most Pushtuns voting for Karzai and most Tajik and Hazaras voting for their own ethnic leaders, underscore a threat to national institutions. The failure to do so will not result in any kind of partition of Afghanistan , but could lead to a reversion to regional/ethnic conflicts. These conflicts brought about the current situation and led to the takeover by the Taliban in the first place.

The quality question, as in Iraq , is key. The numbers themselves mean little until the Afghan forces are capable of moving and operating independently…

Sgt. Mohammad Reza walks silently on a ridge, watching his platoon conduct a reconnaissance patrol in a gully below. His men are all recent recruits. Some are former militia fighters who have seen many battles but little professional training. Others are as green as the helmets on their head...four years after the Taliban's ouster, there are growing expectations that the ANA will pick up more of the slack in defending the country and providing the sort of security that allows Afghans to trust in their own government and their future.

"The fortunate thing about Afghans is that they have a feeling that our army is able to defend the country at a high level of proficiency," says Gen. Rahmatullah Raufi, the corps commander in Kandahar. "But when we talk of defending our country on our own, I confess, we can't do it ourselves. We are a poor country."

Eighty percent of the soldiers in his corps are illiterate, General Raufi says. Fifty percent of the officers are illiterate. Only 20 percent of his soldiers have a professional knowledge of how to serve in an army; the rest are former militia fighters or young recruits. "No one will tell you this, but even if the president sahib asks me, I will tell him this myself.

While the ANA appears to be on course in reaching its goal of a 70,000-man army by 2009, the army also realizes that it needs to improve the quality of its soldiers rather than merely put warm bodies out into uniform.

Afghan soldiers pause on an outcrop as they secure an ammunition cache in Kandahar. Photo by British Army Lt. Col. Andy Fenton. Source: DOD

"Previously, there was a need to produce large numbers of soldiers, but now we focus on quality instead of quantity," says Brig. Gen. Mohammad Amin Wardak, commander of the training center in Kabul…

While the ANA generally enjoys a good local reputation, some Afghans criticize Army leadership for packing the ranks with members of some ethnic groups, and not others.

"I don't want to call this army the Afghan National Army," said Najibullah Kabuli, a parliamentarian during an impassioned outburst in the lower house last week. "I want to call it the Army of National Rivalries. They are asking for exact numbers of Tajiks, exact numbers of Pashtuns."

ANA officials counter that ethnicity is not a criteria for selecting foot soldiers, although there is an attempt to maintain an ethnic balance among officers to reflect the country's ethnic mix.

General Raufi says ethnicity is just one of those issues that will take time to sort out in Afghanistan . "A national army should serve the people, not one ethnic group, not one person, or one province," he says. "Your army is almost 250 years old. Maybe you had those problems in your country's history too."

The Army’s cultural awareness program: lessons learned

Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale 2001) is available here.

FORT DRUM, N.Y. Feb 16, by John Kifner—As the 10th Mountain Division prepared to go to Afghanistan this month, its Third Brigade ordered boxes of the Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid's seminal book "Taliban" to be issued to officers along with body armor, high-tech seven-layer cold weather uniforms and ballistic-grade Oakley Blade wraparound sunglasses…

The centerpiece of the Army's strategy is the cultural awareness program, which includes lectures by outside experts, language lessons and recommended readings. In Iraq , many officers now believe, insensitivity to local customs in house searches, for example, created resentment that helped foster the insurgency…

"These are lessons learned," said Chief Warrant Officer Jeff Malmgren, an intelligence expert. "The hard way, unfortunately."…

Tom Koenigs. Source: UN

New UN envoy to Afghanistan arrives in country; will play key development role

16 February 2006—The new head of the United Nations Mission Assistance in Afghanistan (UNAMA) arrived in the war-ravaged country today…Mr. Koenigs, whose appointment was announced by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in December 2005, succeeds Jean Arnault, who served as Special Representative for Afghanistan between February 2004 and February 2006. The new head of UNAMA, who is a German national, previously served the world body in Kosovo and Guatemala.

Afghanistan Watch is prepared by Carl Robichaud, a program officer at The Century Foundation.

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