February 3, 2006

This Week in Afghanistan Watch

• Donor Promises and Afghan Realities
• U.S. renews aid pledges at London Conference
• Netherlands Votes to Join NATO Expansion
• Ambassador Ronald Neumann on Human Rights and Reconciliation
• U.S. Launches "Businesses Building Bridges" Private Sector Initiative
• Dr. Amin Tarzi: Afghans Likely to Be Disappointed at Conference

"There are bottlenecks, but the government has been extremely effective in some areas and can handle increasing amounts of money."

—Alastair McKenzie, World Bank country director for Afghanistan

"If we had waited for the Afghan institutions to be ready to absorb more money, the schools we have built in Afghanistan would not have been completed today."

—Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, German development minister  

"The people are asking themselves 'if these billions of dollars have been donated, which of our pains have they remedied, what ointment has been put on our wounds.'"

—Ramazan Bashardost, Parliamentarian and Former Planning Minister

"Without a viable legal system, foreign investment will remain elusive. Even Afghan expatriates in the Gulf states , who have invested roughly $5 billion in regional and global trading networks, are reluctant to invest in their homeland."

—George Soros, Chairman, Open Society Institute and Soros Fund Management

"If you don't defend yourself here, you will have to defend yourself back home, in European capitals and Americans' capitals."

—President Hamid Karzai

Afghans set to get greater control over aid
LONDON, Feb 1 (Financial Times) by Rachel Morarjee—World nations pledged $10.5bn in aid for the next five years at the end of a two-day conference in London, which set ambitious goals for improving security, human rights and economic development. . .But achieving these goals depends on aid being spent effectively. Over the past four years, Afghanistan has received $15bn of international aid, but less than a quarter of it has been handled by the Afghans themselves. Much of it has been given straight from donors to charities or companies from their home countries. . .At the heart of a blueprint presented in London this week, known as the “Afghanistan Compact”, is the establishment of a joint Afghan-United Nations Commission. This will be set up to ensure that Kabul meets its targets and can more effectively co-ordinate aid spending plans. . .

Key to changing that will be giving the Afghan government more control of the money and then holding officials accountable for tackling corruption and strengthening law and order. Afghan accusations that the use of foreign aid agencies and private companies for the bulk of reconstruction has inflated costs, and undermined the government, have become increasingly shrill in recent weeks. . .

Dutch vote troops to Afghanistan
After a last minute turnabout by the opposition, the Dutch parliament approved expansion of its NATO force in Afghanistan.

Earlier this week a piece appeared in the Financial Times, co-authored by members of the Democrats 66 party that had opposed sending troops. It’s worth a read: they argue that they oppose the expansion not because of the danger it poses but because the strategy is misguided (“a terrorism-fighting mission disguised as a reconstruction effort”) and suggests that Holland has gained little from cooperating with the U.S. in Iraq and elsewhere.

"Why the Netherlands is right to be wary over Afghanistan," LONDON, Feb 1 (Financial Times) by Bert Bakker and Louswies Van Der Laan—A number of questions will therefore be central to the Dutch parliamentary debate: can 1,200 Dutch soldiers make a real contribution to reconstruction when the province still suffers from extreme instability and violence? Is this, in fact, not simply a terrorism-fighting mission disguised as a reconstruction effort and thus limited in its capability to act? How much time would the Dutch spend defending themselves against Taliban, drug barons and other militants? And how much time would be left to achieve the stated Nato goal of winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people? How could we avoid this "reconstruction mission" becoming embroiled in Enduring Freedom's combat mission and how could locals spot the difference?

Regrettably, rather than discussing these concerns, the Dutch reluctance about the Uruzgan mission has led to a political war of words that crowds out the issues of substance. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato secretary-general, has accused those opposing the mission of being afraid of the dangers of Uruzgan. This is not why many parliamentarians oppose it. The problem with the new mission is that it is flawed in its conception: a PRT cannot succeed in a warzone. The PRT will probably not leave the city, perhaps not even the compound. By not addressing this fundamental criticism, Nato is not taking parliament's concerns seriously.

In addition, threats have been issued which suggest that the Dutch can be bullied into going. First, according to Nato sources, if the Dutch do not go to Uruzgan, the whole ISAF mission will fail. Francesc Vendrell, the European Union's special envoy to Afghanistan , claims nothing less than the EU's credibility in Afghanistan is at stake. If the urgency of this mission is so evident, it should be easy to find other countries willing to contribute troops. The fact that no one else is volunteering is added reason for the Dutch parliament to think twice before agreeing to it.

Second, it is claimed that the Netherlands would lose its international credibility if it refused to go and would no longer be a trustworthy Nato ally. The Dutch military is active in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, the Middle East, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Sudan, Aceh and Pakistan. The Dutch are shouldering a disproportionate amount of the international military burden and we are proud of this. How could questioning one mission sweep away all our achievements?

Third, it is claimed that the Dutch would lose influence if this mission does not go ahead. Is the reverse true? Did the Netherlands , or even President George W. Bush's most loyal ally, Tony Blair, UK prime minister, benefit from supporting the US campaign in Iraq ? Did we get concessions on Guantanamo Bay , extraordinary rendition and Central Intelligence Agency camps? It is precisely because the US has so blatantly ignored pleas from its allies on human rights that the argument of losing influence now sounds hollow.

The tone of the debate is one of "you are either with us or against us". If Nato is to flourish, we must accept that parliaments ask questions when there is a call for soldiers to risk their lives in foreign countries. We must also accept that sometimes they will say "no". A substantial debate on command structures, evacuation plans and respect for human rights should replace threats about the loss of credibility and influence. That will require a mature debate about the future of Nato, as well as the world's long-term commitment to Afghanistan . The time for that debate is now.

U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann. Source: State Department

Excerpts from Ambassador Ronald Neumann’s Scenesetter on Afghanistan
Washington, January 27, 2006—Neumann answers questions on the level of danger in Uruzgan, the issue of warlords in Parliament, and why so many different numbers are thrown around for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan:

Walter Kuperschuck, Dutch National Television: Thank you. How dangerous is this province, in your assessment, and could you tell us a little bit more about this (inaudible) maybe even a fighting mission more than a peacekeeping mission?

AMBASSADOR NEUMANN: It is certainly not a peacekeeping mission. . .when you have a force that's carrying out an active insurgency, that's not peacekeeping. How violent is Uruzgan? Well, there is periodic fighting in Uruzgan. We do the mission there with a couple of special forces outfits that are probably—well, let me just say substantially smaller than the contingent that you would send if you take on the mission. We maintain a PRT there. I was just down there talking to our people who maintain a variety of projects. We will have more ongoing.

I would expect that NATO as a whole, not just the Dutch, will be challenged by the Taliban. The fact that there has been a lively debate in the press I think makes it clear to the enemy as well as to the friend that there's an issue, and they will try to work on that scene. I don't anticipate that there would be, you know, daily huge battles. That's silly. But I anticipate there would be some fighting…

When one says, "How violent is it," well, you know, I spent my last 16 months in Baghdad before I went to Kabul . It looks pretty calm to me, but it's all your standard of comparison, you know. Next to Fallujah, Uruzgan looks good.

Pavel Vanichkin, TASS News Agency of Russia : Sir according to the Human Rights Watch, about 60 percent of the new members of the Afghan parliament have direct links to warlords, drug groups and so on and so on. Let me quote Mr. Sam Zarifi, who is the Asian division of Human Rights Watch, "How can people trust a government which allows warlords and notorious human rights abusers into power?" Could you respond to that?

AMBASSADOR NEUMANN: Sure. The Afghan parliament represents the face of modern Afghanistan . It has former military commanders. It may have some with ties to drug people. It has some very liberal people in it. It has some big reformers. I mean this is the composition of Afghan society today. There is no sort of pristine group which can suddenly spring to power and you can ignore everybody else, anymore than you can ignore any large group in any country…

You have militia commanders who have been resistance leaders in the terms that would be recognized by any country that has had a history of fighting oppression and resistance. Often these people were the only ones who provided security to their communities.

I don't find it terribly surprising that some of them got elected. It's also interesting how many of them did not get elected. There were a lot that ran for office and were not elected and there are people that were elected for office…

The question of whether you can have peace in Afghanistan is a question of whether you can bring all these different people together and bring them to a reconciliation of how to govern their country in the future. You can't do that by leaving real political forces outside. That is a piece of, to my mind, rather silly idealism that has no foundation in the real world. So the fact that they are in and cooperating, up to now, I mean, it's very early in the parliament and we'll see. So far, the first few weeks, they behaved all rather civilly to each other in the issues of electing a speaker and we haven't really gotten to real politics, so we'll find out. But you want to bring the contending influences inside. You want the debate in parliament and not in the hills with guns, and that is still something that is evolving. But overall, I find the parliament positive.

Voice of America: Coming to the aid of America, it is said that this year $625 or $629 million will be paid for the construction of Afghanistan…Now, if this amount has come from one billion or one million to 622, do you think that will give a good impulsion to the others to do something better for Afghanistan at this critical juncture?

AMBASSADOR NEUMANN: Well, we may have something to say in London as well, which I don't want to get ahead of. First, remember that the 1.2 -- people throw different figures around. There's a much larger figure when you include the military assistance, the train and equip of the Afghan National Army, of the Afghan police, and the assistance to drugs. And people, depending on whether they're trying to prove we're doing a lot or a little, cherry pick, selectively utilize those figures.

Though the $1.2 billion in aid for last year is comprised of both a regular budget allocation and a subsequent supplemental budget, we are early in the year. I don't want to say there will be a supplemental, but I would not rule it out either. So I don't know that the 622 is a final aid figure. It is also a very considerable figure. It also, I expect, will -- we are -- have not yet finished, but we are also dedicated to 100 percent removal of our debt to Afghanistan , which will also be a figure of another, probably 110 million. I think that's right. So I think we have to pay 10 percent to the budget and you can count that either way. Now I think our involvement, you know, 19,000 troops on the ground now. It may go down a bit as NATO goes up, but it'll still be 16,000 troops on the ground an active war fighting effort, a major embassy, debt removal and well over half a billion dollars which may rise. And I think that's a pretty significant commitment and I don't think there's any doubt that we are in this for the long haul. And if I had any doubt, President Bush dispelled it in our first meeting when he told me we had no doubt about it. And he was quite clear.

Secretary Rice speaks at a joint press conference. Source: U.S. Mission to Italy

U.S. Launches "Businesses Building Bridges" Private Sector Initiative for Afghanistan
Spread the word to U.S. and Afghan businesses that might be interested in getting involved.

On January 30, as part of a new initiative to highlight the importance of the private sector in the reconstruction of Afghanistan , Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President Hamid Karzai launched the "Businesses Bridges" initiative. . .The goal of this important initiative is to demonstrate the commitment of the U.S. business community to help train Afghan entrepreneurs, to identify practical means to improve the Afghan investment climate and to enhance commercial and economic linkages. Over the next year, Businesses Building Bridges' leaders will use their expertise and knowledge of U.S. business practices to help launch programs to mentor the Afghan business community including women entrepreneurs. These linkages will broaden understanding of business environments in both countries, and help develop innovative ways to increase foreign investment and U.S. business involvement in Afghanistan . The U.S. business leaders anticipate traveling to Afghanistan at least once over the coming year and also will host senior Afghan business executives in the United States . To complement the Businesses Building Bridges initiative, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) announced a grant of $500,000 for training Afghan entrepreneurs. In addition, the State Department will fund Afghan business delegations to select U.S. trade events in 2006.

What do you expect to come out of this donor conference in London?

The Afghan government has high expectations, and perhaps unrealistic ones. They are thinking that this conference will guarantee them funds for at least a five-year plan, not only for reconstruction but also for counter-narcotics, including crop subsidies, which will be expensive and also expecting that the conference will have an element of guaranteeing the security of the country, from both external and internal threats. They have proposed a five-year plan for development, but the main funding for this is expected to come from foreign countries. Close to 95 percent of Afghanistan 's income is actually aid donations. So the expectation is that the next five years will be basically guaranteed, not only funds but also security guarantees.

They're not giving a dollar figure because if people read it, they'll be disappointed, because I don't think that will come in. There are certain numbers Afghanistan tosses around, but if you look at just the counter-narcotics, to give you an idea: the Afghan [proposal for] fighting narcotics is a $20 billion package, which is $5 billion or $4 billion a year. This is more than all the aid the country gets. So I think because of this, they have not given any hard numbers. They have just proposed a plan, and they are looking for as much as they can get.

This is not really a donor conference in the sense that the first two conferences were, in Tokyo [January 21-22, 2002] and Berlin [March 21-April 1, 2004]. Some people—myself included—were critical [of those conferences], saying that Afghanistan had not taken the responsibility onto its own shoulders. It's always been, okay, this is the Bonn agreement and the UN and international community are supposed to do pretty much everything. Here, at least what is happening is the Afghans are taking the lead. They are the ones who have put forward this plan and they are not asking for so much directly. But if you look at the London meeting, what is being said and the expectations are not converging. This is my biggest worry about it. The expectations of the Afghan government and what is coming up will not actually come together.

Unfortunately, right now there's not much. The country has pretty much no taxation, although the Finance Ministry in 2005 tried to collect a tax on businesses—which was criticized as being not very business-friendly. There is no income tax to speak of. Another thing that the United States is now trying to help the country with is to generate some sort of income through customs. What President Karzai has been trying very hard to accomplish is to at least get the money that comes into the country on legal trade, which is pretty significant. That is an ongoing problem, how to establish a customs system with an understanding that the center and the periphery are together, and that money that comes through Herat from Iran doesn't stay in Heart, but goes into the public treasury. If they do manage to do that, it will generate some amount of funding from the country, which makes it more independent. But there's not much more. Unfortunately, the main income, which is not going to the government, is narcotics. A country that gets more than 50 percent of its GDP from narcotics is problematic.

The ISAF force has been a welcome addition, and has done a very good job as far as Afghans are concerned, in the north and the west. The southern expansion, or so-called Phase III expansion...includes some very volatile provinces: Kandahar, Helmand, Nimruz, Zabol, and Oruzgan are pretty [dangerous]. To go there, the NATO mandate says we're not dealing with the counter-narcotics, we're not going to chase the bad guys, or the terrorists, or the neo-Taliban, or whoever the anti-government forces [are]. So the question is, what will they be doing? The Afghan hope is that NATO comes there, but the U.S.-led coalition, Operation Enduing Freedom, will still be there to make sure that the security is kept. This is their hope, but while they're not saying it openly, there is a fear that once NATO comes in there. . . the United States may opt to take some troops out and move them] east, or even out of the country. The U.S. already wants to take some 2,000 to 3,000 out of the country, but if any more were withdrawn, there's a hesitation, an understanding in Afghanistan, that NATO—at least with the mandate they have today—may not be there. The hope still is that the U.S. will retain some sort of force there for the foreseeable future.

There is some very good news, which is the ANA, or Afghan National Army. The US is the lead country training them, and they're doing very well. There is a very realistic plan about how to generate these forces, and the timeline goes all the way out to 2009. The expected full strength will be 74,000. Right now they are somewhere between 24,000 and 25,000. The forces have been very good. In the early days there were a lot of desertions, but right now because the salaries are a bit higher, they're good. And from the U.S. perspective, they have been actually fighting pretty good in battles alongside the United States , and they have actually operated on their own also. Today, the ANA is one of the brightest spots on security. But another thing about the ANA is, how long will the subsidies continue to come in? When will the Afghan government actually start to at least think of some sort of financial responsibility? How long will the U.S. actually bankroll their salaries? If that doesn't happen, that force may not [continue to] be as good as it is right now.

The biggest problem right now is the ANP, or the Afghan national police, which is in absolute disarray. The numbers are exaggerated, and the police—traffic police, border control, counter-narcotics, and the police who are more like a militia force—all have problems. There are several problems. Number one, the training is very short, sometimes a week. Most--some statistics say up to 70 percent—of the forces are illiterate. Desertion is rampant, and the worst problem right now is corruption. Where ever they go, they seem to get involved in the corruption of the local government, or narcotics. So unless the police are also trained well, they're a big problem.

And then another thing of concern is that there are now three ministries dealing with counter-narcotics. There are four different forces fighting narcotics in different ministries. The Ministry of the Interior has two, there's one in the Ministry of Defense, and then a whole new ministry was created, the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. So there you have many many departments but neither their mandate nor their forces are very coordinated, which creates more problems.

Some areas are doing very, very good. I think reconstruction is, unfortunately, directly related to security. Where there is security, reconstruction has gone okay. I'm looking at places like the north. A very good example is Bamian in central Afghanistan. Herat [in the west] is doing very well. There are parts of Kabul where there is a reconstruction boom. Where you really have a problem, again, is the south and the east. There you have very private reconstruction—some people have money, they build a dam here, a bridge there—but there is nothing ongoing on a grand scale. You have the PRTS, provincial reconstruction teams, but they are very small for the job. They are good and simple, but because of the security problems, not much is happening. You have to look at the map: where there is security, things have gone pretty well; where there is no security it hasn't. The problem is that if this insecurity prevails in the south and east, then you may have a country divided not only on ethnic lines, but [economic ones as well]. That could create two sides of the same country, which would make problems beyond reconstruction.

Currently, they're true. There's this NGO-bashing, which is one of the main things the newly-elected Afghan national assembly has taken up. When you travel to Afghanistan, you do see that some of the foreign companies or NGOs are taking a lot of the money for their overhead and security, and not much goes to Aghanistan. In my view, some projects that would have taken longer but employed Afghans would have been good for training Afghans and employing Afghans. They brought Pakistani and Turkish companies in to build roads rather than training Afghans. That was mainly because there were timelines that had to be met, but there is an issue there. If the Parliament has its way, you'll see less and less of the NGOs. The problem is that if the NGOs leave, will the donors give directly to the Afghan government? That's an open question, because corruption if very high in this government. So donors are reluctant to give big chunks of money to a government that doesn't seem to have control over its finances. And another open question is whether the Karzai government has direct control over certain provinces, where a long-term project can go on without foreign hands.

Afghanistan is not yet a democracy. It is trying to become a state. It has democratic institutions, but it doesn't have what it takes to become a democracy: civil society, a population who knows what democracy means, who are aware of their own rights. Afghanistan has to first become a state: the central government has to have power over its territory; defined, secure borders; and a monopoly on the use of force. Afghanistan is marching towards becoming a democratic state. How long it takes, no one knows, but it's not a democracy in the sense of a Western-style democracy.

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Afghanistan Watch is prepared by Carl Robichaud, a program officer at The Century Foundation.

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