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April 21, 2006
This week in Afghanistan Watch:
"Our hearts go out to the families of the innocent victims of this battle…I've directed an investigation to determine the facts in this matter."
—Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin C. Freakley,
operational commander of the Coalition force
"Nation-building efforts cannot be successful unless adequate attention is paid to the health of the population."
—Seth G. Jones, co-author of RAND report
"Under the Taliban there was corruption on the top level, like governors and ministers used to take bribes of big amounts. But under them, it was not as common as it is now. This is a fact."
—Mir Hayatullah Pacha Al-Hashimi, deputy minister of justice
''I think we have been understaffed in Afghanistan since about December of 2001, when we began to pull troops out to prepare to send them into Iraq."
—Senator Bob Graham, former Intelligence Committee chair
Afghanistan by the Numbers
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| One of Afghanistan ’s 7,000 impermanent schools. Source: IRIN |
Annual Pakistan exports to Afghanistan , Taliban period: ~25 million
Annual Pakistan exports to Afghanistan , 2005: $1.2 billion (Source)
Portion of Kabul ’s population that lives in unplanned “informal settlements”: 80 percent (Source)
Schools with no permanent building, according to the Education ministry: 7,000
Number of schools that donors plan to build in 2006: 2,000 (Source)
Length of Afghanistan ’s new anti-narcotics law: 55 pages (Source)
Chance that an Afghan child under five is malnourished: one in two
Number of nations that rank worse than Afghanistan in this category: one (Source)
Now Available
Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition
(Council on Foreign Relations) by Barnett Rubin—"Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition argues that Afghanistan is still far from stability. While the country has reestablished basic institutions of government, it has barely started to make them work."
Next week Afghanistan will take a closer look at this groundbreaking report.
Coalition and Government investigate civilian casualties from “friendly fire” incidents
This week, a major counterinsurgent campaign has led to an estimated 20 civilian casualties in several incidents.
April 18 (BBC News)—Six people, including a mother and her newborn baby, have been injured in two incidents in eastern Afghanistan , reportedly by American forces. Both the incidents took place in Khost province. A six-year-old boy was also injured in one of the incidents.
The reports come as President Hamid Karzai has ordered a probe into the killing of seven civilians by coalition forces over the weekend. The US military has also launched an investigation into the deaths.
The mother was traveling home from a clinic with her newborn baby after midnight in the Yaqubi district of Khost in the east of Afghanistan when they were fired upon by US forces, a family member told the BBC… Then in Khost city a few hours later, another car was shot at by a US patrol - a young man and a six-year-old boy were wounded. The provincial police chief said he was investigating both reports.
On Monday President Karzai's spokesman said he was "very unhappy" about the deaths of seven civilians over the weekend and warned all those involved in military operations to take more care not to injure civilians. The civilians were reportedly killed in "friendly fire" incidents during fighting against militants.
US to Investigate Deaths Related to 2 Battles in Afghanistan
KABUL, April 16 (NYT) by Carlotta Gall—The United States military on Sunday announced that it would investigate the deaths connected to two combat operations in Afghanistan in the past two days against insurgents believed to be tied to the Taliban. Seven civilians were reported killed in one battle. In the other battle, civilians also were reported killed or wounded, and four Afghan police officers were reported by villagers to have been killed by United States fire.
The prompt decision to investigate the circumstances in both incidents and to announce the step reflected a new openness by the United States military command about its operations in Afghanistan . But it also revealed coordination problems among Afghan forces, the American military and other foreign forces in Afghanistan as the insurgency that is believed to be linked to the country's former Taliban rulers has found strength with the return of spring weather.
Afghanistan told no: Canada won't give direct aid to government
A major conclusion of the new Afghan Compact is that donors must channel more of their funds through the government of Afghanistan to build legitimacy and accountability. We’re starting to see, this is easier said than done.
Donors have their own national mechanisms for delivering aid, and don’t like to deviate. Endemic corruption within Afghanistan further complicates the situation. Stay tuned…
OTTAWA, April 18 ( Winnipeg Sun) by Stephanie Rubec—Afghanistan is lobbying Stephen Harper's government to bypass humanitarian organizations and let Canada 's aid flow directly into its government's coffers.
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Afghan Ambassador Omar Samad. Source
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Omar Samad, Afghanistan 's ambassador to Canada, said he's pressing the Ottawa to stop sending aid money through such non-governmental agencies as Oxfam and Care Canada , which control where the money is spent and on what projects. Samad said the agencies are squandering too much of the funds on administrative costs.
Samad said the Afghan government has provided a blueprint for aid spending and would use Canadian funds on infrastructure, agriculture, water and electricity and to run the country. He said the government knows its citizens' needs best, and countries like Canada should trust his country to spend aid money on those priorities.
But the Conservative government is balking at giving the Afghan government complete control over Canadian aid. Canada has earmarked $650 million in aid to Afghanistan from 2001-09 mostly to fund projects aimed at children and women -- more than for any other country during that same period.
Ted Menzies, parliamentary secretary for international aid, said Afghanistan 's government lacks oversight mechanisms and has too young an administration to manage Canada 's millions. "A lot of people have problems with government-to-government aid," Menzies said, adding under that system it's more difficult to track what funds are spent on and avoid misspending…
U.S. drug chief cites progress; numbers suggest otherwise
The following press release is a rather astounding attempt to spin "enormous progress" from a program that has rendered marginal (and probably short-lived) results from extravagant expense.
U.N. reports, which are the best measure of the narcotics economy, show 2005 poppy cultivation was down 20% but that production declined only 4%. This 4% decrease was achieved for a mere $1 billion—more than the entire national budget of Afghanistan . And early estimates for the 2006 harvest show that a rebound is likely. See Afghanistan Watch, March 10.
Afghanistan ’s opium economy is driven by a set of complex economic, social and political dynamics. But from listening to drug czar John Walter’s, you’d think it’s the result of farmers getting “bullied by the Taliban to grow opium”.
Walter argues that the “we're really doing rural development”; it’s admirable that the U.S. has come around to seeing that roads, electricity, and microcredit are essential. But because of inefficient contracting and distribution systems, few benefits have actually reached Afghan farmers. Until agricultural opportunities are transformed—and not just on paper—the narcotics trade will flourish.
Washington, 11 April 2006 (State Department) by Phillip Kurata—Afghan authorities are succeeding in reducing opium poppy cultivation, according to the director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, John Walters.
Briefing reporters in Washington April 10 after a visit to Afghanistan the previous week, Walters said that he saw "enormous progress" in Afghanistan's effort to eradicate opium poppy production since 2004 when he made his first visit to the country.
The most impressive progress occurred in the eastern province of Nangahar , traditionally one of the prime poppy growing areas of the country, he said. In 2005, the area under poppy cultivation dropped by nearly 50 percent nationwide, but the figure for Nangahar province was a decline of 90 percent, he said.
"This happened in Nangahar with no disruption," he said, parallel with efforts "to provide livelihoods that were legitimate and consistent with the continued rule of law." The United States estimates that 207,600 hectares were under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2004, and the figure dropped to 107,000 hectares in 2005, according to one of Walters' aides. The amount of opium produced did not show a corresponding steep drop, however: 4,950 metric tons in 2004 and 4,475 metric tons in 2005, according to the Walters' aide.
The United Nations reports that 2.3 million people, 10 percent of the Afghan population, were involved in opium cultivation 2004; in the following year, the number of opium cultivators fell to 2 million, or 8.7 percent of the population.
Walters said that the opium trade remains the last large threat to Afghanistan, after the Taliban and al-Qaida have been driven from power and the warlords largely have been disarmed.
Walters said that the Afghan government in March launched an aggressive campaign in southern Helmand province, which was the heart of the Taliban power in the 1990s, to eradicate poppy cultivation after an unsuccessful attempt at eradication in 2005.
"The effort to have centralized eradication in force in conjunction with the governor's bogged down last year in Helmand , with farmers, local religious leaders and political leaders protesting and seeking to stop the eradication force," Walters said.
A new governor of Helmand, appointed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, has taken the lead in dispatching local and provincial teams of eradicators, armed with tractors, to destroy poppy fields while Afghan army units protect the eradicators from the Taliban, Walters said.
In 2006, there have been no protests from farmers, religious leaders or local political leaders opposing the eradication, Walters said.
"The opposition has come from the Taliban. The Taliban has encouraged farmers to grow poppy and they have said they will punish people who eradicate voluntarily, as the provincial government has asked. What the continuing eradication process shows is that the Taliban can't keep their promises…"
"The public opinion effort by the government to educate and support standards of right and wrong show that the vast majority of Afghans understand and believe that it is wrong to grow opium and to make money off this product. They don't want to be bullied by the Taliban to grow opium and have no alternative," he said.
Mission of Frustration in Afghan Villages
LANDAR, Afghanistan, April 19 (WP) By Pamela Constable—A convoy of six Humvees bounced along a winding, rocky riverbed last week and entered this village in Khost province near the Pakistani border, chased by a mob of schoolboys in bright blue tunics and pajamas.
The visitors' mission was a tricky one: part diplomacy, part sleuthing, part carrot and stick. The local tribe was viewed as friendly, but U.S. forces had received information that anti-government insurgents were active in the area. By offering to help the needy village, while staging a stern show of force, they hoped to reinforce its wavering allegiance.
For the next two hours, a young U.S. Army captain and three Special Forces officers sat in a dirt courtyard on hastily arranged plastic chairs, while armed cavalry troops guarded each door. Three bearded village elders sat and welcomed them politely. Would the visitors like tea?
"Tea, yes, that would be good," said Denny, a Special Forces member who asked to be identified only by his first name. He smiled, but then he glimpsed some young men lingering outside, and his tone changed sharply. "No one goes in or out."
Then the questions began. The elders listened and nodded gravely, but the exchanges, translated by two Afghan interpreters accompanying the soldiers, had a perfunctory feel. Similar rituals had been performed in a hundred other villages, with similar results.
"Are there any Taliban, al-Qaeda or Hek forces left here?" asked Denny, referring in the last case to followers of renegade militia leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
"No, no, no," one elder said, while the others shook their heads emphatically.
"When people drive at night from Pakistan to Khost, do they come through your village?" Denny asked. U.S. and Afghan officials say Islamic insurgents regularly sneak across the border into Afghanistan to stage attacks.
"No, no, no," the elder repeated with a frown. A boy poured more tea and put out little dishes of candy all around.
Capt. Frank Brooks, 30, a U.S. cavalry officer, leaned forward, trying a different tack.
"We know you are good people, but we have pulled IEDs out of the soil near your village," said Brooks, referring to improvised explosive devices or roadside bombs, which have killed several dozen foreign and local troops across Afghanistan this year. "This is dangerous for us and also for your children walking to school."
The elders nodded gravely again, agreeing that it was indeed a danger and protesting that they knew nothing. They said they were grateful for the presence of U.S. forces, that they had good relations with the local police commander, and that they had fended off insurgent attackers three times.
"I find it difficult to believe what you are saying because of all these bad reports we are getting," Brooks said evenly. "We know your village is poor, and would like to come back here and deliver a lot of school supplies, but we won't do that until the security situation gets better. We need your help."
"Inshallah," the elders responded, their faces solemn and noncommittal. If God wills it…
The other insurgency
April 16 (Boston Globe) by Drake Bennett—Superficially, the situation in Afghanistan already shares some broad outlines with Iraq: a fragile government, representing three ethnic groups with a history of enmity-in Iraq, Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds; in Afghanistan, Tajiks, Pashtuns, and Shia Hazaras-threatened by an insurgency composed of elements from the deposed regime and foreign jihadis. Plus an American commitment, in terms of troops and money, that many feel falls short of what's necessary to truly stabilize and rebuild the country.
Despite these similarities, however, Afghanistan has only recently begun to see a rise in the sort of violence that in Iraq has become familiar. And while there's some disagreement among observers as to whether this spike in violence represents the Afghan insurgency's final stand, or the early stages of an escalation into something more incendiary, a closer look suggests that the US has had advantages in Afghanistan that it lacks in Iraq-advantages that the Bush administration and the newly formed Afghan government may be squandering.
''Insurgencies tend to arise out of a mix of motives: ethnic, sectarian, ideological, economic," says Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow in Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Iraq 's insurgency, he argues, ''is more a matter of ethnic and sectarian interests." It is, in other words, a civil war, with different ethnic and religious groups each fighting to dominate the other.
Afghanistan is something different, he argues. ''It's more like the Vietnam model," he says. He means it to be an encouraging comparison. In Afghanistan , ''the conflict is partly ethnic, but largely ideological." The Taliban, though largely Pashtun, is not just an ethnic militia, but like the Maoist Vietcong ''has a particular conception of what government should look like for everyone."
That particular conception, based on fundamentalist Islam, has limited appeal in Afghanistan . While the new government, led by President Hamid Karzai, is still weak, with little authority beyond Kabul , the Taliban and the handful of foreign jihadis fighting alongside them are widely hated. A poll of 2,000 Afghans conducted last November and December by the University of Maryland 's Program on International Policy Attitudes found that 93 percent had a favorable opinion of Karzai, while 8 percent had a favorable opinion of the Taliban.
War-weariness, too, has limited the support for the insurgency. '' Afghanistan has spent 20 years in civil war," points out James Dobbins, former US special envoy to Afghanistan , ''and the vast bulk of the population and the leadership are anxious not to go back into it." The presence of US and NATO troops in the country has coincided with a period of relative calm, and, unlike Iraqis, Afghans by and large support the continued presence of American troops in their country. The same recent PIPA poll found that 83 percent had a favorable opinion of the US forces in the country and 66 percent favored expanding NATO peacekeeping forces beyond Kabul.
New Studies
AREU Case Study: Urban Livelihoods In Kabul
Kabul has grown at breakneck speed, with most of its residents squatting in informal slums. This report looks at the needs of the urban poor, and makes recommendations for how to improve employment, strengthen and legalize land tenure, and connect the poor to political decisionmaking.
RAND study faults US health effort in Iraq, Afghanistan
The following Reuters paraphrase of the RAND report seems a bit pointed, at least as far as Afghanistan is concerned. The study itself offers a more balanced assessment of U.S. efforts in health pointing out shortcomings while rightly acknowledging the context of a “complex political emergency” in which the “main health challenges in Afghanistan are not amenable to quick fixes”.
WASHINGTON, April 19 (Reuters) by Will Dunham - The United States has botched efforts to improve public health Iraq and Afghanistan, missing a chance to gain support in those countries, an independent report released on Wednesday said.
Instead of devising largely fictitious or abstract “grand plans,” agencies should focus on assessment, oversight, and coordination of actual activities. |
U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq following the 2003 invasion failed to maintain and improve basic sanitation and provide safe drinking water in heavily populated areas, the RAND Corp. report stated. This may have encouraged anti-American sentiment and sympathy for the insurgency, the nonprofit research organization said.
"Nation-building efforts cannot be successful unless adequate attention is paid to the health of the population," said Seth Jones, a RAND political scientist and a lead author of the report. "The health status of those living in the country has a direct impact on a nation's reconstruction and development, and history teaches us it can be a key tool in capturing the goodwill of a nation's residents."
The full report is available here: Securing Health: Lessons from Nation-Building Missions.
Here are some excerpts from the report’s section on Afghanistan.
- “Afghanistan was treated as a national reconstruction project when, in reality, it was a development challenge. This misfocused direction—along with the goals, expectations, and instruments chosen to address it—slowed Afghanistan ’s health care development.”
- “The basic lesson in Afghanistan is that in severely degraded environments, sophisticated planning may be unrealistic and premature. International agencies spent significant effort designing “joint” plans, strategies, and policies with the Afghan Ministry of Health.”
- “Most of the studies did not produce significant new insights, but merely repeated what was already known about Afghanistan : there were too few skilled health care workers, especially in rural areas.”
- “As for the national plans, their recommendations were either obvious—that maternal deaths needed to be reduced and maternal and child health needed to be the focus—or they were overly ambitious and unlikely to be implemented for several years.”
- “GAO found that USAID’s program in Afghanistan generally lacked “measurable goals, specific time frames, and resource levels”; did not “delineate responsibilities”; had not “identified external factors that could significantly affect the achievement of its goals”; and did not “include a schedule for program evaluations” to assess progress against such goals.” In a setting like the one presented in Afghanistan , international agencies may be better off focusing on effectively monitoring their own efforts rather than assisting the Afghan ministry in designing an unwieldy and purely hypothetical monitoring structure.”
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Afghanistan Watch is prepared by Carl Robichaud, a program officer at The Century Foundation.
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