This Week in Afghanistan Watch:

• Overstaying Our Welcome? Assessing the U.S. Military Presence
  
• Analysis on the US-Afghanistan Strategic Pact
  
• Other News from Afghanistan

Afghan President Hamid Karzai's request to President Bush this week for greater control over American troops in his country cuts to several central questions: what foreign presence is appropriate in Afghanistan? Who should run these foreign troops, and to whom should they remain accountable? Are they there to preserve Afghan security and fight terrorism, or for other purposes as well?

Karzai is not the first to voice skepticism about the U.S. military's long-term role in the region. To many allies and competitors, the U.S. force posture seems incongruent with the threat. In Afghanistan alone, the Pentagon leads a coalition of 18,000 troops (16,700 of them American), ostensibly to combat a dwindling Taliban insurgency of perhaps a thousand militants. The mandate of these troops is to combat al Qaeda and the Taliban; they do not play a role in counternarcotics operations, and are only peripherally involved in providing security for Afghan citizens. Rather than decreasing in size in the four years since the defeat of the Taliban, coalition forces almost doubled in the past year from a low of 10,000.

So far, U.S. troops have played a constructive role for Afghanistan. They deposed the Taliban's harsh rule and restored stability to a country that had seen a generation of war. Alongside NATO forces and NGO partners, they helped to preserve and extend governmental authority, and paved the way for elections. October's election was essentially a referendum on Karzai's rule, and voters felt that he provided stability and opportunity, in large part because of his relationship with Washington.

A little over a year ago, attitudes towards American and the U.S. military were generally favorable. The most comprehensive survey, conducted by the Asia Foundation from February to March 2004, found that roughly two-thirds of Afghans were positive toward both the U.S. and U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan. However, the survey gave rise to concerns: a plurality of Afghans were unfavorable to the U.S. in both the Northwest (58 percent unfavorable vs. 30 percent favorable) and the South (46 percent unfavorable vs. 37 percent favorable). Attitudes toward the U.S. military were similar (59 percent unfavorable vs. 26 percent favorable in the Northwest, 42 percent unfavorable vs 39 percent favorable in the South.) (see pp. 9-10)

Moreover, there is evidence that Afghans are chafing at the thought of a long-term American 'occupation.' As General Richard Meyers and President Karzai both argued last week, the violent protests on May 11 were less the result of a single incident (the Koran desecration) than of broader frustrations about America's role. Numerous complaints broadcast in the Afghan media—ranging from imperious behavior by U.S. security contractors, to abuses during raids, to claims that former U.S Ambassador to Afghanistan Khalilzad was the real head of state—suggest that the Afghan public is growing weary of Washington's hand. The presence of American troops, which were ramped up to ensure the success of the coming parliamentary elections, could have the opposite effect, spurring a political backlash that strengthens the position of unsavory factions.

In addition, this troop presence may be fueling anti-Americanism in the region. Operation Enduring Freedom, originally viewed positively by much of the world, has been re-cast in the wake of America's invasion and occupation of Iraq, and is seen by much of the world as part of a U.S. grand strategy of hegemony. A March 2004 Pew poll found that by a wide margin people in the Muslim countries surveyed (Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, and Morocco) oppose America's war on terrorism. The 2005 Pew polling data indicate that respondents question the sincerity of America's motives in the war on terror—especially in Pakistan where only 6 percent felt U.S. efforts were sincere (vs. 58 percent insincere.) A majority of respondents in many nations worried that the U.S. military posed a threat to their country. The net result is suspicion of U.S. intentions and an erosion of America's position in the region.

The U.S. can assuage some of these fears by working to internationalize the security presence in Afghanistan. The Pentagon long opposed the expansion of U.N.-authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces, resulting in a small force of 5,000 limited to Kabul. The mandate of this force, which consists of NATO troops, was recently expanded to the provinces, and has played a role in securing elections and reconstruction. These international forces should be bolstered to guarantee stability until the Afghan army reaches sufficiency (and until its loyalty to the state, rather than to individual factions, is confirmed.) The international force should be increasingly constituted by Muslims, such as the Turkish troops that serve there with distinction today (to bring in more troops from mostly-Muslim states, ISAF will eventually need to involve non-NATO partners.) An expanded ISAF, authorized by the U.N., could eventually supplant the American forces. This force would have the benefit of being multi-national, multi-religious, and internationally accountable.

It will be interesting to see how such a proposal is greeted by Washington, which has not pressed for increases in international troops in Afghanistan as energetically as it has in Iraq. A sizeable and indefinite base presence in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan allows the U.S. to project power toward China and Russia. Moreover, in the President's transformative vision for the greater Middle East, American troops help ensure a loyal, democratic, and thriving Afghanistan that can induce reform within Iran and Pakistan. Of course the question remains: does this presence serve as a stimulant for democratic and societal reform or as an irritant that can incite hostility and help recruit radicals?

Another troubling implication of the over-militarized approach to America's regional goals is that military expenses have crowded out critical state-building investments. America efforts in Afghanistan follow the meringue model of nation-building, with a substantial military crust concealing a broad but airy layer of societal engagement. America sponsors numerous reconstruction initiatives, but many of them lack substance and funding. If budgets reveal priorities, the administration's 2005 supplemental request is illuminating: in a vast request for $82 billion, only $2 billion was set aside for non-military aid to Afghanistan. Military operations in Afghanistan, on the other hand, are estimated at $13 billion per year.

It's sad to say that America's anemic levels of assistance are not unique among donors, which pledged last year to provide $8.2 billion in aid over three years, a far cry from the World Bank and Afghan government's estimate that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion over seven years. What is unique is the military presence that accompanies these aid gestures. The U.S. should work to share the military burden, and then re-invest the savings into measures critical to long-term success: confronting the drug problem, cracking down on smuggling, and expanding government capacity. Afghanistan remains abjectly poor and ranks among the worst-off in nearly every development indicator, including education, women's health, life expectancy, infant mortality, and infectious disease. Even with recent economic and educational progress Afghanistan could still fail.

It's important not to downplay the good that America has done in Afghanistan. U.S. dollars have contributed to the construction of over 200 schools, the immunization against measles and polio of 4 million children, and the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's lifeline—the critical Kabul-Kandahar highway. With U.S. support, Karzai has gradually expanded the reach of the central government toward the lawless periphery. But America has neither done as much as it could, nor as much as it has promised. Afghan expectations are unrealistically high, and the situation remains precarious: a recipe for instability.

Karzai yielded this week in accepting a continued U.S. presence without Afghan or international oversight. But the negative repercussions of an indefinite U.S. military presence are only likely to grow, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

On the US-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership

What does the agreement says about America's intentions, Afghanistan's internal politics, and Afghanistan's neighbors? Afghanistan Watch has compiled several perspectives on the issue: Anatol Lieven (CEIP) discusses the difference between Bush's view ("a strategic partnership") and Karzai's ("a memorandum of understanding"); Ian Kemp (London-based defense analyst) says the agreement's language suggests American forces will remain in Afghanistan for a long time; and Amin Tarzi (RFE/RL) explores the implications of recent unrest and the pact's impact on parliamentary elections.

Strategic Partnership Made Public

May 25, 2005 (RFE/RL)—The full text of the "Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership" signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai on 23 May in Washington has been made public by the White House. In the declaration, the two countries commit to ensure that "Afghanistan will never again" become a safe heaven for terrorists. The primary goal of the strategic partnership is described as strengthening U.S.-Afghan ties in order to help Afghanistan's "long-term security, democracy, and prosperity."

While the declaration specifically states that it is not "directed against any third country," it does encourage the "advancement of freedom and democracy in the wider region." The declaration encourages cooperation "between Afghanistan and its neighbors," while deterring them from "meddling" in Afghanistan's internal affairs. In case Afghanistan perceives that its "territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened" or is at risk, the declaration calls for consultation "with respect to taking appropriate measures" to alleviate such threats.

The joint declaration remains somewhat vague on the issue most debated among Afghans, namely the establishment of permanent U.S. military bases in Afghanistan. The partnership allows the United States to "continue to have access" to Bagram Air Base north of Kabul and to "other locations as may be mutually determined." U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan will continue to have freedom of action in their activities "based on consultations and pre-agreed procedures."

'Strategic Partnership' Seen As Move Toward De Facto Rights For U.S. Bases

May 25, 2005 (RFE/RL) by Ron Synovitz—Analysts who have been studying the details of the joint declaration by Bush and Karzai said they were especially struck by one paragraph. That paragraph says "it is understood" that U.S. military forces will continue to have access to the Bagram Air Field north of Kabul and other strategic military facilities "as may be mutually determined." It also says U.S. and NATO forces will continue to have "freedom of action" to conduct military operations that are based on "consultations and pre-approved procedures."

Ian Kemp, a London-based independent defense analyst, said such language suggests U.S. military forces will remain at bases in Afghanistan for a long time.

"Any strategic partnership should be to the benefit of both countries," Kemp said. "What the United States would be expecting to supply to the Afghan forces is continuing assistance -- both in terms of training and in terms of equipment. A continuation of what we've seen over the past four years of building up the Afghan security forces themselves. But in return for that, the United States is going to be looking for the basing of U.S. troops and U.S. aircraft in Afghanistan. And also, [the United States will be looking for] host-nation support. And possibly, intelligence."

Anatol Lieven, an expert on Afghanistan at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, agreed that the issue of long-term U.S. military bases is central to the partnership.

"I've always been completely sure that the Americans intended to keep Bagram—and other places as well—as permanent bases," Lieven said. "This, I think, will just take things a further step toward formalizing that. It is potentially very, very controversial within Afghanistan. [But] frankly, from Afghanistan's point of view, it probably will be necessary to keep the Americans and NATO around for a very long time to prevent Afghanistan's own inner demons from taking over again."

Lieven said it is significant that Bush spoke of signing "a strategic partnership" while Karzai stressed that their agreement is a "memorandum of understanding." The Afghan Constitution requires parliament to approve formal treaties. But Karzai could have difficulties getting a future parliament to agree to give long-term basing rights to the U.S. military.

"The fact that this document is a 'memorandum of understanding'—and not a treaty—is very important," Lieven said. "I don't think that Karzai would dare to submit a treaty agreeing to long-term American basing rights to an Afghan parliament, when and or if the Afghan parliament is ever convoked. I think it would provoke massive resistance. And it could cause a very major political crisis in Afghanistan. The point is, rather, to give all kinds of guarantees to the Americans. But at a less formal level which will allow for de facto basing rights to continue indefinitely and, in return, procure for Karzai and Afghanistan more commitments of American support."

Lieven said the most important aspect of the strategic partnership for Afghanistan is the psychological security it provides. He said it shows that the United States is not considering withdrawal. And that, he said, is essential for keeping European countries and other members of NATO involved in Afghanistan.

Afghans Cautious On U.S. Military Bases

May 25, 2005 (RFE/RL) by Armin Tarzi—Before embarking earlier in May on a visit to Europe that preceded his trip to the United States, Karzai hastily invited close to a thousand Afghan representatives to a meeting to discuss his proposal for a strategic partnership with the United States. The results of the 5 May meeting, which included many members of the Loya Jirga (grand assembly) that approved Afghanistan's constitution in January 2004, remain ambiguous.

Whereas Karzai spokesman Jawed Ludin said that the representatives were "on the whole...very positive" in their response to Karzai's proposal, some of the participants reacted less favorably.

Mohammad Yunos Qanuni, the leader of the National Understanding Front—a newly-formed opposition block—and the second-place finisher behind Karzai in the presidential elections, told "Kabul Weekly" on 18 May that he thought the "opinion of the representatives...were against the expectations of President Karzai." Qanuni, echoing sentiments widely held by Afghan media outlets since Karzai's announcement of the strategic partnership proposal in April, said that such a relationship would be "beneficial for both countries." However, Qanuni added that the "issue of U.S. bases in Afghanistan" was "something new." He did not reject the idea of bases, however. Instead, in line with the opinions of many in Afghanistan, he said that such a decision "can only be made by [the Afghan] parliament," which is scheduled to be elected in September.

Possible Foreign Opposition To U.S. Bases

The bases issue entered the headlines together with this month's student demonstrations in several Afghan cities. Students were ostensibly angered by a report in the U.S.-based "Newsweek" magazine that some interrogators at the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba had desecrated the Koran—a report later retracted by the magazine. But some of the students' slogans also rejected Karzai's military-base plans.

Following these deadly demonstrations, analysts raised the issue of whether some of Afghanistan's neighbors were manipulating public opinion in Afghanistan in an attempt to prevent the development of a long-term U.S.-Afghan partnership (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 17 May 2005).

In an interview broadcast on 14 May on Afghanistan Television, President Karzai, without naming any particular country, stated that the demonstrations were instigated from abroad in order to—among other things—stop his policy of seeking to establish a partnership with the United States.

Kabul's main pro-government daily, "Anis," on 17 May alleged Iranian involvement in the demonstrations. The paper argued that because the United States is engaged in "a psychological battle" against Iran, Tehran is trying to arouse anti-U.S. sentiments among the Afghans and drive the United States out of Afghanistan.

Whether Iran had a direct hand in the recent demonstrations is something that may never be proven. But the uneasiness of Afghanistan's neighbors regarding such a possibility has been discussed by the Afghan media and politicians. Qanuni, for example, while acknowledging the U.S. bases in Afghanistan would "definitely create problems in the region," said that Afghans should be thinking "about their own country's interests."…

Legitimacy and responsibility are two other factors that Karzai will be faced with if he invites the United States to base its military in Afghanistan on a more permanent basis. The Mazar-e Sharif-based "Baztab" daily in April commented that if the U.S. were to establish bases in Afghanistan, people would "lose confidence" in the ability of the Karzai government to provide security on its own. Similar sentiments were echoed by Sakhi Monir, the editor in chief of the pro-Karzai "Anis," who said that during his election campaign Karzai promised to bring peace and security to Afghanistan in five years. The "strategic partnership" is an indication of a "new political thesis" for the Afghan president, Monir asserted, adding that Afghans voted for Karzai "with the very idea that he will be in a position to bring about peace and stability."…

Afghanistan 'sold to U.S.' message said from Omar

KABUL, May 25, 2005 (Reuters)—Fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar accused Afghanistan's Western-backed president of selling the country to the United States and urged Afghans to resist, a Pakistan-based news agency said on Wednesday…"The land of Afghanistan has been sold to the Americans for an indefinite period of time," Omar was quoted as saying by the Afghan Islamic Press news agency on Wednesday…"This is not just the issue of the Taliban, rather every independent Afghan's conscience."

Afghan politics behind apparent U.S. rift

KABUL, May 25, 2005 (Reuters) by Robert Birsel—Afghan President Hamid Karzai's tough talk on U.S. ties was aimed at soothing local anger over reports of U.S. military abuse and desecration, and does not signal tension between the allies, analysts said on Wednesday…"It is a very good relationship. They are very happy with each other," Kabul University professor and political analyst Wadir Safi said of Afghan-U.S. ties. "The problem is public opinion and the people inside Afghanistan: how to appease them, how to calm them," he said…

"He is doing it to show his domestic audience that he's his own man," said a Western diplomat in Kabul. "He's a real politician and he has to play to domestic sentiment. There are tensions between domestic realities and foreign policy imperatives."…

"Afghanistan wants protection…It must be guaranteed, America must not leave," Safi said. "But the people don't want the illiterate gunmen to rule anymore…Their lives are not better."

"Up to now they were helping the commanders," Safi said of a U.S. policy of working with regional strongmen in the war against the militants. Leave them. Help the people to gain their support."

Other News from Afghanistan

Income tax imposed on Afghans

KABUL, May 26, 2005 (Pajhwok Afghan News) by Zainab Mohammadi—The Customs and Incomes Tax Department Thursday announced a tax on private and commercial income would be levied from September 23. According to the new tax law signed by President Karzai in March, each Afghan national whose monthly earning exceeds 12,500 afghanis ($250) will have to pay 10 per cent of his/her income to the government…Abdul Malik Rahmani of the Finance Ministry estimated 6,000 - 20,000 people would come under the tax net, with government coffers receiving up to $200 million a year from the levy.

40 Tons of Afghan Opium Confiscated

KABUL, May 26, 2005 (AP)—Anti-narcotics forces have confiscated 40 tons of opium this year in raids across Afghanistan, which has become the world's largest supplier of the raw material used to make heroin, an official said Thursday…He said figures over the past three years - since U.S.-led forces ousted the Taliban—show police are now confiscating larger amounts of opium, from 3 tons in 2002 to more than 135 tons in 2004. His comments came as Afghan President Hamid Karzai, currently in the United States, defended his government's efforts at fighting drugs…a diplomatic cable sent May 13 from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul addressed to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said a U.S.-sponsored crackdown on the narcotics industry had not been very effective, partly because Karzai "has been unwilling to assert strong leadership," according to a New York Times report Sunday.

United Nations condemns US abuse in Afghanistan

By Robert Birsel—A report of US military abuse of detainees in Afghanistan is deeply disturbing and those involved should be punished, the United Nations said yesterday. The abuse, including details of the deaths of two inmates at an Afghan detention center, took place in 2002 and emerged from a nearly 2,000-page file of US Army investigators, The New York Times said on Friday.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, speaking before leaving on a US trip, said on Saturday he was shocked and was demanding action against the culprits as well as custody of Afghan prisoners and supervision of US military searches. Jean Arnault, special representative of the UN secretary general in Afghanistan, said the abuse reported in the New York Times was unacceptable and an affront to everything the international community stood for. "The gravity of these abuses calls for the punishment of all those involved in such inexcusable crimes, as demanded by President Karzai", Arnault said in a statement.

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Afghanistan Watch is prepared by Carl Robichaud, a program officer at The Century Foundation.

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