This Week in Afghanistan Watch:
June 9, 2005
by Carl Robichaud
Last week's suicide bombing in Kandahar, which killed 19 and wounded
52, may be yet another signal that an alarming development is underway:
the importation of insurgent techniques from Iraq to Afghanistan.
Before last month, suicide bombings were rare in Afghanistan. Since
the fall of the Taliban three and a half years ago, the country
experienced only five such attacks, none of which targeted civilians
(see graphic). Now a recent wave of attacks-two suicide bombings
against civilians in three weeks, along with a rash of assassinations
and kidnappings-suggest that insurgents are borrowing tactics from
Iraq. The spread of Iraq's problems to Afghanistan would be devastating
to stability there, and to the entire region.
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The June 1 suicide bombing at a Kandahar
mosque killed 19 and wounded 52, the majority of them civilians.
Before last month, there had been only five suicide bombings
in Afghanistan, four of which targeted NATO-led ISAF forces:
June 1, 2005: At a funeral for
a slain anti-Taliban cleric, a man reportedly dressed in a
police uniform detonates a bomb at the entrance to the mosque.
Nineteen are killed and 52 injured, including Kabul's police
chief.
May 7, 2005: A suicide bomber
strikes an Internet cafe at a guesthouse in Kabul, killing
a U.N. engineer and two Afghans (one of them probably the
bomber.) Five others are injured.
October 25, 2004: Two weeks after
the Taliban fail to disrupt elections, a bomber posing as
a beggar approaches ISAF soldiers on a Kabul street popular
with tourists. The blast wounds three soldiers and kills an
Afghan girl.
January 30, 2004: A bomber drives
a taxi carrying explosives next to an ISAF vehicle near a
military base in Kabul. A British soldier is killed and four
others wounded.
January 27, 2004: A man approaches
an ISAF jeep and detonates mortar rounds strapped to his body.
A Canadian soldier and an Afghan civilian are killed, and
three Canadian troops and eight civilians are wounded. A Taliban
spokesman says the attack is the start of a suicide bombing
campaign that ''will continue until coalition forces leave
our country.''
December 29, 2003: After his
arrest, a man sets off explosives strapped to his body, killing
five Afghan security officers. The bombing comes as the loya
jirga draws to a close.
June 9, 2003: A taxi filled with
explosives slams into a bus carrying German ISAF troops. Four
soldiers and an Afghan civilian are killed.
February 2003: A tape recording
by Osama bin Laden calls for suicide bombings in Iraq and
Afghanistan to intimidate America.
September 2001: Ahmed Shah Massoud,
leader of the anti-Taliban forces, is killed by Algerian suicide
bombers disguised as a camera crew.
Pre- 2001: Al Qaeda camps
in Afghanistan teach suicide bombing as part of their training.
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It's worth recalling that suicide bombings were rare in Iraq immediately
after the invasion. There were several scattered suicide attacks
against soldiers in the first few months, but the tactic lacked
support. Then, five months after the invasion, a massive blast leveled
the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, ushering in a new phase of the
war. The radical element of the insurgency had tasted blood.
Today, Iraq's suicide attacks are tragically common. The escalating
use of suicide bombs has pushed U.S. fatalities to 1,674 and the
Iraqi civilian death toll to 12,000 over the past eighteen months-an
average of 20 Iraqi civilians killed every day. The Los Angeles
Times reported that suicide bombings "outpaced car bombings
almost 2-to-1 in May," with "a staggering 90 attacks accounting
for most of last month's 750 deaths." In April alone there
were 69 suicide attacks, "more than in the entire year preceding
the June 28, 2004, hand-over of sovereignty."
The diffusion of extreme tactics in insurgency is difficult to predict.
It is perhaps surprising that suicide bombs have been so rare in
Afghanistan, since the tactic would seem well suited the Taliban's
low-skill but highly motivated insurgents. But suicide bombings,
like other tactics, are spread by importation and demonstration.
In Iraq, the rise in suicide tactics correlates with the influx
of foreign jihadists, who used these tactics in Chechnya and the
Palestinian territories. (According to the Pentagon, foreign jihadists
comprise only ten percent of insurgents in Iraq but account for
nearly all the suicide bombs targeting Iraqi civilians.)
According to a recent Washington Post- ABC News poll, a majority
of Americans now believe the war against Iraq has made America less
safe. The reasons frequently cited are the spreading thin of the
military, the massive expenses, the surge in anti-Americanism, the
undermining of traditional alliances, and the diversion from more
pressing threats in Iran and North Korea. But there's another reason
as well, and one that will persist for many years: the war in Iraq
has demonstrated how a dedicated insurgency, through targeted brutality,
can stalemate a technologically and numerically superior American
force. In effect, Iraq has updated, and broadcast globally, the
lessons of Vietnam and Beirut to a new generation of potential adversaries.
Afghanistan has been held out as a success story in contrast to
Iraq's persistent violence, but victory remains far from certain.
After a winter lull, Afghanistan has been just as dangerous for
U.S. troops: Pentagon figures show that since early March, American
deaths in Afghanistan are 1.6 per 1000 troops deployed, compared
to 0.9 per 1,000 in Iraq over the same period. "It's not supposed
to be like that here," said Capt. Mike Adamski, quoted in a
June 4 New York Times article after a firefight with the Taliban
in May. "It's the hardest fight I saw, even after Iraq."
The neo-Taliban, dwindling in numbers and threatened by an armistice
agreement that could integrate its moderate members into the government,
has little to lose. Their collaboration with foreign jihadists,
which the government blames for the June 1 bombing (the account
remains in dispute), could further radicalize the movement. Like
the Iraqi insurgency, the Taliban realize they cannot hold ground
but can wreak havoc. The strategy in both cases is similar: sustain
operations, cause casualties, undermine the government's credibility,
and outlast the international forces.
Two suicide bombings and a rash of Iraq-style assassinations and
kidnappings do not themselves constitute a trend. But the US cannot
wait for the problem to become manifest. Proactive diplomacy must
engage Afghan authorities, clerics, and regional and tribal leaders
to disown suicide bombing as a foreign and terrorist tactic that
has no place in Afghanistan. It may still be possible to split off
moderate Taliban supporters from the extremists and foreign jihadists
responsible for the latest attacks.
The costs of failure are great. If Iraqi tactics are imported to
Afghanistan it could ignite a bloody second front against an American
army that is stretched perilously thin. That would be one more cost
of the war in Iraq that no one calculated.
Political
Parties in Afghanistan (PDF)
June 7 (International Crisis Group)In this new report, Crisis
Group argues that political parties are critical: "In the absence
of strong pluralistic and democratic institutions to mediate internal
tensions, political bargaining and the competition for power will
most likely continue to occur outside the institutions of government."
The report makes a series of recommendations to strengthen the development
of political parties, which are summarized in the overview.
Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Rearmament? (PDF)
June 6 (Japan-Afghan NGO Group)This report highlights challenges
to the disarmament program. It provides a set of recommendations
which include devising a more nuanced and varied approach to incentives,
faster delivery of inducements, more comprehensive monitoring, and
the hiring of disarmament staff through government channels rather
than from regional commanders.
The
Man in the Palace: Hamid Karzai's uncertain presidency (PDF)
June 6 (The New Yorker) by Jon Lee AndersonThis is an intimate
and fascinating profile of Hamid Karzai that's definitely worth
the read. Anderson discusses Karzai's history, his ambivalence about
power, and his current relationship with America -- examining its
benefits and dangers. This article is not available online, but
there's an 'audio
slide show' that includes an interview with Anderson on the
New Yorker website.
Senator
Biden Calls for Closure of Guantanamo Prison
WASHINGTON, June 6 (WP)"This has
become the greatest propaganda tool that exists for recruiting of
terrorists around the world. And it is unnecessary to be in that
position," Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) said on ABC's
"This Week."
"But the end result is, I think
we should end up shutting it down, moving those prisoners,"
he said. "Those that we have reason to keep, keep. And those
we don't, let go."
Pentagon's
Top General Defends Treatment of Guantanamo Detainees
May 30 (AP)Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the United States has done a
good job of treating detainees humanely
"We struggle with
how to handle them, but we've always handled them humanely and with
the dignity that they should be accorded."
Myers said
a copy of the Koran was not flushed down a toilet. He repeated the
Pentagon's contention that five cases of mistreatment of the Muslim
holy book at Guantanamo Bay were confirmed.
The four-star general said the U.S. military has
detained more than 68,000 people since the terrorist attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001, and investigated 325 complaints of mistreatment.
Investigations have found 100 cases of prisoner mistreatment, and
100 people have been punished, Myers said.
Former
Ambassador to Afghanistan Khalilzad Unveils Plan for Iraq
WASHINGTON, June 8 (LA Times), by Tyler MarshallIn
Senate testimony, Zalmay Khalilzad offers a seven-point program
for progress in Iraq. Experts say chaos there puts its success in
doubt.
Trade
in Afghan south seen hurt by anti-drug drive
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan, June 9 (Reuters) by Sayed SalahuddinBomb
blasts, rebel ambushes and raids are all too common in southern
Afghanistan but traders say it is not the fear of violence that
is hurting business but a government drive to stamp out opium
"There
is less money around these days and less trade and business mostly
because of the campaign against drugs," says Agha Gul Sherzad
who runs the biggest mobile phone shop in Kandahar city, the main
city in the Afghan south.
Under pressure from the international community
that says Afghanistan risks becoming a "narco-state",
teams have been out in the south and east, destroying fields and
opium refineries and seizing tons of drugs and chemicals needed
to make heroin. Impoverished farmers have lost income from their
poppy fields but traders say big-spending drug traffickers have
also been hit, and that is hurting business. Business people in
Kandahar say value of property has fallen, less vehicles are being
imported and the reconstruction of places such as hotels has slowed,
apparently all because there is less drug money in circulation.
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Afghanistan Watch is prepared by Carl
Robichaud, a program officer at The Century Foundation.
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