September 28, 2004

Europeans Still Falling Short on Afghan Security
Jeremy Barnicle

The September 22 New York Times quoted French defense minister Michèle Alliot-Marie telling a group of French and German soldiers, as they headed out on patrol in Kabul, "Your presence is proof that Europe exists and is capable of bringing its weight to bear on the great crises shaking our planet."

Mon dieu. Even allowing for some rally-the-troops hyperbole, Alliot-Marie's call to action is harder to swallow than spoiled foie gras.

France currently contributes 565 soldiers of its 280,000-strong military to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan . Germany has deployed 1909 of its 375,000 troops to ISAF. The 6,500 troops that comprise ISAF primarily cover the Kabul area, which comprises about one-half of one percent of the country, and about ten percent of the Afghan population.

The international commitment-both from the U.S. and Europe-to providing security for the nascent Afghan democracy has been pitifully inadequate from the start. To put things in context, consider this set of ratios from Afghanistan Watch's data sheet:

• International peacekeepers per 1,000 people in Bosnia: 18.6
• International peacekeepers per 1,000 people in Kosovo: 20
• International peacekeepers per 1,000 people in Afghanistan: 0.3

The Europeans acknowledge that this is a problem.

Recognizing the need for a bigger international security footprint about a year ago, the U.N. Security Council and NATO, which now oversees ISAF, authorized an expansion of the peacekeeping force beyond Kabul. Just a few months ago at a summit in Istanbul, NATO heads-of-state affirmed their pledge to send more troops.

But with Afghanistan's first-ever direct presidential election just weeks away, the alliance is falling short of its commitment. "Member states are reluctant to send troops into the increasingly unstable countryside," the Times reports, and just 1,500 new troops have actually been deployed or marked for deployment. Former ISAF deputy commander Gen. Andrew Leslie, a Canadian, has estimated that ISAF needs another 5,000 soldiers to really secure the elections. The estimates for providing real security in the provinces range much higher.

To be fair, European forces have played a critical role in the ISAF; in fact, ISAF would not exist without them. But Ms. Alliot-Marie's grandiloquent declaration reflects the chasm between what European militaries ought to be doing in Afghanistan and what Europe actually is doing in Afghanistan. If the Europeans really want to "bring their weight to bear" in Afghanistan, they should keep their promise and find a way to deploy an adequate peacekeeping presence.

September 28, 2004

Disarmament: Not just how much, but what and from whom
Carl Robichaud

As Afghanistan moves towards elections in two weeks, the U.N. has released numbers suggesting progress in a critical area—the disarmament of Afghanistan's militias of their heavy weapons. On September 26, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) announced that U.N. disarmament programs had now secured almost half of all heavy weapons in Afghanistan, showing rapid if belated progress. As the disarmament program enters its most crucial stage in the coming weeks, however, two big questions remain: what weapons are being turned in, and by whom?

On September 26, UNAMA spokesman Manoel de Almeida e Silva noted that in its first eight days, the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme had secured 130 of the 286 known heavy weapons in Herat and 86 of the 337 heavy weapons in Kandahar.

While this is impressive progress at first glance, the true tests are yet to come. First, as the media has frequently pointed out, militia leaders are reluctant to part with their best weapons and most loyal troops. The first waves of firearms impressed antique gun collectors far more than disarmament officials. When militia leaders comply with disarmament orders, they have typically done so by culling their weakest arms and least effective soldiers.

The second critical question—which has not been asked often enough—is: where is the disarmament occurring? Notably absent from the UN reports were the figures from the Panjshir Valley, stronghold of the country's most powerful militia leader and Defense Minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim. That's because no disarmament has occurred there yet.

Fahim's militia is nominally loyal to Kabul, but is comprised primarily of ethnic Tajiks, and has not readily integrated into the Afghan National Army. Fahim has admitted to stockpiling heavy weaponry at his home base in the Panjshir Valley, but claimed these arms were for the national army, not for the Panjshiri militia faction. Leaders from other regions and ethnicities are understandably skeptical.

The current disarmament process highlights the classic security dilemma: even if reducing everyone's arms makes everyone more secure, it's hard to make these cuts because each side fears its rivals won't comply. If disarmament leaves one group's forces more intact than others, or is perceived as doing so, it will often heighten instability. Asymmetries in the disarmament process, coupled with the perception in Afghanistan that military strength remains the backbone to political influence, could prove volatile as the country approaches presidential and parliamentary elections.

According to UNAMA, the process of securing the Panjshir Valley's heavy weapons begins this week. Stay tuned—this is the most critical test of the disarmament program yet.

September 21, 2004

A Treacherous Four Days

Optimism regarding impressive registration numbers for the October 9 election has been dampened a bit by attempts to assassinate Interim President Hamid Karzai and one of his Vice Presidents in the past four days. The attacks have highlighted how tenuous Afghanistan's situation is, regardless of how elections go.

The first attempt occurred last Thursday when President Karzai's helicopter came under rocket fire near Gardez. Yesterday, a remote-detonated bomb exploded on the Kunduz-Takhar highway as Vice President Nematullah Shahrani's car arrived in the Choogha area, injuring one of his guards. It is not clear who is behind either attempt, but, unfortunately, the range of suspects could be rather wide. The Taliban, who have pledged to disrupt elections and attack each of the eighteen presidential candidates, claim credit for the rocket attack.

Karzai, a moderate of Pashtun descent, enjoys uniquely broad support, and is widely viewed as the sole figure capable of rebuilding an Afghan nation from the current patchwork of ethnic and tribal factions. The two attacks are not the first attempt at assassination—Karzai narrowly escaped an attempt on his life in September 2002. Nor are they the first incidents of election-related violence, which has claimed dozens of lives this year.

These recent attempts are particularly ominous because Afghanistan may be a single bullet away from a return to chaos. Power in Afghanistan remains in the provinces, where oft-feuding regional commanders control the economic resources and military power. Karzai, by virtue of his popularity and perceived neutrality, has had success in holding these regional power-holders in check, and has developed a knack for avoiding direct conflicts while gradually drawing power toward the central government. No other leader seems capable of assuming this role.

September 21, 2004

Drug Policy At a Crossroads

Last week, President Bush noted that that while Karzai's government had shown "good faith efforts" in addressing opium production, it "lacked the capacity" to deal with the problem in Afghanistan's provinces. In his annual report to Congress on drug-producing countries, the president expressed concerns over increased opium cultivation and the government's lack of capacity in the provinces.

It is no surprise that Afghanistan's government has inadequate counternarcotics capacity, since the international community has been slow both in extending its security forces outside Kabul and in rebuilding the country's law enforcement capacity. As a result, the Afghan government currently relies upon local power holders to implement drug interdiction and eradication. These same local leaders derive much of their wealth and power from narcotics, and tend to comply just enough to keep the central government off their backs.

On Friday, the U.S. also noted that its anti-drug campaign in Latin America was not succeeding in reducing supply. According to a BBC report, "U.S. drugs tsar John Walters has admitted that Washington's anti-narcotics policy in Latin America has so far failed…Mr. Walters said in Mexico that billions of dollars of investment over many years have failed to dent the flow of Latin American cocaine onto U.S. streets." U.S.-backed efforts to eliminate traffickers and coca crops have made Columbia the third-largest recipient of U.S. military aid, but have not yielded the desired results. Waters noted that "we have a history in the United States of not following through on programs like this," an ominous observation in the context of Afghanistan.

Will the U.S. and Europe finally put forward the resources to stem the growth of Afghanistan's narcotics trade? According to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Pentagon is developing an overall "master plan" to curb opium poppy cultivation and trade, though details were not forthcoming. The question remains whether this long-needed step, unlike previous half-steps and errors, will include a viable and comprehensive strategy. Serious attention on this issue is long overdue.

September 20, 2004

Karzai Breaks Some Eggs: Is He Making an Omelet or a Mess?
Jeremy Barnicle

Last weekend, violent protests erupted in the city of Herat, in western Afghanistan, following the dismissal of the provincial governor and long-time regional commander Ismail Khan by Interim President Hamid Karzai. Afghan and American troops attempted unsuccessfully to quell the unrest and, when the dust settled, four Afghans were dead, fifteen American soldiers were injured, several U.N. offices were gutted, and humanitarian aid workers were being evacuated.

This was not a promising development as Afghanistan approaches its first direct election of a head-of-state next month; in fact, the New York Times called the events "a major blow" to Karzai's government. Unrest and loss of life are never welcome, but this set of attacks comes at a particularly sensitive time and may challenge the U.N.'s ability to run elections in three weeks.

Is this violence a serious problem, or does it just represent some "initial bumps" on the road to democracy, as claimed by Zalmay Khalilzad, the American envoy in Kabul? More...

August 2004

August 31, 2004

Meanwhile, Back in Afghanistan
Carl Robichaud

On August 19, Afghans celebrated their independence from the British Empire in 1919. Few countries have suffered a harsher history since. The country now stands at a potential turning point, with its first ever direct presidential election scheduled for October 9. Unfortunately, a better future for Afghanistan is by no means assured. The country's long-term stability rests upon two critical and interrelated developments. More...