Eradicating opium through development

More disconcerting news coming out of an international Afghanistan donors conference in Tokyo this week. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime issued its annual winter survey of poppy planting patterns and predicted a poppy harvest close to last year’s record.

Holbrooke on Bush's "ineffective" counter-narcotics plan

Former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke tackles the thorny issue of the Bush administration’s counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan -– calling the billion-dollar-per-year plan the “single most ineffective program in the history of American foreign policy.” According to him, in addition to wasting money, the policy only strengthens the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As most of the poppy crops destroyed are in the insecure south, it pushes penniless farmers with no other options into the arms and influences of the Taliban. Meanwhile, little effort is made to tackle the drug lords and corrupt government officials who enable the trafficking trade.

Holbrooke recommends first boosting security, providing free agricultural support to farmers and building access roads to markets to ensure successful alternate livelihoods, before launching on a complete poppy eradication plan in insecure areas.

New Report on the ‘Forgotten War’

The European Council on Foreign Relations has a new report out calling for U.S. and European governments to “overhaul their strategies and strike a 'grand bargain' to stabilise the country.” Significantly, it urges enticing moderates into the fold of governance and legitimacy through money and other incentives.

There will be no stability in Afghanistan unless “moderate” insurgents embrace constitutionalism and enter democratic politics. Since the Bonn Agreement in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the coalition has supported the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alliance, which brought together the main Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara groupings. For obvious reasons it had no significant links to the Pashtuns who make up 42% of Afghanistan’s population.22 After 2001, despite Karzai’s Pashtun background, Pashtun tribal leaders were largely excluded from government and have been ever since. Many have thus aligned themselves with the resurgent Taliban. The coalition and the Afghan government must work to convince them that they can pursue their interests democratically.

There have already been signs that this is at least possible. Though President Karzai’s overtures to reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were rebuffed, the Taliban, while insisting on a number of conditions, have been receptive to the idea of negotiations as proposed within Karzai's "Peace Jirga". The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently gave his backing to these negotiations, again with conditions attached, but the US administration remains sceptical.

Political agreements - like the failed Musa Qala deal in 2006 overseen by the then ISAF commander, General David Richards – should aim to isolate the “hard-core”, many of whom are foreigners, from more moderate, indigenous groups. Such political agreements would also help avoid the violent tactics that may have won NATO military victories last year but cost vital public support because of high civilian casualties.

An effective policy in the short term would be to identify insurgent leaders willing to cut a deal. The coalition could then operate a system of “divide and rule”, whereby intransigent insurgents would see their erstwhile comrades rewarded with a package of financial and other incentives which add up to a better deal than that offered by the Taliban. (emphasis added by editor).

The report urges European governments to send more troops to Afghanistan, eliminate or reduce the national caveats on their troops, and reverse their “underperformance” by increasing reconstruction aid. On the flip side, the report pushes the U.S. to shift its combat strategy to a more political one and abandon its counter-narcotics plans of aerial spraying or buying up opium crops. It recommends the U.S. shift the onus of the problem onto traffickers and concentrate on arresting and prosecuting drug lords and their governmental supporters.

Ashdown’s Challenges

The Asia Times has an insightful look at the challenges that Paddy Ashdown will face as he begins his new role as the UN envoy to Afghanistan. Pakistani bureau chief Syed Saleem Shahzad opines that Ashdown will have to talk with “the real players” – Mullah Omar and al-Qaida -- notwithstanding the recent expulsion of European diplomats for allegedly talking to the Taliban.

Latest Afghan export: How to produce opium

Intrepid reporter Patrick Cockburn finds that Afghans are helping Iraqi farmers grow poppy and produce opium, as traditional crops of oranges and pomegranates prove to be insufficient to provide a living wage. This trend has now moved to Diyala province, where al-Qaeda has a strong hold and has successfully fought back U.S. and Iraqi military forces.

In the absence of governmental support, local farmers have been unable to compete with cheap imported fruits and vegetables and rising cost of fertilizer. Al-Qaeda is apparently in charge of many of the new opium farms, sometimes taking the land of farmers that it has killed.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan

Col. Dennis Young of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College adds to the chorus of voices urging the Bush administration to divert troops, effort and financial aid to Afghanistan. He also suggests five adjustments to current ISAF and U.S. strategies:

2007 – a year of records

2007 was a year of records in Afghanistan – most of it violent: the highest US military toll, most suicide bombings and record production of opium. More than 6,500 people, including 110 US troops and almost 4500 militants, were killed last year. Poppy production soared to 93 percent of the world’s supply. The Taliban also seems to be growing more sophisticated in its attacks and targets.

Record level of violence in Afghanistan, by Jason Straziuso (The Associated Press) 1 Jan. 2007:  Taliban fighters avoided head-on battles with US, NATO and Afghan army forces in 2007, resorting instead to ambushes and suicide bombings. But militants did attack the weakest of Afghan forces to devastating effect.

More than 925 Afghan policemen died in Taliban ambushes in 2007, including 16 police killed Saturday in Helmand province during an assault on a checkpoint.

"The Taliban attack who they perceive to be the most vulnerable, and in this case it's the police," said Lt. Col. Dave Johnson, a spokesman for the US troops who train Afghan police and soldiers. "They don't travel in large formations like the army does. That puts them in an area of vulnerability."

Taliban suicide attackers set off a record number of attacks this year — more than 140 — and in many ways they became more sophisticated.

In February a suicide bomber killed 23 people outside the main US base at Bagram during a visit by US Vice President Dick Cheney. A suicide bomber in June killed 35 people on a police bus. And in November a suicide bombing that killed six lawmakers also left a total of 77 people dead after security guards opened fire on a crowd of onlookers. Sixty-one school children were killed.

Video: Interview with Gen. McNeill, Rashid, MacDonald

Yesterday, the NewsHour with Jim Leherer ran a good segment on Afghanistan featuring commentary by Gen. Dan McNeill, Ahmed Rashid, and Norine MacDonald (from Senlis Council). The transcript, along with streaming video, is available here.

Competing with opium poppy?

Well, Afghanistan has finally found a crop that can compete with poppy...

Afghanistan Cannabis Crop Up 40 Percent, By RAHIM FAIEZ KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The fields of Balkh province in northern Afghanistan were free of opium poppies this year, a success touted often by Afghan and international officials. But one look at Mohammad Alam's fields uncovers an emerging drug problem.

Ten-foot-tall cannabis plants flourish in Alam's fields. The crop — the source of both marijuana and hashish — can be just as profitable as opium but draws none of the scrutiny from Afghan officials bent on eradicating poppies.

Cannabis cultivation rose 40 percent in Afghanistan this year, to 173,000 acres from 123,550 in 2006, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime estimated in its 2007 opium survey. The crop is being grown in at least 18 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, according to the survey released last month.

The U.N. report singles out Balkh as a "leading example" of an opium-free province, saying other areas should follow "the model of this northern region where leadership, incentives and security have led farmers to turn their backs on opium." However, a section of the report says the increase in marijuana cultivation "gives cause for concern."

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE