Eradicating opium through development

More disconcerting news coming out of an international Afghanistan donors conference in Tokyo this week. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime issued its annual winter survey of poppy planting patterns and predicted a poppy harvest close to last year’s record.

Holbrooke on Bush's "ineffective" counter-narcotics plan

Former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke tackles the thorny issue of the Bush administration’s counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan -– calling the billion-dollar-per-year plan the “single most ineffective program in the history of American foreign policy.” According to him, in addition to wasting money, the policy only strengthens the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As most of the poppy crops destroyed are in the insecure south, it pushes penniless farmers with no other options into the arms and influences of the Taliban. Meanwhile, little effort is made to tackle the drug lords and corrupt government officials who enable the trafficking trade.

Holbrooke recommends first boosting security, providing free agricultural support to farmers and building access roads to markets to ensure successful alternate livelihoods, before launching on a complete poppy eradication plan in insecure areas.

New Report on the ‘Forgotten War’

The European Council on Foreign Relations has a new report out calling for U.S. and European governments to “overhaul their strategies and strike a 'grand bargain' to stabilise the country.” Significantly, it urges enticing moderates into the fold of governance and legitimacy through money and other incentives.

There will be no stability in Afghanistan unless “moderate” insurgents embrace constitutionalism and enter democratic politics. Since the Bonn Agreement in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the coalition has supported the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alliance, which brought together the main Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara groupings. For obvious reasons it had no significant links to the Pashtuns who make up 42% of Afghanistan’s population.22 After 2001, despite Karzai’s Pashtun background, Pashtun tribal leaders were largely excluded from government and have been ever since. Many have thus aligned themselves with the resurgent Taliban. The coalition and the Afghan government must work to convince them that they can pursue their interests democratically.

There have already been signs that this is at least possible. Though President Karzai’s overtures to reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were rebuffed, the Taliban, while insisting on a number of conditions, have been receptive to the idea of negotiations as proposed within Karzai's "Peace Jirga". The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently gave his backing to these negotiations, again with conditions attached, but the US administration remains sceptical.

Political agreements - like the failed Musa Qala deal in 2006 overseen by the then ISAF commander, General David Richards – should aim to isolate the “hard-core”, many of whom are foreigners, from more moderate, indigenous groups. Such political agreements would also help avoid the violent tactics that may have won NATO military victories last year but cost vital public support because of high civilian casualties.

An effective policy in the short term would be to identify insurgent leaders willing to cut a deal. The coalition could then operate a system of “divide and rule”, whereby intransigent insurgents would see their erstwhile comrades rewarded with a package of financial and other incentives which add up to a better deal than that offered by the Taliban. (emphasis added by editor).

The report urges European governments to send more troops to Afghanistan, eliminate or reduce the national caveats on their troops, and reverse their “underperformance” by increasing reconstruction aid. On the flip side, the report pushes the U.S. to shift its combat strategy to a more political one and abandon its counter-narcotics plans of aerial spraying or buying up opium crops. It recommends the U.S. shift the onus of the problem onto traffickers and concentrate on arresting and prosecuting drug lords and their governmental supporters.

Ashdown’s Challenges

The Asia Times has an insightful look at the challenges that Paddy Ashdown will face as he begins his new role as the UN envoy to Afghanistan. Pakistani bureau chief Syed Saleem Shahzad opines that Ashdown will have to talk with “the real players” – Mullah Omar and al-Qaida -- notwithstanding the recent expulsion of European diplomats for allegedly talking to the Taliban.

Latest Afghan export: How to produce opium

Intrepid reporter Patrick Cockburn finds that Afghans are helping Iraqi farmers grow poppy and produce opium, as traditional crops of oranges and pomegranates prove to be insufficient to provide a living wage. This trend has now moved to Diyala province, where al-Qaeda has a strong hold and has successfully fought back U.S. and Iraqi military forces.

In the absence of governmental support, local farmers have been unable to compete with cheap imported fruits and vegetables and rising cost of fertilizer. Al-Qaeda is apparently in charge of many of the new opium farms, sometimes taking the land of farmers that it has killed.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan

Col. Dennis Young of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College adds to the chorus of voices urging the Bush administration to divert troops, effort and financial aid to Afghanistan. He also suggests five adjustments to current ISAF and U.S. strategies:

2007 – a year of records

2007 was a year of records in Afghanistan – most of it violent: the highest US military toll, most suicide bombings and record production of opium. More than 6,500 people, including 110 US troops and almost 4500 militants, were killed last year. Poppy production soared to 93 percent of the world’s supply. The Taliban also seems to be growing more sophisticated in its attacks and targets.

Record level of violence in Afghanistan, by Jason Straziuso (The Associated Press) 1 Jan. 2007:  Taliban fighters avoided head-on battles with US, NATO and Afghan army forces in 2007, resorting instead to ambushes and suicide bombings. But militants did attack the weakest of Afghan forces to devastating effect.

More than 925 Afghan policemen died in Taliban ambushes in 2007, including 16 police killed Saturday in Helmand province during an assault on a checkpoint.

"The Taliban attack who they perceive to be the most vulnerable, and in this case it's the police," said Lt. Col. Dave Johnson, a spokesman for the US troops who train Afghan police and soldiers. "They don't travel in large formations like the army does. That puts them in an area of vulnerability."

Taliban suicide attackers set off a record number of attacks this year — more than 140 — and in many ways they became more sophisticated.

In February a suicide bomber killed 23 people outside the main US base at Bagram during a visit by US Vice President Dick Cheney. A suicide bomber in June killed 35 people on a police bus. And in November a suicide bombing that killed six lawmakers also left a total of 77 people dead after security guards opened fire on a crowd of onlookers. Sixty-one school children were killed.

Video: Interview with Gen. McNeill, Rashid, MacDonald

Yesterday, the NewsHour with Jim Leherer ran a good segment on Afghanistan featuring commentary by Gen. Dan McNeill, Ahmed Rashid, and Norine MacDonald (from Senlis Council). The transcript, along with streaming video, is available here.

Competing with opium poppy?

Well, Afghanistan has finally found a crop that can compete with poppy...

Afghanistan Cannabis Crop Up 40 Percent, By RAHIM FAIEZ KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The fields of Balkh province in northern Afghanistan were free of opium poppies this year, a success touted often by Afghan and international officials. But one look at Mohammad Alam's fields uncovers an emerging drug problem.

Ten-foot-tall cannabis plants flourish in Alam's fields. The crop — the source of both marijuana and hashish — can be just as profitable as opium but draws none of the scrutiny from Afghan officials bent on eradicating poppies.

Cannabis cultivation rose 40 percent in Afghanistan this year, to 173,000 acres from 123,550 in 2006, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime estimated in its 2007 opium survey. The crop is being grown in at least 18 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, according to the survey released last month.

The U.N. report singles out Balkh as a "leading example" of an opium-free province, saying other areas should follow "the model of this northern region where leadership, incentives and security have led farmers to turn their backs on opium." However, a section of the report says the increase in marijuana cultivation "gives cause for concern."

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE

Times review of Opium Season

The New York Times today ran a review by William Grimes of Joel Hafvenstein's Opium Season: A Year on the Afghan Frontier. Hafvenstein, currently evaluating alternative livelihood programs in Badakhshan, has had an unparalleled view of US counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and has contributed many insightful comments to Afghanistan Watch.

The review is quite favorable, and closes with one of my favorite quotes from the book: “We had come to Helmand thinking of opium as the local currency, and had tried to replace it with cash. But security was the real currency of Afghanistan. The traumatized population of Helmand would trade anything for it, follow anyone who could offer it.” If only international policymakers had understood this sooner.

Hafvenstein's book is a must read for anyone who wants to understand why international efforts to curb the spread of poppies have failed -- and what the implications are for the future.

A look inside the Asia Foundation survey

The Asia Foundation released it's third survey of the Afghan people today. Polling in Afghanistan should by no means be seen as dispositive, but this data can provide insights unavailable elsewhere (especially compared with prior baseline surveys by the Asia Foundation in 2004 and 2006). Here's a look inside...

Predictably, media reports framed the poll as a referendum on security (see AFP: “Security fears up sharply among Afghans: survey”) It’s true that pessimism about security rose among Afghans--with 32 percent citing security as their top concern (up from 22 percent last year.)

But the picture is more complicated, since security concerns vary significantly by region and two thirds of Afghans felt that security in their area was good. Moreover, among those who believe the country is headed in the right direction, good security is cited as the second most important reason (34%) after development.

So the Survey paints a nuanced picture and provides some fascinating data on everything from support for traditional institutions (such as Shuras and Jirga) to democracy and women’s rights. A few trends worth noting:

Right Direction / Wrong Direction:

• People are still optimistic, even if there was a slight decline in those who said the country was headed in the right direction (from 44 percent to 42 percent).
• Three-quarters of Afghans continue to assess government performance positively (i.e. either strongly (25%) or somewhat strongly (55%).)
• Afghans continue to espouse confidence in national security forces (both army and police) as well as in traditional institutions such as Shuras and Jirgas. However, “less than half of the respondents had confidence in the government's justice system, political parties and local militias.”
•  Corruption is an issue for many Afghans, but it is not clear that it has grown more acute. Some poll questions suggest an increase in perceptions of corruption while others suggest a decrease.
  

Security:

• Among people who felt the country was going in the wrong direction, security was cited as the top reason. This may seem unsurprising, until you realize that even in last year’s survey security was only rarely mentioned as a reason for a “wrong direction” response.
• On the other hand, among those who said the country was going in the right direction, good security was cited as the second biggest reason (34%).
• Perceptions of security varied greatly by region. Nationwide, “sixty-six percent of the respondents felt that security in their area was good or quite good, and 50 percent said they rarely or never feared for their own or their family's safety. Eighty-two percent said no one in their family had been a victim of any crime or violence during the last one year.” 

Reconstruction:

• Last year, respondents cited “rebuilding of the country” as only the fourth most important reason why the country was headed in the right direction; this year it became the most important reason for believing so (39%). It’s not clear whether people feel reconstruction is going better, or that the other trends they cited as reasons for optimism last year (security, peace, disarmament) are simply going worse. MORE
  

Korb and Wadhams: Five steps

Larry Korb and Caroline Wadhams argue today in a Newsday op-ed that "the United States and NATO must increase troop levels by at least 20,000" in Afghanistan. This rise in troop levels is part of a five-point plan that includes bolstering reconstruction assistance, focusing on rule of law, and reforming U.S. aid channels to Pakistan. The steps they sketch out will be supported by a more comprehensive report in the coming months -- keep your eyes peeled ...

U.S.

must put more focus on Afghan insurgency, Oct 9, 2007: Sunday marked the sixth anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaida....But the mission in Afghanistan is going alarmingly awry, and the United States must refocus and re-energize its policy. The administration and Congress cannot allow the sinking ship of Iraq to take Afghanistan down with it...

To achieve our security objectives, the United States, and especially Congress, must provide increased funds, attention and manpower - both civilian and military. U.S. leaders must also engage the American people, as they may become increasingly pessimistic about U.S. involvement in the Muslim world as a result of the war in Iraq. There are five concrete steps Congress and the administration should pursue immediately. MORE

Firefight at a drug lab in Daychopan, Zabul

The AP provides today one of the first reports I've heard of fighting at a drug lab. The report says the guards were "suspected Taliban" but I wonder how accurate this is...Wish there were more detail on this raid.

In the southern Zabul province, Afghan and coalition troops clashed with insurgents in Daychopan district Sunday, killing four suspected Taliban and wounding four others, said Fazel Bari, the Daychopan district chief.

Also Sunday, Afghan and coalition troops destroyed a heroin laboratory after battling Taliban fighters guarding the facility, a separate coalition statement said. The lab in Helmand contained large amounts of opium-processing chemicals as well as weapons, insurgent propaganda and explosive materials, it said.

Map: BBC.

"Cops or Robbers?" AREU's must-read report on police reform

Donors are finally realizing the importance of police reform. Unfortunately, some of the response has been to throw money at the problem--the latest infusion of funding, for example, focuses on training and equipment, as if the police problem were primarily a technocratic challenge rather than a political one.

Andrew Wilder, research director at Tuft's Feinstein Center, is the author the AREU's remarkable new report on the topic entitled "Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police". He argues that there is still no consensus about the role of police, and too little appreciation that the Ministry of the Interior is part of the problem. The paper highlights five challenges. Donors will need to:

Tom Perriello: Two Views from Qandahar

Qandahar is a lot to take in on a short trip. I had forgotten how much cleaner and wider the streets are than in Kabul. And that the city comes to life in the evening for those two magical hours before the onset of darkness. New development is visible everywhere and statistically trends are headed up from 8 months ago inside the city.

Yet the mood is grim. People talk about corruption that stretches from petty police bribes to drug dealing at the highest levels of provincial Government. While people remain solidly anti-insurgency, a deep fissure has appeared here between the people and government that was a mere crack in 2005.

The logical link between enabling corrupt warlords and undermining our own counter-insurgency efforts is crucial to understand. A corrupt government does not make people pro-insurgency. It simply means people no longer have a dog in the fight. Between a corrupt government (who demand payoffs) or the Taliban and other anti-government forces (who offer handouts), you follow the path of least resistance and try to stay out of the way. MORE

New drug stats out; Most opium now processed within Afghanistan

The UN World Drug Report 2007 (an annual study by the UNODC) was released today, and its most significant finding is that an estimated 90 percent of the Afghanistan's opium is now processed within the country's borders (mostly in the south and the east). That is a striking change from a couple years ago, when that proportion was reversed.

The development of a mature processing industry means that today druglords in Afghanistan keep a far greater share of their profits (which in years past were captured by lab operators in Tajikistan and Pakistan.) It also means that a concerted campaign directed at shutting down these labs (most of which are barely hidden) could hit traffickers where it hurts...Other interesting statistics below...

Wheat Production Doubles in Kunduz

Pajhwok reports this morning that wheat has doubled in Kunduz, gains attributable to increased yield (there were approximately the same numbers of acres under cultivation.) People sometimes deride alternative livelihoods as impossible, since "no crop can compete with poppy". In fact, the picture is more complicated. It's true that on marginal, low yield land, there are few alternatives to poppy, and few opportunity costs to growing it (see this excellent report by AREU). However, on productive land a combination of incentives and eradication policies can influence farmer choices. Higher productivity seeds and agricultural practice can help swing the balance away from poppy, and there are signs this is happening in Kunduz and in several other provinces that have seen declines opium cultivation.

Wheat Production doubles in Kunduz
KUNDUZ CITY, June 21 Asia Pulse - Wheat production in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz has doubled as many farmers have stopped growing poppies under the alternative livelihood program this year. The yield reached 111,000 tons this year as compared to 66,000 tons in last year, noted Abdul Aziz Nekzad, director of the agriculture and irrigation department....Mentioning the reason behind the ample harvest, the official said plenty of irrigation water, the counter-narcotics campaign and the provision of improved seeds has helped boost wheat production in the province. MORE

Image:                     An Afghan farmer selects a wheat variety at a research station (CIMMYT Maize and Wheat Improvement Center).

Away from the quick fix...

Excellent op-ed on narcotics today by Crisis Group's Nick Grono and Joanna Nathan. They succinctly rebut black and white solutions to the drug problem (large-scale eradication and regulated legalization) and suggest some wiser measures:

1. Target the 20-25 top traffickers with extradition and asset seizures.
2. Destroy labs and warehouses (ANA backed by NATO).
3. Cooperate with Iran and Pakistan to shut down middlemen operating on their terrain.
4. Focus alternative livelihood programs on areas before they produce poppy in order to inoculate farmers to its influence.

Skeptics might argue that these steps are difficult to implement with the current levels of corruption, or that they require of politicians an unrealistic embrace of moral ambiguity and long time horizons. I don't think Grono and Nathan would disagree, but they remind us that "it is much easier to say what won't work than what will."

"The challenge," they write, "will be to keep (politicians) focused on smart courses of action that yield long-term results – and away from superficially "easy" policies that end up backfiring." We should do what we can to help make these arguments.

Lifestyles of the Rich and Infamous

Check out “Narcotecture in Herat,” Monocle’s excellent narrated slideshow of the gaudy mansions blooming in Herat. Journalist Rachel Morarjee (better known for her work at the Financial Times) accompanies photographer Ash Sweeting inside some of these lavish shrines built on opium. It’s not pretty...

A premise of the piece is that “Herat’s past glories are slowly being erased by new fortunes,” and they speak with groups like Agha Khan who are “waging a losing battle to prevent the city’s heritage being bulldozed to make way for acres of glass and candy colored mansions.” Unfortunately, the piece doesn’t offer many details about what specifically is being destroyed, and my sense was that these mansions--objectionable as they might be--don’t necessarily threaten Herat’s cultural heritage.

The conclusions asks “whether the rest of the city’s heritage survives the outbreak of peace and prosperity the way that it outlasted three decades of war remains to be seen”…clever, but more than a bit cynical. Whatever aesthetic or moral objections it might provoke, the construction boom comprises roughly half of Afghanistan’s economic growth and has a multiplier effect which helps a lot of ordinary Afghans. Even with many of the funds are leaving the country, as Sweeting keenly observes with a shot of a “Made in China” tag on a bouquet of plastic flowers, and even with impunity and growing inequity, I imagine few Heratis would wish to end their recent peace and prosperity.

Nevertheless, these words and images are striking, and give us a glimpse at an under told story of the new Afghanistan.

• Video
  

Photos: Ash Sweeting, Monocle (c).

Amb. Zahir Tanin at NYU

Last night I saw Zahir Tanin, Afghanistan's new Permanent Representative to the United Nations, speak at New York University (in conversation with scholar and journalist Alon Ben-Meir.)

Ambassador Tanin is clearly a learned man, but his comments were mostly pro-forma until the Q&A. But then things got interesting...MORE

Clash in Nangahar between residents and counternarcotics forces

Arman-e Milli, a Kabul daily in Dari and Pashtu, reports that yesterday "residents of Bati Kot district of Nangarhar province opened fire on members of the counter-narcotics team in the province yesterday morning." We often hear speculation about such incidents, but rarely do we read details:

The clash started yesterday morning, as the police entered the district to destroy the poppy fields. The people say that they threw stones at the police, but the police opened fire on them. Hazrat Ustad, a resident of this area, told a Pajhwok correspondent that, “the police injured eight innocent civilians in the area.”

Hassan Khan, another resident of this area, said that, “the government can’t destroy the poppy fields, as it has not done a single thing for us.” He added that, “we will defend our poppy fields with our lives.”

Noor Agha, the Nangarhar governor spokesperson, said that, “two security officials were injured in this clash.”

GOP disappointed in new drug chief?

According to a press report this week, Congressional Republicans are upset with the appointment of a State Department official to a newly created post of an anti-narcotics chief in Afghanistan. According to one staffer, the position was intended for someone to "knock heads together;" when someone from Foggy Bottom was tapped they've argued that "all this has done is put another player on the field."

There seem to be two worries: first that Thomas Schweich, most recently of the INL and a former chief of staff at the US Mission to the UN, is not senior enough to make this happen, and second that he harbors "soft on drug" inclinations (one staffer said "It's putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop.")

Schweich's positions are not clear yet. From his comments he certainly doesn't seem one of those namby-pamby incrementalists so derided by the drug warriors. On alternative livelihoods without eradication, he has said "we don't think that's ever worked anywhere in the world." He's a clear proponent of spraying (though with the Afghan government's consent.)

Perhaps its his "pessimism" that has earned him enmity: he has said that eliminating poppies in the south is "a longer term proposition, maybe five or 10 years." For congress, that sounds hopelessly long. For those familiar with the challenge, it seems more than a bit optimistic...

House GOP protests drug czar for Afghanistan:WASHINGTON, March 27 (UPI) By SHAUN WATERMAN: Republicans in Congress are angry at the Bush administration's choice of a State Department official to fill a new post to oversee U.S. efforts against drug smuggling and corruption in Afghanistan. "It's putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop," said one senior House GOP staffer. A little-noticed announcement from the White House last week named Thomas Schweich to the new job: coordinator for counter-narcotics and justice reform in Afghanistan. MORE

By the Numbers

Number of different (and often conflicting) land registries in Helmand:            17

Arrests by the British-supported Criminal Justice Task Force since May 2005: 830

Percent that resulted in a conviction:                                                           42%

Estimated years of opium exports that traffickers have stored in reserve:       4

                                                                                    Source: The Guardian

MORE BY THE NUMBERS BELOW
 

Should we end the counterinsurgency and refocus?

Getting a lot of buzz is Rory Stewart's guest column in the NY Times, in which he concludes that the West has bit off more than it can chew and that "the original strategy of limiting our role was correct."

It's a thoughtful piece, and Stewart writes well; however, his own policy prescriptions are no more coherent than the muddled thinking he dissects. MORE

Quoteboard

Some quotes from locals in Helmand, where allies are in the midst of Operation Achilles, the first major offensive of the season. The deputy governor of Helmand has announced plans to eradicate fully half of Helmand's poppy crop this year.

"No has destroyed my poppy and no one will be able to destroy it...We are not paying the Taleban, but they tell us, 'As long as we are here, no one can destroy your poppy'."

        - Hamidullah, a farmer in Musa Qala, Helmand

"I am a small-scale smuggler...I just buy poppy from farmers and sell it to bigger drug traffickers....We don't have a problem with the Taleban...if we give them money, we give by choice, like the zakat. People support the Taleban. Why shouldn't they?" 

        - Rahmatullah, local smuggler in Helmand  

 

An ink blot strategy. . .for poppies?

Antonio Maria Costa, Director of UN Office of Drugs and Crime, on a new strategy to "Establish a stronghold of opium-free, or provinces with a negligible amount, and then slowly regain control of the other provinces.” Sort of the ink blot strategy, but for drugs. At first glance, seems a long shot, though the latest study suggests that 6 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces do not grow poppies:

“We may be able to create a corridor, or an area ranging from Pakistan in the southeast to Turkmenistan in the northwest.”

Tom Lantos: go after the drug kingpins

Tom Lantos, chair of the House International Relations Committee, spoke this morning at the hearing "Afghanistan on the Brink: Where Do We Go From Here?", timing his comments to coincide with the President's speech. Lantos focuses his attention on the narcotics issue, calling for a more aggressive campaign by the military to go after drug traffickers and corrupt officials within the Karzai government. This is a much better approach than eradication methods supported by many within the administration, but Lantos and his colleagues (including Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) whose measured piece on narcotics appeared in Washington Times today) should be under no illusions that clipping some drug kingpins will resolve the insurgency or meaningfully bolster the Afghan government. His speech is reprinted below. MORE

Insights from a military commander

Yesterday I saw a senior U.S military commander in Afghanistan speak in New York. The event was off the record, so I cannot tell you who he was or cite direct quotes. However, this individual was on his way to House and Senate committee hearings, so there should soon be on-the-record version of these insights soon...Here are some of the most noteworthy points of his presentation:

• On the narcotics problem, he argued that the issue is less about aggregate aid and more about coming making the fractured inter-agency process work. I was shocked to learn that the counternarcotics team has five people to manage a $1 billion project (by way of comparison, there are 450 army personnel for the program on training, which has approximately the same budget.) He also noted that...MORE

Burdened U.S. military cuts role in drug war

The LA Times has been following Congress' push to get the Pentagon more involved in counternarcotics--see the rundown from last month here.  Here's the latest from Josh Meyer:

Air and sea patrolling is slashed on southern smuggling routes
WASHINGTON, Jan 22, by Josh Meyer (LA Times): Stretched thin from fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has sharply reduced its role in the war on drugs, leaving significant gaps in the nation's narcotics interdiction efforts...Internal records show that in the last four years the Pentagon has reduced by more than 62% its surveillance flight-hours over Caribbean and Pacific Ocean routes that are used to smuggle cocaine, marijuana and, increasingly, Colombian-produced heroin. At the same time, the Navy is deploying one-third fewer patrol boats in search of smugglers...The Department of Defense defended its policy shift in a budget document sent to Congress in October: "The DOD position is that detecting drug trafficking is a lower priority than supporting our service members on ongoing combat missions."...

Image: The US Coast Guard working...in Umm Qasr Iraq!? Photo by PA1 Tom Sperduto, USCG.

The man from Bogota

Pres. Bush announced today the next Ambassador to Afghanistan: William B. Wood. Wood has an impressive resume that suggests no experience whatsoever in the region (a curious distinction for  the nation's most demanding diplomatic post east of Baghdad...)

Wood's last posting, however, hints at why this president might find him a suitable candidate for the job:

Wood, 56, has spent most of his career in the diplomatic corps, working most recently in Bogotá with Colombia's government against a domestic insurgent group and drug traffickers.

Where did they file those eradication plans?

What John Waters thinks the president said...

When asked about the upcoming eradication program, John Waters, head of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy, sounded anything but decisive:

To assuage those fears, Mr Walters ruled out the use of planes and said spraying would initially use ground-based techniques. President Hamid Karzai had approved herbicide use, he said. "I think the president has said yes, and I think some of the ministers have repeated yes."

But Mr Karzai's office was less sure. One official would not confirm the change. "We are thinking about the issue and looking to see how we might proceed," he said.

Some friendly fire in the war on drugs?

The Pentagon has long sought to steer clear of counter narcotics operations, recognizing that to get involved would compromise its core goals of stability, force protection, and counter-terrorism. The responsibility to fight the spread of opium thus fell to Afghan authorities (who, even if they weren't co-opted by the industry, hardly have the capacity to take on well-funded drug networks) and the British (who were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem.)

Enter Congress. The L.A. Times reports that eight weeks ago, after reports that Afghanistan's cultivation had spiraled further out of control, two Illinois Republicans--Henry Hyde (who chairs the Intl. Rel Com) and  Mark Steven Kirk-- called for a larger Pentagon role in counternarcotics.

After receiving virtually no response since October, Rep. Hyde apparently went to the press:

Hyde, U.S. and U.N. counter-narcotics experts and Afghan officials told The Times that the Defense Department needed to target major drug traffickers, well-known labs that process opium into heroin, bazaars where drugs are sold openly and convoys that carry the drugs out of Afghanistan for shipment to Europe, elsewhere in Asia and, increasingly, the United States.

In response Undersecretary of Defense Eric S. Edelman, who had been tasked to the issue in October by Rumsfeld, sent a conciliatory letter to Hyde on Wednesday:

[Edelman] said Rumsfeld had authorized troops more than a year ago to embed DEA agents and other nonmilitary counter-narcotics personnel on missions in areas of known or suspected drug-related activity. And he said U.S. troops have been instructed to notify the DEA "regarding the disposition of significant drug caches discovered during operations."

It appears, however, that this "authorization" hasn't meant much in terms of a real policy shift.

"They had an ad hoc policy where the guys on the ground, a colonel here or there, would occasionally bring DEA along. What we've been pushing for is a more formal institutional policy," said a senior staff member with the House Committee on International Relations. "Right now, the DEA are like puppy dogs, scratching on the DOD door saying, 'I want a ride.' " He quoted a recent e-mail from a U.S. counter-narcotics official in Afghanistan who said he had seen virtually no cooperation between the Pentagon and the DEA on tactical operations. If Rumsfeld had ordered troops to work with drug agents, the official wrote, "it was not well known, understood or accepted."

Stay tuned: a classified briefing on the military's counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan is set for today. This will be one of the more openly contentious areas of Afghanistan policy issues for both the new Secretary of Defense and the new Congress this year...

Photo: A U.S. Army humvee passes an opium poppy field near Lashkar Gah in southern Afghanistan

Kabul-Kandahar highway, Musa Qala, and Senlis Council

Today the PCR Project gives a good run-down of stories they are following:

• It is becoming increasingly dangerous and expensive to use the once highly touted Kabul-Kandahar highway...
• The Senlis Council, a highly respected NGO that has argued for the legalization of poppy, may have been kicked out of Afghanistan for engaging in activities that are “contrary to the constitution of Afghanistan” and tacitly encouraging poppy growth.
• British troops withdrew from Helmand Province’s Musa Qala last week after a September deal with tribal elders and the provincial governor [which] could become a model for other districts throughout the South...

Microlending and Afghan reconstruction?

USAID announced this month (clip below break) that $80 million will be distributed in small loans to rural Afghans over the next three years. This is a welcome initiative. Credit programs exist in Afghanistan, but on too small a scale to compete with the array of traffickers who already occupy the role of lender. These traffickers extend cash to impoverished farmers at usurious rates (and with predictably harsh penalties for non-payment) in return for future payment in cash or poppy sap.

Micro-lending programs are powerful because they correct a market failure--the stifling absence of credit for poor people. For years, Muhammad Yunus, who received the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize for his work at the Grameen Bank, has argued that despite their lack of collateral and traditional "creditworthiness," poor people -- and especially poor women -- can make highly reliable borrowers.

You can read Dr. Yunus's excellent Wall Street Journal op-ed here (A Hand Up, Not a Handout.) He argues that loans are usually more effective than grants, even -- and especially -- when the needs are greatest.  Counterintuitive? Read his argument:

In Bangladesh, we've learned that when aid is free, not only do the poor get the least of it, but everyone inflates their needs. While some handouts are clearly necessary in such times, we focus on lending small amounts of money. This lets us keep costs down and rebuild funds for the next disaster. Most importantly, our Grameen banks are ready to act at a moment's notice. They can respond to a disaster without waiting for anyone's permission, immediately becoming like humanitarian agencies by suspending loan payments, and providing cash, food and medicines.

Micro-lending provides a counterbalance to the two biggest problems we've seen in reconstructing Afghainstan--the problem of administrative costs and bureaucratic delays implicit in foreign aid. The point of Yunus's article is to recommend microlending for Katrina victims, but it raises the question: are we doing enough to support microlending in Afghanistan?

Illicit: Traffickers Diversify

I was reading Moisés Naím's excellent book Illicit the other day, and came across this passage (which is continued after the break). Afghanistan is a case study in the processes he describes; the impact of institutional capture by opium traffickers and their allies is already evident, and their diversification (into real estate, for example) is well underway. Expect more of the same. All future attempts to reform Afghan politics, justice system, or economic development must account for the centrality of the illicit economy:

Left unchecked, illicit trade can only pursue its already well advanced mutation. There is ample evidence that it offers terrorists and other miscreants means of survival and methods of financial transfer and exchange. Its effect on geopolitics will go further. In developing countries and those in transition from communism, criminal networks often constitute the most powerful vested interests confronting the government. In some countries, their resources and capabilities even surpass those of their governments.

With lives threatened, livelihoods wither

In his NYT op-ed, Joel Hafvenstein, who worked on an alternative livelihoods program in Helmand, offers a vivid account of how our counternarcotics strategy (and our development strategy in general) has collapsed in the absence of security:

Afghanistan’s Drug Habit
Sept 20 (NYT):

... By May 2005, we had paid out millions of dollars and had some 14,000 men on the payroll simultaneously. The program buoyed the provincial economy, and would have made a fine launching pad for long-term alternatives to poppy.

Security was our Achilles’ heel. There was a new American military base by the graveyard on the edge of town, but the few score Iowa National Guard members there lacked the manpower and the local knowledge to protect us. We could not afford the professional security companies in Kabul, most run by brash veterans of Western militaries. Then, just before Christmas, some of our engineers were carjacked. We resorted to the only remaining source of protection: the provincial police.

Drug Addiction Rates Soar

Not a new story, but one worth repeating: the demand for Afghan narcotics comes not only from the West, but also from within the region (mostly in Pakistan and Iran, but increasingly in Afghanistan itself, as the story below reveals.)

Afghan leaders have long complained that their cultivation of poppy was an inevitable response to the demands of infidels. The reality is that the demand for opium sap starts from much closer to home, and must be addressed there as well. The UK, the US, and Russia could end their heroin problem tomorrow and the demand for Afghan opium would not disappear (although profits for drug lords, criminal networks and corrupt officials would shrink, since it's the international trade that drives high revenues for middle men.)

Poppy cultivation and trade is corrupting the lives and society of Afghans as well as westerners, and Afghan religious and community leaders should be more emphatic in their condemnation of all aspects of the drug trade.

The erosion of norms against growing poppy is a major factor in the spread of cultivation to areas in which poppies were never grown before (once limited to a few regions, they are now farmed in every province.) This trend won't be reversed until Afghans come to terms with the pernicious effect that narcotics are having on their own society.  (click here for photos by Bejanmin Krain)

Drug Addiction Rates Soar in War-Torn Afghanistan Voice of America Kabul, August 8 2006, By Benjamin Sand: The United Nations says addiction rates in war-torn Afghanistan have doubled in the past two years, to the point that nearly a million people are now using illegal drugs...