Pakistan’s intelligence services

The New York Times has an excellent piece on Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency losing control over some of the groups of militants that it fostered since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These militants have now turned against the military and are contributing to attacks directed at the army, intelligence agencies and the government.

The article also sheds light on the ISI’s role in rigging the 2002 national election, and the defection of intelligence officials to the extremist militant cause.

“Greatest military threat to Pakistan”?

Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban leader of the newly formed coalition Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, who has been accused by Pakistani intelligence of masterminding Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, is getting some media interest.

Blast from the past

President of the Afghanistan Foreign Press Association Vanni Cappelli writes about an American diplomat raising questions about the threat of the Pakistani military – almost 40 years ago. Cappelli digs up a 1970 New York Times op-ed by Chester Bowles who predicted that Pakistani military would be the strategic threat of the future, not the then-burning Vietnam.

New covert US push in Pakistan?

The US is considering sending the CIA on more aggressive, covert missions into the chaotic tribal regions of Pakistan. The New York Times article quotes anonymous senior administration sources saying that the possible missions would be very secretive but would involve CIA cooperation with Special Operations forces. These options are being discussed in response to intelligence reports that see new Taliban efforts to destabilize the Pakistani government. (Also see the earlier Afghanistan Watch post on this)

Blogger “Charlie” who writes for the respected “Abu Muqawama” counterinsurgency blog thinks that Pakistan lacks two conditions that could make these missions successful:

1) A welcoming and cooperative government, whose armed forces take the lead in ground operations.
2) Little in the way of media coverage or Pentagon/Foggy Bottom meddling.

Islamist split in Pakistan

Nicholas Schmidle writes on the split within the Islamist movements in Pakistan in this week's New York Times Magazine. The hard-line Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, reportedly the political front for jihadi groups including the Taliban, seems to have toned down its anti-American and pro-jihadi rhetoric, as it prepares to contest the upcoming Pakistani parliamentary elections. This issue of whether to participate in the elections or boycott them has caused the powerful Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal alliance to split. This alliance won 10 percent of the popular vote last time around and formed provincial governments in two of the four Pakistani provinces.

In the past year, the J.U.I. chief (Maulana Fazlur Rehman) has tried to disassociate himself from the new generation of Taliban wreaking havoc not only across the border in Afghanistan, as they have for years, but also increasingly in Pakistan. At the same time, Rehman has been trying to persuade foreign ambassadors and establishment politicians here that he is the only one capable of dealing with those same Taliban. In the process, some Islamists maintain that Rehman has sold them out. Last April, a rocket whistled over the sugarcane fields that separate Rehman’s house from the main road before crashing into the veranda of his brother’s home next door. A few months later, Pakistani intelligence agencies discovered a hit list, drafted by the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, with Rehman’s name on it.

[snip]

Rehman doesn’t pretend to be a liberal; he wants to see Pakistan become a truly Islamic state. But the moral vigilantism and the proliferation of Taliban-inspired militias along the border with Afghanistan is not how he saw it happening. The emergence of Taliban-inspired groups in Pakistan has placed immense strain on the country’s Islamist community, a strain that may only increase with the assassination of Bhutto.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan

Col. Dennis Young of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College adds to the chorus of voices urging the Bush administration to divert troops, effort and financial aid to Afghanistan. He also suggests five adjustments to current ISAF and U.S. strategies:

Bhutto assassination reverberates across Afghanistan

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto last week continues to ring across Afghanistan, as American officials worry that it heralds the rise of a more virulent extremism against the Pakistani government that could undermine the Afghan mission. It could also damage the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two neighbors, and hurt efforts to fight cross-border terrorism.

Video: Interview with Gen. McNeill, Rashid, MacDonald

Yesterday, the NewsHour with Jim Leherer ran a good segment on Afghanistan featuring commentary by Gen. Dan McNeill, Ahmed Rashid, and Norine MacDonald (from Senlis Council). The transcript, along with streaming video, is available here.

Suicide bomb hits governor's compound in Nimruz; another averted in Kabul

Another fatal suicide attack in a province that rarely sees them (Nimruz).

Note also the clip on a Pakistani suicide bomber that stopped in Kabul as he attempted to board a bus filled with military trainers. Disaster was averted because of the quick thinking of a guard. MORE

Classified proposal: enlist Pakistan's tribes against AQ

US military officials confirmed this weekend that a special operations plan is in the works to arm and empower Pakistani tribal leaders against foreign extremists. The proposal is modeled on efforts in Anbar province, Iraq, where Sunni sheiks were enlisted to turn local Iraqis against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.

The Times notes that "Some other elements of the campaign have been approved in principle by the Americans and Pakistanis and await financing, like $350 million over several years to help train and equip the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force that now has about 85,000 members and is recruited from border tribes" but adds that "the classified proposal to enlist tribal leaders is new."

The story also notes that a group of Pakistan experts convened in March thought the proposal had its merits, but that successes 'would be difficult to achieve, particularly in the north (Bajaur) and south (North and South Waziristam.' Not only has the tribal leadership been eviscerated in these regions, but there is a great skepticism about working with the United States and the Pakistani army. This seems to me the great -- and perhaps insurmountable -- challenge with such an approach...

Gordon Adams on the Pentagon-Pakistan "slush fund"

Gordon Adams has a great post on Democracy Arsenal which takes a closer look at Pentagon payments to Pakistan (which are only now coming under scrutiny in congress). Here's a clip (Note: there's more on DoD's usurpation of roles once performed by State in Adam's Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article...):

The Los Angeles Times of November 18, 2007 reports that the Pentagon is looking into Coalition Support payments to Pakistan (of which $5.3 b have been made to date), because documentation of the Pakistani spending supposedly being reimbursed is too thin...One unnamed official, who tracks these payments, told the LA Times: “"Backdoor subsidies is what it can look like to some more skeptical observers, because there hasn't been good oversight and the amounts involved have been so great.  There is suspicion that it's a slush fund."

No kidding! Count me a “skeptical observer.”  So now the Pentagon, which has no expertise at making foreign assistance payments directly to other governments or at tracking them after they are made, are going to play catch-up ball with this program. MORE

Sarah Chayes on Arghandab, the Taliban, and GoA meddling

Sarah Chayes has a piece today in the Washington Post in which she recalls, from her front row seat, the Taliban incursion into Arghandab in the wake of Mullah Naqib's heart attack.

Her verdict is deeply troubling: despite a successful coalition counterattack, the Taliban operation  "was a deft, successful psychological operations action":

It said that, despite the likelihood that they would attack after the death of Mullah Naqib, no obstacle was thrown up to oppose them, and they were able to walk into the district. The targeting of the mullah's house was a deliberate affront. It said: "You see, o men of no honor? You can't even protect his house. You are nothing now." The sum of these messages was aimed at the ordinary people who are the prize in any insurgency: Our encroachment is inevitable, the Taliban said. You should align yourselves with the inevitable.

Equally troubling is the Government of Afghanistan's response. Immediately after Mullah Naqib's death, President Karzai, along with his two brothers and the governor of Kandahar, "interfered in the recent selection of a new elder, sidelining a man who had been Mullah Naqib's deputy during the anti-Soviet jihad." "If anyone knew how to fight the Taliban in Arghandab, it was he," argues Chayes, "And yet the government's machinations were plainly aimed at shutting him out" in favor of a more pliable replacement, the untried son of Mullah Naqib. Their goal, she implies, is to ram through an alluring -- but dangerously flawed  -- reconciliation with the Taliban.

A Mullah Dies, and War Comes Knocking, By Sarah Chayes, Nov 18, KANDAHAR: Wednesday, Oct. 31: I woke to the sound of artillery thudding -- like the beat of a heavy heart. It was Afghan army batteries firing into Arghandab, at new Taliban positions there. Through several nights, I had been listening, my ears pricking like a dog's, to the faint popping of gunfire, the clattering of helicopters, the whine of personnel carriers speeding along the roads, falling asleep only when the morning call to prayer rang out in the pre-dawn chill.

I can't explain how this felt, the penetration of war to this crucial part of Kandahar, where I have lived for six years. Arghandab district, with its riot of tangled fruit trees, is the lung of Kandahar province; its meandering, stone-studded river is the artery of the whole region. Arghandab is shade and water, and mud-walled orchards, and mulberries and apricots, and pomegranates the size of grapefruits hanging from the willowy branches. MORE

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE

Musharraf says he'll step down this month

Hot off the wires...of course, we'll believe it when we see it. Note his indication that emergency rule will continue through January elections.

Pakistan leader to quit army this month By ZARAR KHAN, Associated Press Writer, 12 minutes ago: RAWALPINDI, Pakistan - President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said Wednesday he expects to step down as army chief by the end of November and begin a new presidential term as a civilian, warning that Pakistan risked chaos if he gave into opposition demands to resign.

In an interview with The Associated Press, he accused former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, currently under house arrest, of fueling political turmoil and rejected Western pressure to quickly lift emergency rule, which he indicated was likely to continue through the January elections.

"All those who are blunt enough to tell me to my face what the reality is, all of them think, yes, it will lead the country to chaos if I do not handle the political environment now with me remaining as the president," he said at his army office.

The U.S.-backed general had originally planned to quit as chief of the powerful army by Thursday, when his presidential mandate and the term of the current parliament expire, but he said he was forced to delay the restoration of civilian rule until a court ruling on his recent re-election.

He said the exact timing would depend on the Supreme Court — which he purged of independent-minded judges when he suspended the constitution on Nov. 3 — but expected it to happen within this month. MORE

Pickering, Hills and Abramowitz on Pakistan

Three of America's most respected former diplomats weigh in on Pakistan today in the Washington Post. They argue the Pentagon must step up, and leverage aid to secure elections under a neutral caretaker government. Also pose an interesting analogy to the Philippines...

The Answer in Pakistan by Thomas R. Pickering, Carla Hills and Morton Abramowitz, Nov 13: Every day that Gen. Pervez Musharraf refuses to reverse his imposition of martial law and restore Pakistan's constitution brings another round of disturbing reports...The Bush administration's aims of securing support for the "war on terror" and stability for a nuclear power will continue to be right, but as a nation of 160 million people rapidly frays under repression, it will only become more obvious that military dictatorship is not the answer.

This realization is already settling in. Many in the Bush administration and Congress have been sending clear messages of disapproval to Musharraf. The Pentagon, however, has been more ambiguous, and it is unclear whether military aid will continue as if nothing happened on Nov. 3. The United States must go beyond verbal condemnations and show with actions that it believes Musharraf is on the wrong track. If there is a recent analogy to what is happening in Pakistan, it is the Philippines of Ferdinand Marcos in late 1985 (though the stakes are much higher today)....MORE

Quoteboard

“There is a question why the provincial officials were not with their parliamentarian guests. And it is a question why there was shooting after the explosion.”

- Burhanuddin Rabbani,  leader of the United National Front.

“This time there should be consequences. We should stop delivery of any further F-16s to Pakistan and cut off all other U.S. assistance until the state of emergency is lifted.”

- Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY), member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

“It is dangerous to stand up to a military dictatorship, but more dangerous not to.”

- Benazir Bhutto, former Pakistan Prime Minister

“This is going to be a very short-lived emergency,”

- Tariq Azim Khan, Pakistani deputy information minister

Update: Congress and Pakistan

CQ has an update to its story yesterday, with statements from Leahy, Kerry, and Biden (and a non-statement by Lantos...)

Chorus of Calls to Halt Aid to Pakistan Getting Louder on Capitol Hill By Colby Itkowitz, CQ Staff Calls on Capitol Hill to cut aid to Pakistan grew Wednesday, as the Bush administration defended its policy of maintaining close ties with President Pervez Musharraf despite his declaration of emergency rule. ...President Bush, personally weighing in on the Pakistan crisis for the first time since Musharraf declared emergency rule Nov. 3, telephoned the Pakistani leader Wednesday for what Bush called a “frank discussion.” “And my message was that we believe strongly in elections and that you ought to have elections soon, and you need to take off your uniform,” Bush said.

Murmurs in Congress on cutting aid to Pakistan

The administration this year requested $800m in aid to Pakistan. Pres. Musharraf has since announced emergency rule, postponed elections, and cracked down on protesters -- but there have been no ultimatums from the administration and no sign that funds will be cut.

In testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee this afternoon, Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte argued that aid should stay, arguing that Pakistan"cutting these programs would send a negative signal to the people of Pakistan"

Some in Congress see things differently -- which is why Senator Biden (chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) received a call on Tuesday. It was Musharraf on the line, urging him not to cut off the aid. Biden has said that  Pakistan"I told President Musharraf how critical it is for relations between our two countries that elections go forward as planned in January...That he follow through on his commitment to take off his uniform and that he restore the rule of law to Pakistan." MORE

Exports up 13 percent in first two quarters

Every year, Afghanistan imports about $5 billion dollars in goods and exports just $500 million. But this year, according to a government spokesman, exports are at least on the rise. In the first two quarters, exports have gone up 12% and 13% respectively when compared with last year.

Afghan exports include handcrafts, fresh and dry fruit, minerals, leather products, cotton and precious stones and have gone to  India, China, Pakistan, UAE, Europe and the US. The rise in exports is attributable, to some extent, on the removal of customs, barriers, and other red tape. A good trend, but obviously still a long way to go.

Afghanistan's exports up by 13pc in 2nd quarter. (Pajhwok Afghan News) by Zainab Muhammadi, KABUL, Oct 21: Afghanistan's exports had registered 13 percent increase during the second quarter of the current Afghan year as compared to the same period during last year, officials said on Sunday.

Korb and Wadhams: Five steps

Larry Korb and Caroline Wadhams argue today in a Newsday op-ed that "the United States and NATO must increase troop levels by at least 20,000" in Afghanistan. This rise in troop levels is part of a five-point plan that includes bolstering reconstruction assistance, focusing on rule of law, and reforming U.S. aid channels to Pakistan. The steps they sketch out will be supported by a more comprehensive report in the coming months -- keep your eyes peeled ...

U.S.

must put more focus on Afghan insurgency, Oct 9, 2007: Sunday marked the sixth anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaida....But the mission in Afghanistan is going alarmingly awry, and the United States must refocus and re-energize its policy. The administration and Congress cannot allow the sinking ship of Iraq to take Afghanistan down with it...

To achieve our security objectives, the United States, and especially Congress, must provide increased funds, attention and manpower - both civilian and military. U.S. leaders must also engage the American people, as they may become increasingly pessimistic about U.S. involvement in the Muslim world as a result of the war in Iraq. There are five concrete steps Congress and the administration should pursue immediately. MORE

Part II of the Rubin/Marshall talk

TPMtv with Barnett Rubin

Barnett Rubin, in a video interview with Joshua Micah Marshall

A Chat with Barnett Rubin, Part I: A few weeks ago Dr. Barnett Rubin, one of the world's premier Afghanistan experts at NYU, created a stir with a series of blog posts about signs the Bush administration might be gearing up for a military campaign against Iran. Last week I interviewed Rubin about the Bush administration's war talk against Iran and I asked him, Is there really any evidence that Iran is helping arm the Taliban, as the Bush administration keeps claiming?

Musharraf's appointments signal seriousness about transition

Last week, Pres. Musharraf pledged to step down as chief of the army if elected President next month. His recent re-organization of the military leadership suggests he's serious. He would hardly be as intent to make these changes if he expected to stand pat.

Musharraf promoted two lieutenant generals to top posts:

• Maj. Gen. Nadeem Ijaz Taj was tapped to run the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).
• Maj. Gen. Mohsin Kamal was posted to the 10th Corp (the nation's most important garrison, based in Rawalpindi)

These promotions allow Musharraf to appoint the current holders of these positions -- ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Ahmed Kiani and Rawalpindi Corp Commander, Lt. Gen. Tariq Majid -- to "Vice Chief" (the army's No. 2 job) & "Chief of General Staff" (the No. 3 post.) Gretchen Peters of ABC News's The Blotter notes that "Analysts and Western officials say both men are moderates, with favorable views of the West and of America."

What are the implications of these moves? The Blotter writes that:

Musharraf promoted several faithful subordinates into key positions and freed up his two most trusted deputies apparently to step into the No. 2 and 3 slots. Analysts say the appointments indicate Musharraf plans to stick to his promise -- made by his lawyer this week before the country's Supreme Court -- to relinquish his post as army chief if re-elected president by the legislature next month.

"These are all trusted deputies of Musharraf," said Talat Massood, a retired defense secretary for Pakistan. "We can expect they will continue to support him and continue his policy of supporting the war on terror."

"No surprises here," said a Western official of the appointments. "He's trying to line up his best men ahead of the elections."

Peters describes Gen. Kiani as "an avid golfer who's considered the most intellectual of Pakistan's senior officers, studied at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas" and Gen. Majid as "Musharraf's star pupil years ago at the Command and Staff College in Quetta...He fits the bill, say insiders, both in terms of his age and past experience, to take over the army."

What will become of the current Vice Chief and the current Chief of the General Staff, who are set to retire next month? The BBC sees this picture as murkier:

The BBC's Sanjay Dasgupta says that this round of appointments is being seen as part of larger move by President Musharraf to place a core group of loyal supporters in key positions before he quits as army chief. Who his successor will be is now the big question in Pakistan's military-dominated politics, he adds.

Next month, two of Gen Musharraf's top deputies in the army retire -- Gen Ehsan Ul Haq, who is the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee, and Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat, who is the vice-chief of army staff.

Some analysts say that one of these two men is being freed up to take over as the army chief after Gen Musharraf.

But others disagree, saying the pair have been around long enough to have developed clout and influence within the military establishment in their own right. Hence they have the potential to become alternative power centres, and Gen Musharraf would prefer a new face, who would owe his promotion, and therefore his loyalty, solely to him.

Image: Ehsan Ul Haq and Ahsan Saleem Hayat upon their appointments to the #2 and #3 positions in 2004. Pakistan Daily Times.

Controversy over direct US military action in Pakistan misses the point

The latest of Richard Weitz's excellent articles on Afghanistan and Pakistan is available at the World Politics Review (a great new site that provides exclusive daily foreign policy analysis from contributors across 40 countries.)

Weitz argues that the discovery, during the Tillman investigation, of specific US rules of engagement for when US forces are authorized to enter Pakistan -- along with Barack Obama's remarks that "if President Musharraf won't act, we will" -- leaves the impression that US efforts to capture the Big Three (bin Laden, al-Zawahri, and Mullah Omar) are primarily about direct military action. The assumption that seriousness of purpose against the Taliban and Al Qaeda can be measured by one's willingness to cross the border is mistaken and counterproductive. Moreover, as Weitz notes, a focus on what the Pentagon is doing threatens "to obscure the small role that such direct military operations play in the overall U.S. effort to prevent Taliban insurgents from using Pakistan as a support base for their operations in Afghanistan."

Non-Military Tools Neglected in Debate Over Afghan-Pakistani Border Operations, by Richard Weitz 31 Aug 2007 World Politics Review Exclusive

London confronts Beijing over Chinese weapons in Taliban hands

The BBC reports today that London has privately complained to Beijing that Chinese-made weaponry has being found in the hands of the Taliban. Normally this is not news -- Afghanistan is awash in small arms, much of it manufactured in China. However, the article implies (citing conversations with experts) that because the type of weaponry includes HN-5 anti-aircraft missiles and armor piercing ammo it is unlikely that it was provided by the traditional channel (Pakistan's ISI) and may instead be coming through Iran.

I'm not sure I buy the assumption that the ISI wouldn't provide high-tech weaponry to the Taliban simply because these arms could be used against them -- weapons transfers went to militants in the past under similar circumstances. Moreover, the flow of arms through any of these nations does not guarantee official complicity -- there are lots of smugglers and corrupt officials willing to run guns to make a buck.

Nevertheless, there is an interesting story here. It is not that Chinese weapons are in the hands of the Taliban or that the Taliban is getting arms from across the Iranian border (which US officials have credibly demonstrated). It is instead why Britain chose this moment to raise these questions for the first time with Beijing. Has the nature of these transfers changed? Is this conversation a function of the tensions surrounding Iran and its nuclear program?

Taleban 'getting Chinese arms' By Paul Danahar, (BBC): The BBC has been told that on several occasions Chinese arms have been recovered after attacks on British and American troops by Afghan insurgents. The authorities in Beijing have promised to carry out an investigation. This appears to be the first time Britain has asked China how its arms are ending up with the Taleban. At a meeting held recently at the Chinese foreign ministry in Beijing, a British official expressed the UK's growing concern about the incidents...MORE   

Image: A Chinese-made HN-5 (Hongying 5 "Red Cherry") shoulder launched missile (an improved version of the Russian-made SA-7). FAS.

Comments on the South Korean hostage situation

The following are comments I made to a South Korean reporter covering the hostage crisis. If you have additional insights for him -- or corrections for me -- drop me an email and I will pass them along.

1. What is the security situation in Afghanistan as a whole?

It very much depends on the region. Several provinces in the south and southeast (e.g. Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, Ghazni) are quite dangerous and have become more so. But in the rest of the country, especially in the north and the west and in major cities such as Kabul, is fairly safe. Afghans and foreigners living and working there must take precautions, but are not at risk in the same way that aid workers in Kandahar would be.

After incidents like these, the international community must reconsider where and how it operates. The OECD has estimated that fully half of all development assistance has been spent in four of the most dangerous provinces in the south. It is extremely difficult and expensive to do development work in this environment. A decision was made to concentrate development work in these contentious areas in order to “win hearts and minds,” but it’s not clear that this approach is working. On the other hand, there are many stable regions in Afghanistan that are languishing from a lack of attention. So a wiser approach, especially in light of these recent kidnappings, is to pick some of the low-hanging fruit that is currently rotting on the vine. MORE

Reports of first surface-to-air missile attack in Afghanistan

One of the nightmares that keep Western planners up at night is the possibility that insurgents might get a hold of some MANPADS (Man-portable air defense systems). The most prominently discussed is the Stinger missile -- after all, many of the missiles the US provided to mujahideen for use against the Soviets have never been accounted for -- but there are plenty of Russian built surface-to-air missiles floating around that could prove disastrous in the wrong hands. Until this week, the threat of shoulder-launched missiles was the dog that hasn't barked.

Then on Sunday a C-130 transport plane was reportedly attacked in Nimroz province with a surface-to-air missile. NATO will neither confirm nor deny the incident, but the London Telegraph (by way of the Washington Times) reports that "The crew reported that a missile system locked on to their aircraft and that a missile was fired. It closed in on the large C-130, pursuing it as the pilots made a series of violent evasive maneuvers and jettisoned flares to confuse the heat sensors in the nose of the surface-to-air missile, or SAM." The article continues: "The C-130 attacked in Nimroz was flying at 11,000 feet at the time of the attack, which is within the 1.5- to 3.4-mile range of a shoulder-launched missile system such as the SAM-7."

The million dollar question is whether this will prove an isolated incident, or the start of a trend. Speculation has begun as to where these weapons are coming from; apparently there was a SAM-7 among the arms that was intercepted along the Iran border in April.

Taliban's failed first use of SAM still worrisome  KABUL, July 29 (Washington Post/LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH): Taliban militants used a heat-seeking, surface-to-air missile to attack a Western aircraft over Afghanistan for the first time last week, coalition military sources say. The attack with a weapon thought to have been smuggled across the border with Iran represents a worrisome increase in the capability of the militants that Western commanders had long feared.

Photo: DOD: An Afghan Mujahideen demonstrates positioning of a hand-held surface-to-air missile. 26 Aug 1988

"Cops or Robbers?" AREU's must-read report on police reform

Donors are finally realizing the importance of police reform. Unfortunately, some of the response has been to throw money at the problem--the latest infusion of funding, for example, focuses on training and equipment, as if the police problem were primarily a technocratic challenge rather than a political one.

Andrew Wilder, research director at Tuft's Feinstein Center, is the author the AREU's remarkable new report on the topic entitled "Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police". He argues that there is still no consensus about the role of police, and too little appreciation that the Ministry of the Interior is part of the problem. The paper highlights five challenges. Donors will need to:

Just because we don't speak about things publicly...

The recent back and forth from Washington and Islamabad--sparked by White House statements that it would unilaterally strike Al Qaeda in Pakistan's territory if necessary--has been one whirlwind of a show. A string of spokesmen have made each side's position absolutely clear (depending, of course, upon which audience that particular message is intended for...) Frances Townsend, a White House homeland security adviser, summed it up when she fielded a question on FOX about why the US wasn't already engaged in operations in Pakistan: "Just because we don't speak about things publicly doesn't mean we're not doing things you talk about."

Pakistan responded that such operations would be an inconceivable infringement of sovereignty (wink, wink) and that it's in a better position to shut down AQ--if only the US would pass along its intel.

Bill Arkin, writing for the Washington Post's Early Warning blog, gets to the heart of the matter: "lost amid the back and forth is an interesting question: If Pakistan is indeed not getting intelligence information from the United States, why not?" He suggests "Is it because we found it was making its way back to the bad guys?" MORE 

Photo: Source: White House. Frances Townsend (right) meets with President Bush and the Homeland Security Team at the National Counterterrorism Center in McLean, Virginia.

Tom Perriello: Comments on Security

With news of another major suicide bomb attack in the South making headlines, I wanted to pass along an unofficial summary of a dozen or so interviews with security experts from various Embassies, UN offices, NGOs, and the Afghan government.

Overall, most security experts agree that the insurgency has shifted its emphasis from the bolder frontal attacks on international forces that we saw in summer 2006 to asymmetric tactics, i.e. “shoot and scoot” operations, suicide bombings, and IEDs. This is a regression for the insurgency, and NATO and OEF operations have driven much of this shift. Most analysts credit the successful targeting of mid-level insurgent leaders (top leaders assumed to be safely in Quetta) with hindering Taliban operations. MORE

Tom Perriello: Two Views from Qandahar

Qandahar is a lot to take in on a short trip. I had forgotten how much cleaner and wider the streets are than in Kabul. And that the city comes to life in the evening for those two magical hours before the onset of darkness. New development is visible everywhere and statistically trends are headed up from 8 months ago inside the city.

Yet the mood is grim. People talk about corruption that stretches from petty police bribes to drug dealing at the highest levels of provincial Government. While people remain solidly anti-insurgency, a deep fissure has appeared here between the people and government that was a mere crack in 2005.

The logical link between enabling corrupt warlords and undermining our own counter-insurgency efforts is crucial to understand. A corrupt government does not make people pro-insurgency. It simply means people no longer have a dog in the fight. Between a corrupt government (who demand payoffs) or the Taliban and other anti-government forces (who offer handouts), you follow the path of least resistance and try to stay out of the way. MORE

Away from the quick fix...

Excellent op-ed on narcotics today by Crisis Group's Nick Grono and Joanna Nathan. They succinctly rebut black and white solutions to the drug problem (large-scale eradication and regulated legalization) and suggest some wiser measures:

1. Target the 20-25 top traffickers with extradition and asset seizures.
2. Destroy labs and warehouses (ANA backed by NATO).
3. Cooperate with Iran and Pakistan to shut down middlemen operating on their terrain.
4. Focus alternative livelihood programs on areas before they produce poppy in order to inoculate farmers to its influence.

Skeptics might argue that these steps are difficult to implement with the current levels of corruption, or that they require of politicians an unrealistic embrace of moral ambiguity and long time horizons. I don't think Grono and Nathan would disagree, but they remind us that "it is much easier to say what won't work than what will."

"The challenge," they write, "will be to keep (politicians) focused on smart courses of action that yield long-term results – and away from superficially "easy" policies that end up backfiring." We should do what we can to help make these arguments.

Cohen and Barton: Alternatives to Musharraf

Today Craig Cohen and Rick Barton of CSIS argue, in a Washington Post op-ed, that alternatives to Musharraf exist, and "the United States must put itself on the side of the Pakistani people before it finds itself overtaken by events":

Pakistan’s four provinces are larger in population and size than many European countries. Rather than threatening aid cut offs to Pakistan, the United States should maintain current levels, but reward provincial, city and local governments, opposition parties and civil society organizations that share our long-term objectives in Pakistan.

Rather than bemoan that Musharraf is America’s only alternative, we should start contributing to the development of new leaders across the country.

In particular, they recommend we triple our investment in education, which currently only accounts for 2.54% of US assistance to Islamabad.

Guess what? There is an Iraq/al Qaeda link

Last year, the CIA boosted its presence in Pakistan and Aghanistan to ~50 clandestine operatives in order to track down HVT1 and HVT2 (aka high-value targets one and two, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahri.) While the intel surge hasn’t produced any substantiated leads ("We're not any closer" said a military official on the brief), the CIA recently identified a pernicious trend that is not without irony: al Qaeda’s operations, once starved for cash after 9/11, are being kept afloat by cash flowing out of Iraq.

To summarize: the administration said we needed to go into Iraq because Saddam had connections to al Qaeda. While it turns out that this link was fallacious, post-Saddam Iraq is now the engine that keeps al Qaeda’s operations awash in cash, recruits and technical training.

Greg Miller writes today in the LA Times that Iraq has become AQ’s “most profitable franchise”:

In one of the most troubling trends, U.S.officials said that al Qaeda's command base in Pakistan is increasingly being funded by cash coming out of Iraq, where the terrorist network's operatives are raising substantial sums from donations to the anti-American insurgency as well as from kidnappings of wealthy Iraqis and other criminal activity. He suggests that Musharraf’s deal with “tribal leaders” has facilitated flows from Iraq and has “made travel easier for operatives migrating to Pakistan after taking part in the insurgency in Iraq. Some of those veterans are leading training at newly established camps and are positioned to become the 'next generation of leadership' in the organization, said the former senior CIA official.”

Miller’s article is well worth a read. MORE

Karzai's tightrope act...

President Karzai, visiting Shindand district (near the Iranian border), had to walk a fine line in a speech that followed a series of civilian deaths at the hands of international forces. Karzai criticized the tactics of these forces--even as he argued the need to their continued presence. (In a separate interview with
Pakistan television he said "Foreign troops would not leave till Al Qaeda, which is active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is wiped out, and this may take two or three years or more.") He criticized the Taliban for targeting civilians even while saying that crimes committed by genuine Afghan Taliban (as opposed to foreign jihadists) were forgivable, and even as he urged Mullah Omar to join him in talks.

Karzai is put in an exceedingly difficult position by the recent civilian deaths. He has long called for restraint in air-strikes and search and seizure tactics, but it’s clear that international forces will do what they see fit regardless of his protests. The president assured the crowd in Shindand that it would not happen again, but does anyone believe he can really deliver on this promise?

Karzai-Musharraf to talk in Turkey

Musharraf said yesterday he hopes "the ground realities will be understood." Of course, some things have changed since the two last met, but tensions have hardly subsided: last week, fire was exchanged across the Afghan-Pakistani border.

Amb. Zahir Tanin at NYU

Last night I saw Zahir Tanin, Afghanistan's new Permanent Representative to the United Nations, speak at New York University (in conversation with scholar and journalist Alon Ben-Meir.)

Ambassador Tanin is clearly a learned man, but his comments were mostly pro-forma until the Q&A. But then things got interesting...MORE

Clashes continue between local and foreign militants in South Waziristan

Islamabad has pointed to recent victories by local militias against foreign militants (who have ties to Al Qaeda and the IMU) as a sign that its strategy of relying upon traditional leaders, and not the national army, is starting to pay off. According to a Pakistan spokesman, a tribal chief aligned with the Taliban has come over to their side, leading to an ultimatum that foreign insurgents leave. Press has little access to the area, so these claims are difficult to verify.

This story last week is an interesting counterpoint to the NY Times front page story that describes the resurgence of Al Qaeda's leadership and capabilities.

Pakistan Fights Near Afghanistan Kill 52
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) By Munir Ahmad - Fighting between local and foreign militants Friday killed 52 people, bringing to more than 200 the number of dead in recent days in a conflict between Pakistanis and suspected al-Qaida-linked extremists, a senior official said.

Map: BBC.

 

All the news that fits: 3 opeds from the NY Times

Three excellent op-eds in the Times today on Afghanistan and the region:

• Pakistani novelist Mohsin Hamid writes about his frustration as a liberal who supported Musharraf five years ago. "An exaggerated fear of Pakistan's people," he writes, must not prevent Americans from acknowledging that Musharraf is losing support: "Pakistan has grown increasingly divided between the relatively urban and prosperous regions that border India and the relatively rural, conservative and violent regions that border Afghanistan. The two mainstream political parties have historically bridged that divide and vastly outperformed religious extremists in free elections, but under General Musharraf they have been marginalized..." Musharraf has done some good, he says, but his time has come...

• Nicholas Kristof writes about Kiva, a site that allows ordinary people to make direct loans overseas. He was in Afghanistan this week checking up on his two loans (of $25 each) to a baker and a TV repairman in Kabul. Kiva loans are administered directly by local partners and with little overhead (Kristof's New York to Kabul flight represents an older model of administering aid...) Kiva is a terrific mechanism--and hopefully Kristof's article will bring them some attention from the mainstream.
  
  • For more details, see www.Kiva.org.

• Rory Stewart stays on message: humility, humility, humility.  Actions justified on moral grounds is nonsensical if they cannot be acheived; "we have no moral obligation to do what we cannot do." Stewart does no service by conflating US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan for rhetorical reasons, but he has some sober and sage advice:

"We will have to focus on projects that Iraqis and Afghans demand; prioritize and set aside moral perfectionism; work with people of whom we don’t approve; and choose among lesser evils. We will have to be patient. We should aim to stop illegal opium growth and change the way that Iraqis or Afghans treat their women. But we will not achieve this in the next three years. We may never be able to build a democratic state in Iraq or southern Afghanistan. Trying to do so through a presence based on foreign troops creates insurgency and resentment and can only end in failure."

What went on behind closed doors?

According to Matthias Gebauer, reporting yesterday for Germany's Spiegel from Peshawar:

Once behind closed doors, though, Cheney didn't mince words. With CIA Deputy Director Steve Kappes by his side, Cheney threatened them US Congress, with its Democratic majority, could deny Pakistan its promised aid of $785 million if Musharraf didn't finally take action against the Taliban.

Who say's Mr. Cheney doesn't appreciate the Democrats once in a while?

Harrowing account of detention

The Washington Post this week printed a story documenting Marwan Jabour's account of detention. Suspected of ties to al-Qaida's chem and bio programs, he was held and abused in a secret detention facility he believes is in Afghanistan. (A Human Rights Watch report provided the account.)

Two years ago, in Mother Jones, Emily Bazelon (of Slate's Gabfest Podcast fame...) wrote that "Americans, and the world, have become accustomed to accounts like Mustafa’s in connection with Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison. But his story hints at another scandal—one that has received little sustained media attention and sparked no public outrage. Over the past three years, numerous reports—from Afghan and American human rights groups, and from the Pentagon itself—have documented allegations of abuse inside U.S. compounds in Afghanistan." (See also the Salt Pit.) This could well be another such case -- and a bitter reminder of the continued absence of transparency in US detention policies.

Terror Suspect Gives Account of Detention
Feb 27, By Katherine Shrade (AP) WASHINGTON: While held incommunicado for more than two years by the U.S. and Pakistan, accused jihadist Marwan Jabour claims he was beaten, burned with an iron, held naked for a month and chained to the wall of his cell so tightly that he could not stand up...MORE

Photo: The CIA's largest CIA covert prison in Afghanistan was code-named the Salt Pit. Space Imaging Middle East.

Cheney confronts Pakistan on intel

Cheney was in the region for an unannounced trip to Pakistan, in which he met with Musharraf and his top advisers, including a representative from the ISI. Accompanying Cheney was the #2 in the CIA, Stephen R. Kappes, who most likely presented US intel that Al Qaeda camps have been reconstructed on the Afghanistan border:

Cheney was accompanied on his trip to Islamabad by Stephen R. Kappes, deputy director of the CIA and a Middle East expert who has served in Pakistan. Intelligence officials said Kappes's presence was a sign of U.S. interest in increasing intelligence operations with Pakistan. They said there are indications that the al-Qaeda leadership, though moving constantly, has resumed training of outsiders in areas of Pakistan, though it is nowhere near the extent that occurred in Afghanistan under the Taliban.

Some context here: Kappes has a history with Pakistan, as he was in charge of penetrating the AQ Khan network--where he uncovered the links to Libya's nuclear program. According to the NY TImes, "One of the biggest successes of Mr. Kappes's career came after he became the clandestine service's second-ranking official and was put in charge of coordinating the C.I.A's effort to penetrate the secret network of a Pakistani nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan." So he may not be one to take Islamabad's statements at face value...

Photo: Vice President Dick Cheney shakes hands with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. (Pakistan Press Information Dept.)

Bruce Hoffman: AQ resurgent

This article is noteworthy because of its author. This warning would sound alarmist from almost anyone other than