Thinking like an insurgent: the Army's new academy

The Wall St Journal has a front page, 2,300 word piece this morning on the U.S. Army's "Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy", which was established this April to improve tactics. Last year the Army unveiled a new counterinsurgency doctrine, but its dissemination has been slow; when one of its authors, Lt. Col. John Nagl went to Afghanistan he saw "uneven understanding of counterinsurgency principles."

Capt. Dan Helmer, the 26-year old Rhode Scholar who set up the 'school' in six weeks notes that "We're trying to win an argument that supporting the government is worth risking your life for." That's a tough sell right now, and requires an approach which is 80% military and 20% political, according to Helmer. 

The Army says they've made great progress this year in giving troops Afghanistan-specific training before deployment, but current deployment patterns aren't providing enough time for learning. "There isn't enough time between being told that they're going and getting them through the training," says Lou Gelling, deputy commander of the Army's battle command training program. "That's the reality of it." Sounds like a lot of the training right now is supplemental, not comprehensive: five day courses for 60 soldiers at a time in a makeshift classroom.

As usual, one of the central problems ties back to Afghanistan's status as America's "second war":

The counterinsurgency training sometimes seems targeted more toward Iraq, according to Capt. Helmer and Col. Nagl. Of the 90 men under Col. Nagl's command, almost all are Iraq veterans and just one has served in Afghanistan. Even Capt. Helmer's orders to Afghanistan included the mistaken, but telling, instruction to take a course in Arabic -- a language spoken in Iraq, but not in Afghanistan.

The article is subscriber only content, but here are a few excerpts:

In Counterinsurgency Class, Soldiers Think Like Taliban, Wall Street Journal, By MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS, Nov 30, KABUL:A natural-born insurgent, Sgt. First Class Jacob Stockdill was brimming with malicious suggestions when a group of American soldiers and Afghan security men sat down last month to plot their own defeat. MORE

Quoteboard

"If you're coming as our friends, don't. If you're coming as our enemies, we will fight you."
     - Zmarai, Arghandab district police chief, in response to Taliban threats.
MORE...

Sarah Chayes on Arghandab, the Taliban, and GoA meddling

Sarah Chayes has a piece today in the Washington Post in which she recalls, from her front row seat, the Taliban incursion into Arghandab in the wake of Mullah Naqib's heart attack.

Her verdict is deeply troubling: despite a successful coalition counterattack, the Taliban operation  "was a deft, successful psychological operations action":

It said that, despite the likelihood that they would attack after the death of Mullah Naqib, no obstacle was thrown up to oppose them, and they were able to walk into the district. The targeting of the mullah's house was a deliberate affront. It said: "You see, o men of no honor? You can't even protect his house. You are nothing now." The sum of these messages was aimed at the ordinary people who are the prize in any insurgency: Our encroachment is inevitable, the Taliban said. You should align yourselves with the inevitable.

Equally troubling is the Government of Afghanistan's response. Immediately after Mullah Naqib's death, President Karzai, along with his two brothers and the governor of Kandahar, "interfered in the recent selection of a new elder, sidelining a man who had been Mullah Naqib's deputy during the anti-Soviet jihad." "If anyone knew how to fight the Taliban in Arghandab, it was he," argues Chayes, "And yet the government's machinations were plainly aimed at shutting him out" in favor of a more pliable replacement, the untried son of Mullah Naqib. Their goal, she implies, is to ram through an alluring -- but dangerously flawed  -- reconciliation with the Taliban.

A Mullah Dies, and War Comes Knocking, By Sarah Chayes, Nov 18, KANDAHAR: Wednesday, Oct. 31: I woke to the sound of artillery thudding -- like the beat of a heavy heart. It was Afghan army batteries firing into Arghandab, at new Taliban positions there. Through several nights, I had been listening, my ears pricking like a dog's, to the faint popping of gunfire, the clattering of helicopters, the whine of personnel carriers speeding along the roads, falling asleep only when the morning call to prayer rang out in the pre-dawn chill.

I can't explain how this felt, the penetration of war to this crucial part of Kandahar, where I have lived for six years. Arghandab district, with its riot of tangled fruit trees, is the lung of Kandahar province; its meandering, stone-studded river is the artery of the whole region. Arghandab is shade and water, and mud-walled orchards, and mulberries and apricots, and pomegranates the size of grapefruits hanging from the willowy branches. MORE

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE

Death toll up to 68, two arrested in attack

Sixty eight civilians have been buried, a hundred more are wounded, and countless questions remain. The provincial police chief Gen. Abdul Rahman Sayed Khail said two suspects had been arrested; these men apparently ordered women to leave the area shortly before the blast.

Alix Kroeger of the BBC gives voice to what many of us are wondering…

Another puzzling aspect of the Baghlan bombing is the sheer number of people killed, making it the deadliest such attack in Afghanistan's history. Put bluntly, most suicide bombings here kill only the bombers themselves.

There are still some people who believe, partly because of the devastating death toll, that it was not a suicide bomb at all. Forensic investigators are now at work in Baghlan, but it will be some time before their findings are released.

I have no special knowledge here, but count me among the skeptics. Have you ever seen this level of carnage from a single suicide bomber? Virtually all of the massive attacks in Iraq have been from vehicle bombs or pre-positioned explosives. That's not to say that the bombing was not from the Taliban, but there are some key details missing. MORE

WPR piece on private security contractors

Below is a piece I wrote, published today in the World Politics Review (an online foreign policy daily.)

Private Military Contractors in Afghanistan, Carl Robichaud | 30 Oct 2007

After the Sept. 16 Blackwater scandal, which drew unprecedented attention to the role played by private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq, these firms have increasingly come under scrutiny in other theaters of war, such as Afghanistan. But while efforts in Afghanistan to rein in PSCs seem to parallel those in Iraq, they are driven by different dynamics -- and have very different implications. MORE 

A look inside the Asia Foundation survey

The Asia Foundation released it's third survey of the Afghan people today. Polling in Afghanistan should by no means be seen as dispositive, but this data can provide insights unavailable elsewhere (especially compared with prior baseline surveys by the Asia Foundation in 2004 and 2006). Here's a look inside...

Predictably, media reports framed the poll as a referendum on security (see AFP: “Security fears up sharply among Afghans: survey”) It’s true that pessimism about security rose among Afghans--with 32 percent citing security as their top concern (up from 22 percent last year.)

But the picture is more complicated, since security concerns vary significantly by region and two thirds of Afghans felt that security in their area was good. Moreover, among those who believe the country is headed in the right direction, good security is cited as the second most important reason (34%) after development.

So the Survey paints a nuanced picture and provides some fascinating data on everything from support for traditional institutions (such as Shuras and Jirga) to democracy and women’s rights. A few trends worth noting:

Right Direction / Wrong Direction:

• People are still optimistic, even if there was a slight decline in those who said the country was headed in the right direction (from 44 percent to 42 percent).
• Three-quarters of Afghans continue to assess government performance positively (i.e. either strongly (25%) or somewhat strongly (55%).)
• Afghans continue to espouse confidence in national security forces (both army and police) as well as in traditional institutions such as Shuras and Jirgas. However, “less than half of the respondents had confidence in the government's justice system, political parties and local militias.”
•  Corruption is an issue for many Afghans, but it is not clear that it has grown more acute. Some poll questions suggest an increase in perceptions of corruption while others suggest a decrease.
  

Security:

• Among people who felt the country was going in the wrong direction, security was cited as the top reason. This may seem unsurprising, until you realize that even in last year’s survey security was only rarely mentioned as a reason for a “wrong direction” response.
• On the other hand, among those who said the country was going in the right direction, good security was cited as the second biggest reason (34%).
• Perceptions of security varied greatly by region. Nationwide, “sixty-six percent of the respondents felt that security in their area was good or quite good, and 50 percent said they rarely or never feared for their own or their family's safety. Eighty-two percent said no one in their family had been a victim of any crime or violence during the last one year.” 

Reconstruction:

• Last year, respondents cited “rebuilding of the country” as only the fourth most important reason why the country was headed in the right direction; this year it became the most important reason for believing so (39%). It’s not clear whether people feel reconstruction is going better, or that the other trends they cited as reasons for optimism last year (security, peace, disarmament) are simply going worse. MORE
  

The story behind the "crackdown" on PSCs...

Cracking down on illicit private military contractors (aka private security contractors) in Afghanistan may well be in order, but is that what's really happening?

Barnett Rubin writes on Informed Comment that "Word on the street is that rather than a sincere "crackdown" on private security firms, the government's actions are more similar to its counter-narcotics actions: use of the government by one criminal group to suppress its competitors."

In response, a "well-informed friend in Kabul" argues that this was not a crackdown (the arrests comprised 100 employees in an industry of 10,000) and suggests instead that "some competitors closely linked to the President are trying to (a) extract bribes from the PSCs for not being shut down arbitrarily and (b) eliminate rivals."

This Kabul reader offers some more insights which suggest a) the indispensability of PSCs for certain roles and b) the difference between Afghan and foreign-led PSCs, and C) the political nature of this "crackdown":

The real challenge to the government is the fact that the Ministry of Interior does not have the capacity to replace the protection guaranteed by the private companies outside of Kabul. While there might be enough room in the police to replace some guards inside the capital, capacity and morale of the police are insufficient to take on the task of guarding let's say Kajaki dam in Helmand....
 
Pointing to international contractors and their problems is deflecting attention from the biggest problem - the Afghan PSCs. In foreign firms the foot soldiers might come from an illegal armed group, but the command and logistics elements are all foreign and will collapse in crisis or not lend them easily to factional agendas. The Afghan firms unify the foot soldiers with C2 [command and control] from one faction and are therefore much more dangerous - best example provided by Khawar of Jurat.
 
Nobody so far has questioned the PSCs owned by illustrious people such as [names of relatives of current or past ministers]. Nobody has looked into the firms operating under the control of local warlords [names of former top provincial officials] in the East and South either.

Two more Afghan security firms shut down

In an effort that parallels Iraq's attempt to reign in PMCs, Afghanistan has shut down two more private security firms (bringing the total to four in the past week).  So far all the closures have been Afghan firms (rather than international firms) but that could soon change. The police last week said they plan to shut down a dozen firms all told -- if PMCs tied to donor countries or powerful Afghans are among them, expect a scuffle.

The regulations on these firms is so lax that there is not even a publicly-available register for them (!) The MoI says 60 firms have registered with it, but the AP suspects there are perhaps two dozen others in operation. Without regulation, accountability and a mandate for when and how force can be used, how are these "firms" anything more than guys with guns?

Here's the original AP story:

Kabul shuts down two more security firms (AP) October 18, 2007, KABUL: Two more private Afghan security firms were closed down on Wednesday, police said, in a continuing crackdown on a lucrative but largely unregulated security industry. Authorities raided Falcon and Millet after both companies’ licenses to operate in Afghanistan expired, recovering more than 80 illegal weapons, police said in a statement.

The Gangs of Kabul

Not a phenomenon one hears much about...if any readers have insights into this, I would be grateful...What is meant here by a 'gang' and how do they operate?

Update: Thanks for the insightful comments...more are welcome.

Fifteen arrested after man killed in Afghan gang fight: (AFP) 10/14/2007 KABUL: Police in the Afghan capital Kabul said they had arrested 15 men after another was stabbed to death in a brawl between gangs, which have reemerged since the fall of the hardline Taliban.

The men were arrested late Saturday after the street fight in a poor area of the capital Friday, the first day of the Eid al-Fitr holiday marking the end of Ramadan, police chief General Alishah Paktiawal told AFP. "After Eid prayers two street gangs fought and one person was killed, stabbed with knives," he said. "We have arrested 15 people in relation to the incident." The gangs were fighting over territory around a mosque in the area, he said. MORE

Two police chiefs sacked. Problem solved, right?

Tip of the iceberg:

Afghan police chiefs sacked for negligence (Reuters) By Jon Hemming, KABUL:   The Afghan government sacked two provincial police chiefs for negligence, the Interior Ministry said on Saturday, highlighting problems in a force often accused of corruption and which is key to security in Afghanistan...The Interior Ministry said it had sacked the provincial police chiefs of Dai Kundi in the centre of the country and Wardak just southwest of the capital, Kabul....The police chief in Wardak stands accused of pocketing officers' salaries, leading many in his force to abandon their posts...

Wardak, only an hour's drive from Kabul, is among provinces previously regarded as safe which have witnessed a rise in Taliban violence in the last few months. Only a few hundred Turkish troops from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are stationed there and they are not allowed by their government to conduct offensive operations. MORE

Korb and Wadhams: Five steps

Larry Korb and Caroline Wadhams argue today in a Newsday op-ed that "the United States and NATO must increase troop levels by at least 20,000" in Afghanistan. This rise in troop levels is part of a five-point plan that includes bolstering reconstruction assistance, focusing on rule of law, and reforming U.S. aid channels to Pakistan. The steps they sketch out will be supported by a more comprehensive report in the coming months -- keep your eyes peeled ...

U.S.

must put more focus on Afghan insurgency, Oct 9, 2007: Sunday marked the sixth anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaida....But the mission in Afghanistan is going alarmingly awry, and the United States must refocus and re-energize its policy. The administration and Congress cannot allow the sinking ship of Iraq to take Afghanistan down with it...

To achieve our security objectives, the United States, and especially Congress, must provide increased funds, attention and manpower - both civilian and military. U.S. leaders must also engage the American people, as they may become increasingly pessimistic about U.S. involvement in the Muslim world as a result of the war in Iraq. There are five concrete steps Congress and the administration should pursue immediately. MORE

Have PhD in Anthropology, will travel...

I was surprised to find this piece had climbed to the second most emailed article in the New York Times today, but perhaps I shouldn't have been. Interesting, well-reported, and counterintuitive.

• Video

It's odd to find that a field so synonymous with The Academy has become a coveted commodity (much to the chagrin of certain professors, cited in the article, who seem philosophically averse to using their discipline for anything pragmatic...)

Can you imagine all the Anthropology majors emailing their parents to say "I told you so?" And can you imagine what better shape we'd be today if we entered Afghanistan with a modicum of understanding of its cultural context? The Army seems to now appreciate the importance of these skills, but it's a steep learning curve. (One could also question whether the Army is the right institution to be delivering governance and services...)

Anthropologists help U.S. Army in Afghanistan and Iraq, By David Rohde, Oct 4 (NYT):  SHABAK VALLEY, Afghanistan: In this isolated Taliban stronghold in eastern Afghanistan, American paratroopers are fielding what they consider a crucial new weapon in counterinsurgency operations here: a demure civilian anthropologist named Tracy.

Tracy, who asked that her surname not be used for security reasons, is a member of the first-ever Human Terrain Team, an experimental Pentagon program that assigns anthropologists and other social scientists to American combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they act as cultural advisers and suggest ways to win local support without using military force.

Colonel Martin Schweitzer, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division unit working with anthropologists here, said the unit's combat operations had been reduced by 60 percent since the anthropologists arrived this spring. He said the focus had shifted from combat to improving security, health care and education for the population.

"We're looking at this from a human perspective, from a social scientist's perspective," he said. "We're not focused on the enemy. We're focused on bringing governance down to the people."

Last month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates authorized a $40 million expansion of the program, which will assign teams of anthropologists and social scientists to each of the 26 American combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, military officials are scrambling to find more scholars willing to deploy to the front lines to interpret tribal structures and explain cultural differences. MORE

Afghanistan's "land mafia"

A 200 word piece today by the BBC highlights an important trend and leaves us wanting more details. The emergence of the so-called "land mafia" (a term that probably makes it sound more centrally organized than it us...) has broad repercussions, especially since Afghanistan lacks enforceable, consistent land rights. Multiple land registries allow well-connected strongmen to stake claims with impunity, and the lack of a functioning legal system leaves victims with no recourse.

The lack of security vis a vis land and property rights remains one of the major impediments to investment in Afghanistan. This briefly received some attention in 2003 when refugees streamed home -- only to find someone else there. It's still a big issue today, but the last serious work I've seen on this is the AREU's 2003 report ( Land Rights in Crisis). Sounds to me like a prize-winning expose just waiting for the right journalist...

Powerful 'grab Afghanistan land' By Stephanie Irvine (BBC)  Sept 6: The Afghan urban development minister says land is being appropriated illegally by powerful individuals at a rate of two sq km (0.8 sq miles) a day. Former military commanders, members of parliament and senior officials are seizing land and then selling it on illegally, says Yousaf Pashthun.

Image: Urban Development Minister Mohammad Yousaf Pashthun. BBC.

Firefight at a drug lab in Daychopan, Zabul

The AP provides today one of the first reports I've heard of fighting at a drug lab. The report says the guards were "suspected Taliban" but I wonder how accurate this is...Wish there were more detail on this raid.

In the southern Zabul province, Afghan and coalition troops clashed with insurgents in Daychopan district Sunday, killing four suspected Taliban and wounding four others, said Fazel Bari, the Daychopan district chief.

Also Sunday, Afghan and coalition troops destroyed a heroin laboratory after battling Taliban fighters guarding the facility, a separate coalition statement said. The lab in Helmand contained large amounts of opium-processing chemicals as well as weapons, insurgent propaganda and explosive materials, it said.

Map: BBC.

Comments on the South Korean hostage situation

The following are comments I made to a South Korean reporter covering the hostage crisis. If you have additional insights for him -- or corrections for me -- drop me an email and I will pass them along.

1. What is the security situation in Afghanistan as a whole?

It very much depends on the region. Several provinces in the south and southeast (e.g. Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, Ghazni) are quite dangerous and have become more so. But in the rest of the country, especially in the north and the west and in major cities such as Kabul, is fairly safe. Afghans and foreigners living and working there must take precautions, but are not at risk in the same way that aid workers in Kandahar would be.

After incidents like these, the international community must reconsider where and how it operates. The OECD has estimated that fully half of all development assistance has been spent in four of the most dangerous provinces in the south. It is extremely difficult and expensive to do development work in this environment. A decision was made to concentrate development work in these contentious areas in order to “win hearts and minds,” but it’s not clear that this approach is working. On the other hand, there are many stable regions in Afghanistan that are languishing from a lack of attention. So a wiser approach, especially in light of these recent kidnappings, is to pick some of the low-hanging fruit that is currently rotting on the vine. MORE

"Cops or Robbers?" AREU's must-read report on police reform

Donors are finally realizing the importance of police reform. Unfortunately, some of the response has been to throw money at the problem--the latest infusion of funding, for example, focuses on training and equipment, as if the police problem were primarily a technocratic challenge rather than a political one.

Andrew Wilder, research director at Tuft's Feinstein Center, is the author the AREU's remarkable new report on the topic entitled "Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police". He argues that there is still no consensus about the role of police, and too little appreciation that the Ministry of the Interior is part of the problem. The paper highlights five challenges. Donors will need to:

Tom Perriello: Comments on Security

With news of another major suicide bomb attack in the South making headlines, I wanted to pass along an unofficial summary of a dozen or so interviews with security experts from various Embassies, UN offices, NGOs, and the Afghan government.

Overall, most security experts agree that the insurgency has shifted its emphasis from the bolder frontal attacks on international forces that we saw in summer 2006 to asymmetric tactics, i.e. “shoot and scoot” operations, suicide bombings, and IEDs. This is a regression for the insurgency, and NATO and OEF operations have driven much of this shift. Most analysts credit the successful targeting of mid-level insurgent leaders (top leaders assumed to be safely in Quetta) with hindering Taliban operations. MORE

Rule of law conference nets $360 m in new money

Last week's Rome conference on the rule of law was largely overshadowed by discussions of civilian casualties, but it resulted in some good news: a major boost to the beleaguered sector. Overall, donors pledged $360 m in new funds (over four or five years...) for training judges, building prisons and courtrooms, etc.

The new funds are on top of the $50m already designated for legal sector reform (but I've seen no indication as to whether donors may be reprogramming the new funds from other funding areas...) As of last week, officials would not break down the contributions by country, but this week the US announced its pledge of $15 m. Before the conference the European Union announced that it was readying ~$270 m in pledges, so that's where the bulk of funding is coming from. Please drop a comment if you have more details on what happened in Rome and who has pledged what...