Elections in Afghanistan could be problematic

As talk swirls over whether Zalmay Khalilzad will run for Afghan president and Karzai attempts to project his authority to prepare for what could be a possible re-election bid, a U.S. Army report finds cause for worry about national elections in Afghanistan. Michael J. Metrinko, of the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, looks at problems with future Afghan elections in the face of deteriorating security.

Never mind, Ashdown

Lord Paddy Ashdown has withdrawn his name from consideration as the UN envoy to Afghanistan, after President Hamid Karzai and other officials expressed opposition last week, concerned about the extent of his power. 

Briton Opposed by Afghans Won’t Take U.N. Post, by Carlotta Gall (The New York Times) 28 Jan. 2008: The Afghan foreign minister, Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, said Mr. Ashdown had been rejected because of negative press and public reaction to his appointment, but diplomats said it had more to do with Mr. Karzai’s desire, one year before Afghan elections, to improve his image by standing up to Western powers. In addition to opposing Mr. Ashdown’s appointment, Mr. Karzai has also opposed a plan to widen the position’s authority.

The Afghan UN Ambassadar Zahir Tanin told the BBC that the preferred candidate is NATO’s deputy commander in Europe, Gen. John McColl.

James Bone of the London Times sees it as “part of an old-fashioned power-struggle that would be instantly recognisable to any village khan - or UN bureaucrat.” NATO wants better “coordination” in the face of soaring opium production and insurgency, but the Afghan government wants to retain control. Karzai may also have been worried about Ashdown’s far-reaching powers in Bosnia – where he could fire officials and overturn laws -- trickling into his position in Afghanistan.

New Report on the ‘Forgotten War’

The European Council on Foreign Relations has a new report out calling for U.S. and European governments to “overhaul their strategies and strike a 'grand bargain' to stabilise the country.” Significantly, it urges enticing moderates into the fold of governance and legitimacy through money and other incentives.

There will be no stability in Afghanistan unless “moderate” insurgents embrace constitutionalism and enter democratic politics. Since the Bonn Agreement in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the coalition has supported the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alliance, which brought together the main Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara groupings. For obvious reasons it had no significant links to the Pashtuns who make up 42% of Afghanistan’s population.22 After 2001, despite Karzai’s Pashtun background, Pashtun tribal leaders were largely excluded from government and have been ever since. Many have thus aligned themselves with the resurgent Taliban. The coalition and the Afghan government must work to convince them that they can pursue their interests democratically.

There have already been signs that this is at least possible. Though President Karzai’s overtures to reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were rebuffed, the Taliban, while insisting on a number of conditions, have been receptive to the idea of negotiations as proposed within Karzai's "Peace Jirga". The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently gave his backing to these negotiations, again with conditions attached, but the US administration remains sceptical.

Political agreements - like the failed Musa Qala deal in 2006 overseen by the then ISAF commander, General David Richards – should aim to isolate the “hard-core”, many of whom are foreigners, from more moderate, indigenous groups. Such political agreements would also help avoid the violent tactics that may have won NATO military victories last year but cost vital public support because of high civilian casualties.

An effective policy in the short term would be to identify insurgent leaders willing to cut a deal. The coalition could then operate a system of “divide and rule”, whereby intransigent insurgents would see their erstwhile comrades rewarded with a package of financial and other incentives which add up to a better deal than that offered by the Taliban. (emphasis added by editor).

The report urges European governments to send more troops to Afghanistan, eliminate or reduce the national caveats on their troops, and reverse their “underperformance” by increasing reconstruction aid. On the flip side, the report pushes the U.S. to shift its combat strategy to a more political one and abandon its counter-narcotics plans of aerial spraying or buying up opium crops. It recommends the U.S. shift the onus of the problem onto traffickers and concentrate on arresting and prosecuting drug lords and their governmental supporters.

Paddy Ashdown to be new UN Rep

It’s official. Paddy Ashdown, the former EU-UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, has accepted the post as the new UN envoy to Afghanistan, according to a source quoted by Reuters. The UN Security Council is expected to approve and publicly announce this on Monday. Ashdown's biggest challenge will be coordinating and reconciling military and civilian efforts from all the various countries involved in Afghan reconstruction and security, while ensuring that the Afghan government is not left behind in these efforts. See Afghanistan Watch’s earlier post on this.

Bagram holds more than twice as many as Guantanamo

The secretive American detention center at Bagram base now holds more than twice as many prisoners as Guantanamo Bay, according to a New York Times report. Despite American efforts to shut down the base prison and transfer detainees to Afghan facilities and oversight, the number of prisoners has continued to grow as Guantanamo stopped taking in detainees.

The Afghan facility can only hold half the people that it was initially designed for, and construction has been slowed down by security and legal issues. Meanwhile human rights groups say treatment of detainees at Bagram, which was formerly abysmal culminating with the beating deaths of two detainees, has improved overall, but overcrowding complaints persist.

Intrigue of expelled diplomats deepens

The intrigue surrounding the expulsion of EU acting representative in Afghanistan, Mervyn Patterson, and UN diplomat Michael Semple, is deepening. A London Times report over the weekend quoted Afghan government sources claiming that the two were trying to “turn” the brother of the late Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah.

Islamist split in Pakistan

Nicholas Schmidle writes on the split within the Islamist movements in Pakistan in this week's New York Times Magazine. The hard-line Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, reportedly the political front for jihadi groups including the Taliban, seems to have toned down its anti-American and pro-jihadi rhetoric, as it prepares to contest the upcoming Pakistani parliamentary elections. This issue of whether to participate in the elections or boycott them has caused the powerful Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal alliance to split. This alliance won 10 percent of the popular vote last time around and formed provincial governments in two of the four Pakistani provinces.

In the past year, the J.U.I. chief (Maulana Fazlur Rehman) has tried to disassociate himself from the new generation of Taliban wreaking havoc not only across the border in Afghanistan, as they have for years, but also increasingly in Pakistan. At the same time, Rehman has been trying to persuade foreign ambassadors and establishment politicians here that he is the only one capable of dealing with those same Taliban. In the process, some Islamists maintain that Rehman has sold them out. Last April, a rocket whistled over the sugarcane fields that separate Rehman’s house from the main road before crashing into the veranda of his brother’s home next door. A few months later, Pakistani intelligence agencies discovered a hit list, drafted by the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, with Rehman’s name on it.

[snip]

Rehman doesn’t pretend to be a liberal; he wants to see Pakistan become a truly Islamic state. But the moral vigilantism and the proliferation of Taliban-inspired militias along the border with Afghanistan is not how he saw it happening. The emergence of Taliban-inspired groups in Pakistan has placed immense strain on the country’s Islamist community, a strain that may only increase with the assassination of Bhutto.

Afghans’ Experience with Corruption

With Afghanistan often at the bottom of international corruption lists and indices, an interesting report from Integrity Watch Afghanistan studies what Afghans consider to be corrupt behavior. It finds that while Afghans tend to have higher patience with petty corruption, justifying them on the grounds of low civil salaries, there is no social tolerance for large bribes and greed, which are considered morally wrong and un-Islamic. Many find corruption as more pervasive now than in previous administrations and regimes and see it as the most de-legitimizing factor in government.

People often emphasized with a certain resignation that due to the strong and interwoven spider web of illicit networks, which are closely collaborating from district to provincial and central level, it was difficult to identify feasible solutions. Aware of the fact that the whole administrative and political system needs to be changed, interviewees believed that small steps, like strengthening the provincial councils, aiming at behavioural change through religious education, and awareness raising via media could build the ground for reform programs and a slow change in culture.

This report follows a previous study done in January 2007 that examined the Afghan perceptions of corruption. It found that in 2006, half of the 1250 Afghan respondents reported paying bribes while two-thirds faced family financial problems due to corruption – alarming numbers, indeed.

Expelling Diplomats

The expulsion of two senior diplomats from Afghanistan last week is causing much consternation. Irishman Michael Semple, the EU acting representative in Afghanistan, and Mervyn Patterson, from Northern Ireland, working with the UN assistance mission, were accused of jeopardizing national security after reportedly talking to the Taliban during a trip to Musa Qala in Helmand Province. They were stripped of their diplomatic immunity and expelled from Afghanistan last week.

Rory Stewart writes in the London Times that “it would seem that they have been expelled for precisely what made them uniquely useful to Afghanistan and the international community: their courage, relationships, energy and skills, which took them to the most remote and dangerous areas.”

What makes the expulsion particularly galling, says Stewart, is that diplomats are normally expelled by hostile dictatorships, not budding democracies.

(Afghanistan) is supposed to be a constitutional state with an elected parliament, financed with billions of dollars of international aid and supported by more than 40,000 foreign troops. There is supposed to be no difference between the Afghan government and its western allies.
Why, then, would the Afghan government insult its closest and most powerful partners by expelling their senior diplomats? Why does the Afghan government not want highly informed foreigners to meet locals in Musa Qala?
The unprecedented western investment in Afghanistan assumes that the Afghan government is serious about eliminating drugs and defeating the Taliban. Did Semple and Patterson discover something different? Or is the Kabul government simply fed up with foreigners who micromanage and second-guess their decisions?
Whatever the reason, both Afghanistan and the international community lose by this expulsion.

Bhutto assassination reverberates across Afghanistan

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto last week continues to ring across Afghanistan, as American officials worry that it heralds the rise of a more virulent extremism against the Pakistani government that could undermine the Afghan mission. It could also damage the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two neighbors, and hurt efforts to fight cross-border terrorism.

A roundup from December

Here’s a short news roundup of significant developments in or concerning Afghanistan from December:

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
The House approved the 2008 defense authorization bill, which in addition to providing $189.4 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, creates an office for a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and a bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting for more oversight of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The SIGAR is a much-needed agency to track down corruption and mismanagement in Afghanistan, much as its equivalent has done in Iraq. With this extra level of oversight and ensuring that reconstruction aid is invested properly, it will hopefully help get Afghan reconstruction back on track.

Brown's Plan for Afghanistan
UK prime minister Gordon Brown outlined his new plan for Afghanistan that included increasing aid by £450 million and tough benchmarks for Afghan security forces, encouraging Afghans to take responsibility for their own security.

Brown told MPs that aid would be given for "high impact" projects such as better roads, power supplies and clean water, as well as loans for small businesses and funding for civic groups and community development projects to improve local and national government.

You can read a transcript of Brown’s plan here. His emphasis on Afghans taking “ownership” and responsibility for their future and security is important.

In testimony before the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence on Dec. 10, RAND analyst Seth Jones explained the fast growth of the Afghan insurgency, thusly:

“The answer is simple,” one senior Afghan government official told me in October 2007. “The people are losing faith in the government. Our security forces cannot protect local villages, and our institutions struggle to deliver basic services.”

He testified that people are turning to the Taliban, not because they believe in extremism but because they are losing patience with the government’s inefficacy and corruption.

Indeed, the primary challenge in Afghanistan is one of governance. Governance includes the set of institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.11 It involves the government’s ability at the national or sub-national level to establish law and order, effectively manage resources, and implement sound policies. An insurgency reflects a process of alternative state building, where insurgents compete to provide governance to the population. Insurgents take advantage of weak governance and assume state-like functions. They tax and set up administrative structures for the population they control.

A Key Test for the Afghan National Army
The Afghan National Army seems to have proven itself in a key test last month – retaking the small dusty, but strategic toehold town of Musa Qala from the Taliban. Its symbolism was tied mainly to the fact that it was the only significant town controlled by the Taliban. As Guardian reporter Jason Burke put it, “For both sides, the struggle for the small country town represents in microcosm the battle for the country as a whole.”

But the offensive also spotlights the fact that despite its success, the Afghan National Army remains severely under-equipped and under-helped.

While U.S. officials cite the achievements of the Afghan military, the force has historically suffered from high attrition rates. It has also lacked sufficient military aid and trainers, and has been hobbled by old weaponry, Afghan defense officials say.

Quoteboard

"I'm not in the business of turning down jobs I haven't been offered."
  - Paddy Ashdown

"I can put a guy out on a ridge with an AK-47 and have him take a couple of shots. The Americans will shoot back with their big guns and disrupt the whole valley...Being an insurgent would be so easy."
  - Sgt. Jacob Stockdill

"All you have to do is not screw up, and, even if you do, you just blame it on the Americans."
  - Capt. Chris Rowe
MORE

Ashdown headed to Kabul as "super-envoy"?

According to new reports, Paddy Ashdown, the former EU-UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been offered a newly created position in Kabul as a "super envoy" that would head Afghanistan efforts by NATO, the UN, and perhaps the EU as well.

According to a NATO diplomat quoted yesterday in the Financial Times, “Ashdown’s name seems to be the only one in play. I understand that Karzai is comfortable with that and it seems as if the ball is now in Ashdown’s court.” Other names floated for the position have included Joschka Fischer and Hikmet Cetin, former foreign ministers of Germany and Turkey.

Ashdown's name has been bandied about since June, but he was reluctant to consider the job unless he had the endorsement of the United States. Then recently the dual-hatted position was championed by Nicholas Burns, the number three man in the US State Dept. There remains disagreement over the nature of the role, according to Karzai spokesman Hamayun Hamidzada, who notes in The Scotsman that "Britain wants a Kabul-based envoy, who would co-ordinate people here, and also in the capitals. The US thinks you need a roving envoy going from capital to capital." 

Will Ashdown accept? In June, he said there was the need for such a post:  "My view, for what it is worth, is that there needs to be a single figure out there pulling all the strands together. At the moment there is little or no co-ordination and the country is starting to work against itself." 

The change could greatly improve coordination and elevate the status of the UN in Afghanistan. It would require a tremendously skilled  manager and coordinator to make it all work -- something Ashdown was able to do quite well in Bosnia. In a WSJ op-ed last month, Hans Binnendijk argued that "a new, high-profile European High Representative under U.N. auspices should be appointed to pull together the diverse national contributions in Afghanistan and to coordinate military and economic approaches into a comprehensive and coherent whole. Paddy Ashdown provides a good example with his work in Bosnia. Such a High Representative could also help convince European publics to stick with the Afghan effort." The challenge will be coordinating with the US and with the Afghan government, which as a sovereign state would never grant Ashdown the level of authority he had in Bosnia.

Photo: Paddy Ashdown (aka Jeremy John Durham Ashdown, Baron Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon...) 

Gordon Adams on the Pentagon-Pakistan "slush fund"

Gordon Adams has a great post on Democracy Arsenal which takes a closer look at Pentagon payments to Pakistan (which are only now coming under scrutiny in congress). Here's a clip (Note: there's more on DoD's usurpation of roles once performed by State in Adam's Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article...):

The Los Angeles Times of November 18, 2007 reports that the Pentagon is looking into Coalition Support payments to Pakistan (of which $5.3 b have been made to date), because documentation of the Pakistani spending supposedly being reimbursed is too thin...One unnamed official, who tracks these payments, told the LA Times: “"Backdoor subsidies is what it can look like to some more skeptical observers, because there hasn't been good oversight and the amounts involved have been so great.  There is suspicion that it's a slush fund."

No kidding! Count me a “skeptical observer.”  So now the Pentagon, which has no expertise at making foreign assistance payments directly to other governments or at tracking them after they are made, are going to play catch-up ball with this program. MORE

Sarah Chayes on Arghandab, the Taliban, and GoA meddling

Sarah Chayes has a piece today in the Washington Post in which she recalls, from her front row seat, the Taliban incursion into Arghandab in the wake of Mullah Naqib's heart attack.

Her verdict is deeply troubling: despite a successful coalition counterattack, the Taliban operation  "was a deft, successful psychological operations action":

It said that, despite the likelihood that they would attack after the death of Mullah Naqib, no obstacle was thrown up to oppose them, and they were able to walk into the district. The targeting of the mullah's house was a deliberate affront. It said: "You see, o men of no honor? You can't even protect his house. You are nothing now." The sum of these messages was aimed at the ordinary people who are the prize in any insurgency: Our encroachment is inevitable, the Taliban said. You should align yourselves with the inevitable.

Equally troubling is the Government of Afghanistan's response. Immediately after Mullah Naqib's death, President Karzai, along with his two brothers and the governor of Kandahar, "interfered in the recent selection of a new elder, sidelining a man who had been Mullah Naqib's deputy during the anti-Soviet jihad." "If anyone knew how to fight the Taliban in Arghandab, it was he," argues Chayes, "And yet the government's machinations were plainly aimed at shutting him out" in favor of a more pliable replacement, the untried son of Mullah Naqib. Their goal, she implies, is to ram through an alluring -- but dangerously flawed  -- reconciliation with the Taliban.

A Mullah Dies, and War Comes Knocking, By Sarah Chayes, Nov 18, KANDAHAR: Wednesday, Oct. 31: I woke to the sound of artillery thudding -- like the beat of a heavy heart. It was Afghan army batteries firing into Arghandab, at new Taliban positions there. Through several nights, I had been listening, my ears pricking like a dog's, to the faint popping of gunfire, the clattering of helicopters, the whine of personnel carriers speeding along the roads, falling asleep only when the morning call to prayer rang out in the pre-dawn chill.

I can't explain how this felt, the penetration of war to this crucial part of Kandahar, where I have lived for six years. Arghandab district, with its riot of tangled fruit trees, is the lung of Kandahar province; its meandering, stone-studded river is the artery of the whole region. Arghandab is shade and water, and mud-walled orchards, and mulberries and apricots, and pomegranates the size of grapefruits hanging from the willowy branches. MORE

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE

Death toll up to 68, two arrested in attack

Sixty eight civilians have been buried, a hundred more are wounded, and countless questions remain. The provincial police chief Gen. Abdul Rahman Sayed Khail said two suspects had been arrested; these men apparently ordered women to leave the area shortly before the blast.

Alix Kroeger of the BBC gives voice to what many of us are wondering…

Another puzzling aspect of the Baghlan bombing is the sheer number of people killed, making it the deadliest such attack in Afghanistan's history. Put bluntly, most suicide bombings here kill only the bombers themselves.

There are still some people who believe, partly because of the devastating death toll, that it was not a suicide bomb at all. Forensic investigators are now at work in Baghlan, but it will be some time before their findings are released.

I have no special knowledge here, but count me among the skeptics. Have you ever seen this level of carnage from a single suicide bomber? Virtually all of the massive attacks in Iraq have been from vehicle bombs or pre-positioned explosives. That's not to say that the bombing was not from the Taliban, but there are some key details missing. MORE

Update: Congress and Pakistan

CQ has an update to its story yesterday, with statements from Leahy, Kerry, and Biden (and a non-statement by Lantos...)

Chorus of Calls to Halt Aid to Pakistan Getting Louder on Capitol Hill By Colby Itkowitz, CQ Staff Calls on Capitol Hill to cut aid to Pakistan grew Wednesday, as the Bush administration defended its policy of maintaining close ties with President Pervez Musharraf despite his declaration of emergency rule. ...President Bush, personally weighing in on the Pakistan crisis for the first time since Musharraf declared emergency rule Nov. 3, telephoned the Pakistani leader Wednesday for what Bush called a “frank discussion.” “And my message was that we believe strongly in elections and that you ought to have elections soon, and you need to take off your uniform,” Bush said.

Murmurs in Congress on cutting aid to Pakistan

The administration this year requested $800m in aid to Pakistan. Pres. Musharraf has since announced emergency rule, postponed elections, and cracked down on protesters -- but there have been no ultimatums from the administration and no sign that funds will be cut.

In testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee this afternoon, Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte argued that aid should stay, arguing that Pakistan"cutting these programs would send a negative signal to the people of Pakistan"

Some in Congress see things differently -- which is why Senator Biden (chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) received a call on Tuesday. It was Musharraf on the line, urging him not to cut off the aid. Biden has said that  Pakistan"I told President Musharraf how critical it is for relations between our two countries that elections go forward as planned in January...That he follow through on his commitment to take off his uniform and that he restore the rule of law to Pakistan." MORE

A softer, cuddlier Blackwater

On Monday, the Times reported that Blackwater changed its logo "from macho to corporate." A company spokesmen says the decision was taken long before the Sept 17 incident. Sure...

As the Times reports:

The rifle-scope crosshairs so obvious in the old Blackwater logo have been reduced to a set of horizontal elipses that bracket, but no longer enclose, the paw print, which has also changed to more closely resemble an actual bear-paw imprint. The original Blackwater logo had thick white serif lettering draped over the crosshairs on a menacing black field. The new logo separates the image and the letters, which now appear in buttoned-down sans-serif black and slightly italicized on a white field.

Wired's Danger Room is not impressed, but has taken on some of the hard work for Blackwater. Readers have created six options for Blackwater's new look. Go weigh in on your favorite...

 

A look inside the Asia Foundation survey

The Asia Foundation released it's third survey of the Afghan people today. Polling in Afghanistan should by no means be seen as dispositive, but this data can provide insights unavailable elsewhere (especially compared with prior baseline surveys by the Asia Foundation in 2004 and 2006). Here's a look inside...

Predictably, media reports framed the poll as a referendum on security (see AFP: “Security fears up sharply among Afghans: survey”) It’s true that pessimism about security rose among Afghans--with 32 percent citing security as their top concern (up from 22 percent last year.)

But the picture is more complicated, since security concerns vary significantly by region and two thirds of Afghans felt that security in their area was good. Moreover, among those who believe the country is headed in the right direction, good security is cited as the second most important reason (34%) after development.

So the Survey paints a nuanced picture and provides some fascinating data on everything from support for traditional institutions (such as Shuras and Jirga) to democracy and women’s rights. A few trends worth noting:

Right Direction / Wrong Direction:

• People are still optimistic, even if there was a slight decline in those who said the country was headed in the right direction (from 44 percent to 42 percent).
• Three-quarters of Afghans continue to assess government performance positively (i.e. either strongly (25%) or somewhat strongly (55%).)
• Afghans continue to espouse confidence in national security forces (both army and police) as well as in traditional institutions such as Shuras and Jirgas. However, “less than half of the respondents had confidence in the government's justice system, political parties and local militias.”
•  Corruption is an issue for many Afghans, but it is not clear that it has grown more acute. Some poll questions suggest an increase in perceptions of corruption while others suggest a decrease.
  

Security:

• Among people who felt the country was going in the wrong direction, security was cited as the top reason. This may seem unsurprising, until you realize that even in last year’s survey security was only rarely mentioned as a reason for a “wrong direction” response.
• On the other hand, among those who said the country was going in the right direction, good security was cited as the second biggest reason (34%).
• Perceptions of security varied greatly by region. Nationwide, “sixty-six percent of the respondents felt that security in their area was good or quite good, and 50 percent said they rarely or never feared for their own or their family's safety. Eighty-two percent said no one in their family had been a victim of any crime or violence during the last one year.” 

Reconstruction:

• Last year, respondents cited “rebuilding of the country” as only the fourth most important reason why the country was headed in the right direction; this year it became the most important reason for believing so (39%). It’s not clear whether people feel reconstruction is going better, or that the other trends they cited as reasons for optimism last year (security, peace, disarmament) are simply going worse. MORE
  

The story behind the "crackdown" on PSCs...

Cracking down on illicit private military contractors (aka private security contractors) in Afghanistan may well be in order, but is that what's really happening?

Barnett Rubin writes on Informed Comment that "Word on the street is that rather than a sincere "crackdown" on private security firms, the government's actions are more similar to its counter-narcotics actions: use of the government by one criminal group to suppress its competitors."

In response, a "well-informed friend in Kabul" argues that this was not a crackdown (the arrests comprised 100 employees in an industry of 10,000) and suggests instead that "some competitors closely linked to the President are trying to (a) extract bribes from the PSCs for not being shut down arbitrarily and (b) eliminate rivals."

This Kabul reader offers some more insights which suggest a) the indispensability of PSCs for certain roles and b) the difference between Afghan and foreign-led PSCs, and C) the political nature of this "crackdown":

The real challenge to the government is the fact that the Ministry of Interior does not have the capacity to replace the protection guaranteed by the private companies outside of Kabul. While there might be enough room in the police to replace some guards inside the capital, capacity and morale of the police are insufficient to take on the task of guarding let's say Kajaki dam in Helmand....
 
Pointing to international contractors and their problems is deflecting attention from the biggest problem - the Afghan PSCs. In foreign firms the foot soldiers might come from an illegal armed group, but the command and logistics elements are all foreign and will collapse in crisis or not lend them easily to factional agendas. The Afghan firms unify the foot soldiers with C2 [command and control] from one faction and are therefore much more dangerous - best example provided by Khawar of Jurat.
 
Nobody so far has questioned the PSCs owned by illustrious people such as [names of relatives of current or past ministers]. Nobody has looked into the firms operating under the control of local warlords [names of former top provincial officials] in the East and South either.

Germany's Afghan conundrum

Last week Germany voted by a 2 to 1 margin to sustain the deployment of its 3,000 strong forces in Afghanistan--for now. But how sustainable is this mission when the public at large opposes the deployment by the same margin?

Ulf Gartzke, in an op-ed today in the Globe and Mail argues that Angela Merkel (along with other NATO heads of state) "can no longer afford to avoid engaging in a fundamental public discussion of why losses in Afghanistan are justified in terms of our core national security interests." Merkel has stayed out of the Germany's Afghanistan debate, but this "defensive, reactive strategy ultimately carries huge political and security risks, both at home and abroad."

So long as the mission is seen in Germany as George Bush's war, it will remain unpopular and could be a liability in 2009.  But there is no better reminder in the threat a failed Afghanistan would leave for Germany than the recent -- derailed at the last minute -- to set off a series of massive car bombs in a Frankfurt airport that handles 5 million passengers a month. The terrorists plotting that attack, Gartzke notes, were Islamic terrorists trained along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

German lessons: the Afghan conundrum (The Globe and Mail) by Ulf Gartzke, Special to Globe and Mail Update, Oct 16: Last Friday, the German parliament extended the Bundeswehr's 3,100-strong ISAF mandate in Afghanistan for another year. ...For Chancellor Angela Merkel and her conservative allies, the Bundeswehr's bloody, seemingly open-ended Afghan engagement is a political time bomb that could go off in the run-up to the next federal elections, to be held by 2009.

Draft GoA rules for private security contractors

The Associated Press obtained a draft of the policy being discussed by the Government of Afghanistan on security contractors. The document must receive approval from the Cabinet before entering into effect. It notes that "the GOA (government of Afghanistan) has allowed for limited PSC operations and activities. However, increasingly, the absence of targeted regulation ... in parallel with unstable security environment has generated an unfortunate and nearly anarchical PSC market with a long series of security problems and criminal activities." Here are the highlights:

Extensive reliance of PSCs (private security companies), risks deepening the current state of instability in at least 4 ways: MORE

Two police chiefs sacked. Problem solved, right?

Tip of the iceberg:

Afghan police chiefs sacked for negligence (Reuters) By Jon Hemming, KABUL:   The Afghan government sacked two provincial police chiefs for negligence, the Interior Ministry said on Saturday, highlighting problems in a force often accused of corruption and which is key to security in Afghanistan...The Interior Ministry said it had sacked the provincial police chiefs of Dai Kundi in the centre of the country and Wardak just southwest of the capital, Kabul....The police chief in Wardak stands accused of pocketing officers' salaries, leading many in his force to abandon their posts...

Wardak, only an hour's drive from Kabul, is among provinces previously regarded as safe which have witnessed a rise in Taliban violence in the last few months. Only a few hundred Turkish troops from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are stationed there and they are not allowed by their government to conduct offensive operations. MORE

Part II of the Rubin/Marshall talk

Canada calls for special UN envoy to Afghanistan

After 30 bilateral meetings last week on the subject, Canada's foreign minister today addressed the United Nations General Assembly and called for the appointment of a "special UN envoy to Afghanistan." Not clear exactly how this post would differ from the SRSG. According to reports, would be "modeled on the work of former British prime minister Tony Blair in the Middle East peace process."

Canada issues Afghan rally cry, (Globe and Mail Update) by Tenille Bonoguore, Oct 2, 2007:Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier issued a rallying cry Tuesday to the United Nations, calling on member nations to support the bid to appoint a special UN envoy for Afghanistan…

TPMtv with Barnett Rubin

Barnett Rubin, in a video interview with Joshua Micah Marshall

A Chat with Barnett Rubin, Part I: A few weeks ago Dr. Barnett Rubin, one of the world's premier Afghanistan experts at NYU, created a stir with a series of blog posts about signs the Bush administration might be gearing up for a military campaign against Iran. Last week I interviewed Rubin about the Bush administration's war talk against Iran and I asked him, Is there really any evidence that Iran is helping arm the Taliban, as the Bush administration keeps claiming?

Musharraf's appointments signal seriousness about transition

Last week, Pres. Musharraf pledged to step down as chief of the army if elected President next month. His recent re-organization of the military leadership suggests he's serious. He would hardly be as intent to make these changes if he expected to stand pat.

Musharraf promoted two lieutenant generals to top posts:

• Maj. Gen. Nadeem Ijaz Taj was tapped to run the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).
• Maj. Gen. Mohsin Kamal was posted to the 10th Corp (the nation's most important garrison, based in Rawalpindi)

These promotions allow Musharraf to appoint the current holders of these positions -- ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Ahmed Kiani and Rawalpindi Corp Commander, Lt. Gen. Tariq Majid -- to "Vice Chief" (the army's No. 2 job) & "Chief of General Staff" (the No. 3 post.) Gretchen Peters of ABC News's The Blotter notes that "Analysts and Western officials say both men are moderates, with favorable views of the West and of America."

What are the implications of these moves? The Blotter writes that:

Musharraf promoted several faithful subordinates into key positions and freed up his two most trusted deputies apparently to step into the No. 2 and 3 slots. Analysts say the appointments indicate Musharraf plans to stick to his promise -- made by his lawyer this week before the country's Supreme Court -- to relinquish his post as army chief if re-elected president by the legislature next month.

"These are all trusted deputies of Musharraf," said Talat Massood, a retired defense secretary for Pakistan. "We can expect they will continue to support him and continue his policy of supporting the war on terror."

"No surprises here," said a Western official of the appointments. "He's trying to line up his best men ahead of the elections."

Peters describes Gen. Kiani as "an avid golfer who's considered the most intellectual of Pakistan's senior officers, studied at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas" and Gen. Majid as "Musharraf's star pupil years ago at the Command and Staff College in Quetta...He fits the bill, say insiders, both in terms of his age and past experience, to take over the army."

What will become of the current Vice Chief and the current Chief of the General Staff, who are set to retire next month? The BBC sees this picture as murkier:

The BBC's Sanjay Dasgupta says that this round of appointments is being seen as part of larger move by President Musharraf to place a core group of loyal supporters in key positions before he quits as army chief. Who his successor will be is now the big question in Pakistan's military-dominated politics, he adds.

Next month, two of Gen Musharraf's top deputies in the army retire -- Gen Ehsan Ul Haq, who is the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee, and Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat, who is the vice-chief of army staff.

Some analysts say that one of these two men is being freed up to take over as the army chief after Gen Musharraf.

But others disagree, saying the pair have been around long enough to have developed clout and influence within the military establishment in their own right. Hence they have the potential to become alternative power centres, and Gen Musharraf would prefer a new face, who would owe his promotion, and therefore his loyalty, solely to him.

Image: Ehsan Ul Haq and Ahsan Saleem Hayat upon their appointments to the #2 and #3 positions in 2004. Pakistan Daily Times.

Latest: Webb amendment longshot with Warner switchover

Today John Warner (D-VA) changed his mind and now opposes the Webb measure...seems like a long shot now. From CQ TODAY:

Amendment to Limit Troop Deployments Faces Long Odds Sept. 19, 2007 – 1:35 p.m. By John M. Donnelly, CQ Staff: An amendment to mandate minimum rest times for U.S. troops between deployments faced long odds Wednesday after an influential Republican senator switched his position and said he would vote against it.

John W. Warner, R-Va., a senior Armed Services Committee member who voted for the amendment by Jim Webb, D-Va., when it last came to the floor in July, said he had changed his mind. He said the ranks of military specialists are so thin in many positions that commanders on the ground would be seriously hobbled by mandatory “dwell times” between deployments. Bush administration officials have been furiously lobbying moderate Republican senators to oppose the measure...                                                                            

Webb measure nears support to override filibuster

A measure by Sen. Jim Webb (D-Va) would reduce the number of US troops available for both Iraq and Afghanistan by mandating longer time at home. The amendment hit 56 votes in July and is apparently now closer to the 60 it needs to break a GOP filibuster. The President has said he will veto any such measure, and Webb is nowhere near the 67 votes necessary to override. Still, a story to watch. Here's the rundown from yesterday's Congressional Quarterly:

...After those votes, the Senate intends to move to an amendment by Jim Webb, D-Va., that would require that U.S. troops be given at least as much time at home as they spend deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. The Webb measure, which netted 56 votes in July, is now closer to the 60 votes needed to cut off an expected Republican filibuster. Among the GOP senators who may support the measure are Specter, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and George V. Voinovich of Ohio.

“We still need at least three Republicans to cross over,” said Senate Majority Whip Richard J. Durbin, D-Ill. “We’re working on it every day.” The Webb measure is significant because its supporters and critics say it could reduce the number of troops available to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan...

Image: Sen. Jim Webb.

The serpents of Medusa's hair

The latest epilogue to Operation Medusa: Canadian forces have re-established control in Zhare and Panjwai (in August, Taliban militants overran local authorities when Canadian troops rotated...) However, this week’s victory was hardly decisive -- the Taliban mostly ceded ground, as has been their modus operandi in recent months -- and will retaliate against the lightly armed police force left behind to consolidate NATO’s gains.

A spokesman for the Canadian forces argued that incorporated learning and new approaches -- e.g. joint checkpoints -- will ensure that this time is different. Army and police training has advanced, and Canada even forced the resignation of a corrupt police chief in Zhari district. Patience is key, as General Champoux has argued: "This has been a shaping year,'' he said, "I think next year will be a decisive year."

But we’ve heard this before. The Canadians have a lot of terrain to cover and a low density of force -- is it realistic to expect the ANA and ANP to hold this area on its own? Can this week’s gains be anything more than ephemeral without additional resources or a new approach?

Canadian Forces Regain Part of Strategic Area in Southern Afghanistan KABUL, Sept. 14, by David Rohde — Canadian forces this week regained control of roughly half of a strategic area outside of the southern city of Kandahar that fell to the Taliban in August, according to Afghan and Canadian officials…Seven hundred Canadian troops, backed by airstrikes and Leopard tanks, met little resistance from Taliban fighters…The Taliban generally have avoided direct clashes with heavily armed NATO forces and instead attacked lightly armed Afghan police forces or carried out suicide and roadside bomb attacks. MORE

Image: Tête de Méduse by Rubens

Oh, you thought I meant unconditional talks?

From the AP:

Qari Yousef Ahmadi appeared to step back from a statement to The Associated Press on Monday that the Taliban would consider negotiations if the Afghan government made a formal offer. He also said other media outlets who reported that he said the Taliban was willing to hold talks now had misquoted him.

"The Taliban will not be ready for negotiations until the U.S. and its allies leave our country," Ahmadi told the AP by satellite phone from an undisclosed location. "We will pursue our jihad against America and its allies until they leave our country. After that ... then the Taliban will be ready for negotiations."

On Sunday, Karzai repeated his previous stance: the government is ready to hold talks with militants.  Ahmadi replied the next day to the AP that the Taliban would consider talks if an offer were made. So much for that approach...But stay tuned.

Controversy over direct US military action in Pakistan misses the point

The latest of Richard Weitz's excellent articles on Afghanistan and Pakistan is available at the World Politics Review (a great new site that provides exclusive daily foreign policy analysis from contributors across 40 countries.)

Weitz argues that the discovery, during the Tillman investigation, of specific US rules of engagement for when US forces are authorized to enter Pakistan -- along with Barack Obama's remarks that "if President Musharraf won't act, we will" -- leaves the impression that US efforts to capture the Big Three (bin Laden, al-Zawahri, and Mullah Omar) are primarily about direct military action. The assumption that seriousness of purpose against the Taliban and Al Qaeda can be measured by one's willingness to cross the border is mistaken and counterproductive. Moreover, as Weitz notes, a focus on what the Pentagon is doing threatens "to obscure the small role that such direct military operations play in the overall U.S. effort to prevent Taliban insurgents from using Pakistan as a support base for their operations in Afghanistan."

Non-Military Tools Neglected in Debate Over Afghan-Pakistani Border Operations, by Richard Weitz 31 Aug 2007 World Politics Review Exclusive

Ahmed Rashid on Washington's Pakistan plan

Rashid argues that the army's morale is crumbling and the Sharif incident could well lead to a standoff with the supreme court. Meanwhile, Washington's plan for a Bhutto-Musharraf power-share has not profited from publicity; Bhutto is now seen "as part of some Bush game plan"  as well as too close to the general. Worth a read...

A distraction from Washington's grand design, Daily Telegraph, Ahmed Rashid, Sept 11, 2007: Nawaz Sharif is not part of the American script for the war on terror and the future of Pakistan, written by mandarins in the US State Department...The real script is to save the beleaguered Gen Pervez Musharraf, and involves another former prime minister in exile -- the fragrant Daughter of the East, Benazir Bhutto. When in a few weeks' time she repeats yesterday's homecoming saga from London, she will be welcomed by the very police that manhandled Mr Sharif and she will be allowed to lead a procession to her home town.

That is because the West is desperate to bring her and Gen Musharraf into a loveless marriage so that the general can combat the terrorists and the lady play democracy.. .MORE

Don Rumsfeld, microlender to Afghanistan?

Donald Rumsfeld's first major interview since leaving office, on the newsstands in GQ next month, dubs Afghanistan "a big success" and announces, among other things, that he's starting a foundation that will focus on post-graduate fellowships, a lecture series, post-Soviet reform, and -- you guessed it -- microlending in Afghanistan.

"The third thing is, we're interested in microenterprise. Most of the poor countries of the world—I shouldn't say most—a number of the poorer countries of the world have corrupt governments, and so when nations help nations, a lot of that money doesn't end up going to the people; it gets stuck in graft and corruption." He explains that before he came back to government, he worked on microloans with some outfit doing work in India and was impressed by it. He wants to do it in Afghanistan.

Interesting: Rumsfeld has discovered that graft and corruption are an impediment to Afghanistan's future. Has it crossed his mind, even fleetingly, that the policies he pushed so hard for -- a light engagement, the empowerment of warlords, an allergy to statebuilding and rule of law programs -- permitted the culture of impunity that allows Afghanistan's kleptocrats to flourish?  Am I being too harsh here?

Below is another excerpt from the interview (about the Pentagon and its limitations...) MORE

Afghanistan's "land mafia"

A 200 word piece today by the BBC highlights an important trend and leaves us wanting more details. The emergence of the so-called "land mafia" (a term that probably makes it sound more centrally organized than it us...) has broad repercussions, especially since Afghanistan lacks enforceable, consistent land rights. Multiple land registries allow well-connected strongmen to stake claims with impunity, and the lack of a functioning legal system leaves victims with no recourse.

The lack of security vis a vis land and property rights remains one of the major impediments to investment in Afghanistan. This briefly received some attention in 2003 when refugees streamed home -- only to find someone else there. It's still a big issue today, but the last serious work I've seen on this is the AREU's 2003 report ( Land Rights in Crisis). Sounds to me like a prize-winning expose just waiting for the right journalist...

Powerful 'grab Afghanistan land' By Stephanie Irvine (BBC)  Sept 6: The Afghan urban development minister says land is being appropriated illegally by powerful individuals at a rate of two sq km (0.8 sq miles) a day. Former military commanders, members of parliament and senior officials are seizing land and then selling it on illegally, says Yousaf Pashthun.

Image: Urban Development Minister Mohammad Yousaf Pashthun. BBC.

London confronts Beijing over Chinese weapons in Taliban hands