Elections in Afghanistan could be problematic

As talk swirls over whether Zalmay Khalilzad will run for Afghan president and Karzai attempts to project his authority to prepare for what could be a possible re-election bid, a U.S. Army report finds cause for worry about national elections in Afghanistan. Michael J. Metrinko, of the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, looks at problems with future Afghan elections in the face of deteriorating security.

Torture of Canadian-transferred detainees continues

The Globe and Mail reports that Afghan detainees turned over by Canadian forces are still being tortured in Afghan prisons, according to governmental documents just released by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

The Globe and Mail has established that the report of the case is recent, written after a Nov. 5, 2007, inspection of the National Directorate of Security prison in Kandahar. That was six months after a supposedly improved transfer agreement was put in place to monitor detainee treatment. The agreement was designed to address problems raised by critics about the ill treatment of prisoners taken by Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan and handed over to Afghan authorities with insufficient follow-up.

See the released documents here.

A disheartening account of Afghan Police

New York Times reporter C.J. Chivers has a disheartening account of the state of Afghan police. He finds overworked and grossly underpaid and under-equipped policemen on the verge of mutinying, in charge of enormous swaths of land.

In its simplest distillation, the strategy driving this American-led war is straightforward. Western troops are an interim force to provide security, spur development and mentor indigenous security forces until the Afghan leadership can govern alone.

But in the past two years, the insurgency has blossomed, making control of many provinces a contest. The Afghan Army, under American tutelage, has made considerable progress, American officers say.

The police lag far behind. Lightly equipped, marginally trained, undermined by corruption and poor discipline, they remain weak, though their expected role is daunting. They are not asked merely to police a country that lacks the rule of law. They are being used to fight a war.

Meanwhile, former Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann is recommending a draft to build up the Afghan National Army.

A roundup from December

Here’s a short news roundup of significant developments in or concerning Afghanistan from December:

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
The House approved the 2008 defense authorization bill, which in addition to providing $189.4 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, creates an office for a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and a bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting for more oversight of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The SIGAR is a much-needed agency to track down corruption and mismanagement in Afghanistan, much as its equivalent has done in Iraq. With this extra level of oversight and ensuring that reconstruction aid is invested properly, it will hopefully help get Afghan reconstruction back on track.

Brown's Plan for Afghanistan
UK prime minister Gordon Brown outlined his new plan for Afghanistan that included increasing aid by £450 million and tough benchmarks for Afghan security forces, encouraging Afghans to take responsibility for their own security.

Brown told MPs that aid would be given for "high impact" projects such as better roads, power supplies and clean water, as well as loans for small businesses and funding for civic groups and community development projects to improve local and national government.

You can read a transcript of Brown’s plan here. His emphasis on Afghans taking “ownership” and responsibility for their future and security is important.

In testimony before the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence on Dec. 10, RAND analyst Seth Jones explained the fast growth of the Afghan insurgency, thusly:

“The answer is simple,” one senior Afghan government official told me in October 2007. “The people are losing faith in the government. Our security forces cannot protect local villages, and our institutions struggle to deliver basic services.”

He testified that people are turning to the Taliban, not because they believe in extremism but because they are losing patience with the government’s inefficacy and corruption.

Indeed, the primary challenge in Afghanistan is one of governance. Governance includes the set of institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.11 It involves the government’s ability at the national or sub-national level to establish law and order, effectively manage resources, and implement sound policies. An insurgency reflects a process of alternative state building, where insurgents compete to provide governance to the population. Insurgents take advantage of weak governance and assume state-like functions. They tax and set up administrative structures for the population they control.

A Key Test for the Afghan National Army
The Afghan National Army seems to have proven itself in a key test last month – retaking the small dusty, but strategic toehold town of Musa Qala from the Taliban. Its symbolism was tied mainly to the fact that it was the only significant town controlled by the Taliban. As Guardian reporter Jason Burke put it, “For both sides, the struggle for the small country town represents in microcosm the battle for the country as a whole.”

But the offensive also spotlights the fact that despite its success, the Afghan National Army remains severely under-equipped and under-helped.

While U.S. officials cite the achievements of the Afghan military, the force has historically suffered from high attrition rates. It has also lacked sufficient military aid and trainers, and has been hobbled by old weaponry, Afghan defense officials say.

Thinking like an insurgent: the Army's new academy

The Wall St Journal has a front page, 2,300 word piece this morning on the U.S. Army's "Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy", which was established this April to improve tactics. Last year the Army unveiled a new counterinsurgency doctrine, but its dissemination has been slow; when one of its authors, Lt. Col. John Nagl went to Afghanistan he saw "uneven understanding of counterinsurgency principles."

Capt. Dan Helmer, the 26-year old Rhode Scholar who set up the 'school' in six weeks notes that "We're trying to win an argument that supporting the government is worth risking your life for." That's a tough sell right now, and requires an approach which is 80% military and 20% political, according to Helmer. 

The Army says they've made great progress this year in giving troops Afghanistan-specific training before deployment, but current deployment patterns aren't providing enough time for learning. "There isn't enough time between being told that they're going and getting them through the training," says Lou Gelling, deputy commander of the Army's battle command training program. "That's the reality of it." Sounds like a lot of the training right now is supplemental, not comprehensive: five day courses for 60 soldiers at a time in a makeshift classroom.

As usual, one of the central problems ties back to Afghanistan's status as America's "second war":

The counterinsurgency training sometimes seems targeted more toward Iraq, according to Capt. Helmer and Col. Nagl. Of the 90 men under Col. Nagl's command, almost all are Iraq veterans and just one has served in Afghanistan. Even Capt. Helmer's orders to Afghanistan included the mistaken, but telling, instruction to take a course in Arabic -- a language spoken in Iraq, but not in Afghanistan.

The article is subscriber only content, but here are a few excerpts:

In Counterinsurgency Class, Soldiers Think Like Taliban, Wall Street Journal, By MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS, Nov 30, KABUL:A natural-born insurgent, Sgt. First Class Jacob Stockdill was brimming with malicious suggestions when a group of American soldiers and Afghan security men sat down last month to plot their own defeat. MORE

Quoteboard

"If you're coming as our friends, don't. If you're coming as our enemies, we will fight you."
     - Zmarai, Arghandab district police chief, in response to Taliban threats.
MORE...

Sarah Chayes on Arghandab, the Taliban, and GoA meddling

Sarah Chayes has a piece today in the Washington Post in which she recalls, from her front row seat, the Taliban incursion into Arghandab in the wake of Mullah Naqib's heart attack.

Her verdict is deeply troubling: despite a successful coalition counterattack, the Taliban operation  "was a deft, successful psychological operations action":

It said that, despite the likelihood that they would attack after the death of Mullah Naqib, no obstacle was thrown up to oppose them, and they were able to walk into the district. The targeting of the mullah's house was a deliberate affront. It said: "You see, o men of no honor? You can't even protect his house. You are nothing now." The sum of these messages was aimed at the ordinary people who are the prize in any insurgency: Our encroachment is inevitable, the Taliban said. You should align yourselves with the inevitable.

Equally troubling is the Government of Afghanistan's response. Immediately after Mullah Naqib's death, President Karzai, along with his two brothers and the governor of Kandahar, "interfered in the recent selection of a new elder, sidelining a man who had been Mullah Naqib's deputy during the anti-Soviet jihad." "If anyone knew how to fight the Taliban in Arghandab, it was he," argues Chayes, "And yet the government's machinations were plainly aimed at shutting him out" in favor of a more pliable replacement, the untried son of Mullah Naqib. Their goal, she implies, is to ram through an alluring -- but dangerously flawed  -- reconciliation with the Taliban.

A Mullah Dies, and War Comes Knocking, By Sarah Chayes, Nov 18, KANDAHAR: Wednesday, Oct. 31: I woke to the sound of artillery thudding -- like the beat of a heavy heart. It was Afghan army batteries firing into Arghandab, at new Taliban positions there. Through several nights, I had been listening, my ears pricking like a dog's, to the faint popping of gunfire, the clattering of helicopters, the whine of personnel carriers speeding along the roads, falling asleep only when the morning call to prayer rang out in the pre-dawn chill.

I can't explain how this felt, the penetration of war to this crucial part of Kandahar, where I have lived for six years. Arghandab district, with its riot of tangled fruit trees, is the lung of Kandahar province; its meandering, stone-studded river is the artery of the whole region. Arghandab is shade and water, and mud-walled orchards, and mulberries and apricots, and pomegranates the size of grapefruits hanging from the willowy branches. MORE

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE

Quoteboard

“There is a question why the provincial officials were not with their parliamentarian guests. And it is a question why there was shooting after the explosion.”

- Burhanuddin Rabbani,  leader of the United National Front.

“This time there should be consequences. We should stop delivery of any further F-16s to Pakistan and cut off all other U.S. assistance until the state of emergency is lifted.”

- Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY), member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

“It is dangerous to stand up to a military dictatorship, but more dangerous not to.”

- Benazir Bhutto, former Pakistan Prime Minister

“This is going to be a very short-lived emergency,”

- Tariq Azim Khan, Pakistani deputy information minister

WPR piece on private security contractors

Below is a piece I wrote, published today in the World Politics Review (an online foreign policy daily.)

Private Military Contractors in Afghanistan, Carl Robichaud | 30 Oct 2007

After the Sept. 16 Blackwater scandal, which drew unprecedented attention to the role played by private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq, these firms have increasingly come under scrutiny in other theaters of war, such as Afghanistan. But while efforts in Afghanistan to rein in PSCs seem to parallel those in Iraq, they are driven by different dynamics -- and have very different implications. MORE 

A softer, cuddlier Blackwater

On Monday, the Times reported that Blackwater changed its logo "from macho to corporate." A company spokesmen says the decision was taken long before the Sept 17 incident. Sure...

As the Times reports:

The rifle-scope crosshairs so obvious in the old Blackwater logo have been reduced to a set of horizontal elipses that bracket, but no longer enclose, the paw print, which has also changed to more closely resemble an actual bear-paw imprint. The original Blackwater logo had thick white serif lettering draped over the crosshairs on a menacing black field. The new logo separates the image and the letters, which now appear in buttoned-down sans-serif black and slightly italicized on a white field.

Wired's Danger Room is not impressed, but has taken on some of the hard work for Blackwater. Readers have created six options for Blackwater's new look. Go weigh in on your favorite...

 

A look inside the Asia Foundation survey

The Asia Foundation released it's third survey of the Afghan people today. Polling in Afghanistan should by no means be seen as dispositive, but this data can provide insights unavailable elsewhere (especially compared with prior baseline surveys by the Asia Foundation in 2004 and 2006). Here's a look inside...

Predictably, media reports framed the poll as a referendum on security (see AFP: “Security fears up sharply among Afghans: survey”) It’s true that pessimism about security rose among Afghans--with 32 percent citing security as their top concern (up from 22 percent last year.)

But the picture is more complicated, since security concerns vary significantly by region and two thirds of Afghans felt that security in their area was good. Moreover, among those who believe the country is headed in the right direction, good security is cited as the second most important reason (34%) after development.

So the Survey paints a nuanced picture and provides some fascinating data on everything from support for traditional institutions (such as Shuras and Jirga) to democracy and women’s rights. A few trends worth noting:

Right Direction / Wrong Direction:

• People are still optimistic, even if there was a slight decline in those who said the country was headed in the right direction (from 44 percent to 42 percent).
• Three-quarters of Afghans continue to assess government performance positively (i.e. either strongly (25%) or somewhat strongly (55%).)
• Afghans continue to espouse confidence in national security forces (both army and police) as well as in traditional institutions such as Shuras and Jirgas. However, “less than half of the respondents had confidence in the government's justice system, political parties and local militias.”
•  Corruption is an issue for many Afghans, but it is not clear that it has grown more acute. Some poll questions suggest an increase in perceptions of corruption while others suggest a decrease.
  

Security:

• Among people who felt the country was going in the wrong direction, security was cited as the top reason. This may seem unsurprising, until you realize that even in last year’s survey security was only rarely mentioned as a reason for a “wrong direction” response.
• On the other hand, among those who said the country was going in the right direction, good security was cited as the second biggest reason (34%).
• Perceptions of security varied greatly by region. Nationwide, “sixty-six percent of the respondents felt that security in their area was good or quite good, and 50 percent said they rarely or never feared for their own or their family's safety. Eighty-two percent said no one in their family had been a victim of any crime or violence during the last one year.” 

Reconstruction:

• Last year, respondents cited “rebuilding of the country” as only the fourth most important reason why the country was headed in the right direction; this year it became the most important reason for believing so (39%). It’s not clear whether people feel reconstruction is going better, or that the other trends they cited as reasons for optimism last year (security, peace, disarmament) are simply going worse. MORE
  

The story behind the "crackdown" on PSCs...

Cracking down on illicit private military contractors (aka private security contractors) in Afghanistan may well be in order, but is that what's really happening?

Barnett Rubin writes on Informed Comment that "Word on the street is that rather than a sincere "crackdown" on private security firms, the government's actions are more similar to its counter-narcotics actions: use of the government by one criminal group to suppress its competitors."

In response, a "well-informed friend in Kabul" argues that this was not a crackdown (the arrests comprised 100 employees in an industry of 10,000) and suggests instead that "some competitors closely linked to the President are trying to (a) extract bribes from the PSCs for not being shut down arbitrarily and (b) eliminate rivals."

This Kabul reader offers some more insights which suggest a) the indispensability of PSCs for certain roles and b) the difference between Afghan and foreign-led PSCs, and C) the political nature of this "crackdown":

The real challenge to the government is the fact that the Ministry of Interior does not have the capacity to replace the protection guaranteed by the private companies outside of Kabul. While there might be enough room in the police to replace some guards inside the capital, capacity and morale of the police are insufficient to take on the task of guarding let's say Kajaki dam in Helmand....
 
Pointing to international contractors and their problems is deflecting attention from the biggest problem - the Afghan PSCs. In foreign firms the foot soldiers might come from an illegal armed group, but the command and logistics elements are all foreign and will collapse in crisis or not lend them easily to factional agendas. The Afghan firms unify the foot soldiers with C2 [command and control] from one faction and are therefore much more dangerous - best example provided by Khawar of Jurat.
 
Nobody so far has questioned the PSCs owned by illustrious people such as [names of relatives of current or past ministers]. Nobody has looked into the firms operating under the control of local warlords [names of former top provincial officials] in the East and South either.

Two more Afghan security firms shut down

In an effort that parallels Iraq's attempt to reign in PMCs, Afghanistan has shut down two more private security firms (bringing the total to four in the past week).  So far all the closures have been Afghan firms (rather than international firms) but that could soon change. The police last week said they plan to shut down a dozen firms all told -- if PMCs tied to donor countries or powerful Afghans are among them, expect a scuffle.

The regulations on these firms is so lax that there is not even a publicly-available register for them (!) The MoI says 60 firms have registered with it, but the AP suspects there are perhaps two dozen others in operation. Without regulation, accountability and a mandate for when and how force can be used, how are these "firms" anything more than guys with guns?

Here's the original AP story:

Kabul shuts down two more security firms (AP) October 18, 2007, KABUL: Two more private Afghan security firms were closed down on Wednesday, police said, in a continuing crackdown on a lucrative but largely unregulated security industry. Authorities raided Falcon and Millet after both companies’ licenses to operate in Afghanistan expired, recovering more than 80 illegal weapons, police said in a statement.

The Gangs of Kabul

Not a phenomenon one hears much about...if any readers have insights into this, I would be grateful...What is meant here by a 'gang' and how do they operate?

Update: Thanks for the insightful comments...more are welcome.

Fifteen arrested after man killed in Afghan gang fight: (AFP) 10/14/2007 KABUL: Police in the Afghan capital Kabul said they had arrested 15 men after another was stabbed to death in a brawl between gangs, which have reemerged since the fall of the hardline Taliban.

The men were arrested late Saturday after the street fight in a poor area of the capital Friday, the first day of the Eid al-Fitr holiday marking the end of Ramadan, police chief General Alishah Paktiawal told AFP. "After Eid prayers two street gangs fought and one person was killed, stabbed with knives," he said. "We have arrested 15 people in relation to the incident." The gangs were fighting over territory around a mosque in the area, he said. MORE

Draft GoA rules for private security contractors

The Associated Press obtained a draft of the policy being discussed by the Government of Afghanistan on security contractors. The document must receive approval from the Cabinet before entering into effect. It notes that "the GOA (government of Afghanistan) has allowed for limited PSC operations and activities. However, increasingly, the absence of targeted regulation ... in parallel with unstable security environment has generated an unfortunate and nearly anarchical PSC market with a long series of security problems and criminal activities." Here are the highlights:

Extensive reliance of PSCs (private security companies), risks deepening the current state of instability in at least 4 ways: MORE

Two police chiefs sacked. Problem solved, right?

Tip of the iceberg:

Afghan police chiefs sacked for negligence (Reuters) By Jon Hemming, KABUL:   The Afghan government sacked two provincial police chiefs for negligence, the Interior Ministry said on Saturday, highlighting problems in a force often accused of corruption and which is key to security in Afghanistan...The Interior Ministry said it had sacked the provincial police chiefs of Dai Kundi in the centre of the country and Wardak just southwest of the capital, Kabul....The police chief in Wardak stands accused of pocketing officers' salaries, leading many in his force to abandon their posts...

Wardak, only an hour's drive from Kabul, is among provinces previously regarded as safe which have witnessed a rise in Taliban violence in the last few months. Only a few hundred Turkish troops from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are stationed there and they are not allowed by their government to conduct offensive operations. MORE

Korb and Wadhams: Five steps

Larry Korb and Caroline Wadhams argue today in a Newsday op-ed that "the United States and NATO must increase troop levels by at least 20,000" in Afghanistan. This rise in troop levels is part of a five-point plan that includes bolstering reconstruction assistance, focusing on rule of law, and reforming U.S. aid channels to Pakistan. The steps they sketch out will be supported by a more comprehensive report in the coming months -- keep your eyes peeled ...

U.S.

must put more focus on Afghan insurgency, Oct 9, 2007: Sunday marked the sixth anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaida....But the mission in Afghanistan is going alarmingly awry, and the United States must refocus and re-energize its policy. The administration and Congress cannot allow the sinking ship of Iraq to take Afghanistan down with it...

To achieve our security objectives, the United States, and especially Congress, must provide increased funds, attention and manpower - both civilian and military. U.S. leaders must also engage the American people, as they may become increasingly pessimistic about U.S. involvement in the Muslim world as a result of the war in Iraq. There are five concrete steps Congress and the administration should pursue immediately. MORE

Have PhD in Anthropology, will travel...

I was surprised to find this piece had climbed to the second most emailed article in the New York Times today, but perhaps I shouldn't have been. Interesting, well-reported, and counterintuitive.

• Video

It's odd to find that a field so synonymous with The Academy has become a coveted commodity (much to the chagrin of certain professors, cited in the article, who seem philosophically averse to using their discipline for anything pragmatic...)

Can you imagine all the Anthropology majors emailing their parents to say "I told you so?" And can you imagine what better shape we'd be today if we entered Afghanistan with a modicum of understanding of its cultural context? The Army seems to now appreciate the importance of these skills, but it's a steep learning curve. (One could also question whether the Army is the right institution to be delivering governance and services...)

Anthropologists help U.S. Army in Afghanistan and Iraq, By David Rohde, Oct 4 (NYT):  SHABAK VALLEY, Afghanistan: In this isolated Taliban stronghold in eastern Afghanistan, American paratroopers are fielding what they consider a crucial new weapon in counterinsurgency operations here: a demure civilian anthropologist named Tracy.

Tracy, who asked that her surname not be used for security reasons, is a member of the first-ever Human Terrain Team, an experimental Pentagon program that assigns anthropologists and other social scientists to American combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they act as cultural advisers and suggest ways to win local support without using military force.

Colonel Martin Schweitzer, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division unit working with anthropologists here, said the unit's combat operations had been reduced by 60 percent since the anthropologists arrived this spring. He said the focus had shifted from combat to improving security, health care and education for the population.

"We're looking at this from a human perspective, from a social scientist's perspective," he said. "We're not focused on the enemy. We're focused on bringing governance down to the people."

Last month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates authorized a $40 million expansion of the program, which will assign teams of anthropologists and social scientists to each of the 26 American combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, military officials are scrambling to find more scholars willing to deploy to the front lines to interpret tribal structures and explain cultural differences. MORE

Part II of the Rubin/Marshall talk

The serpents of Medusa's hair

The latest epilogue to Operation Medusa: Canadian forces have re-established control in Zhare and Panjwai (in August, Taliban militants overran local authorities when Canadian troops rotated...) However, this week’s victory was hardly decisive -- the Taliban mostly ceded ground, as has been their modus operandi in recent months -- and will retaliate against the lightly armed police force left behind to consolidate NATO’s gains.

A spokesman for the Canadian forces argued that incorporated learning and new approaches -- e.g. joint checkpoints -- will ensure that this time is different. Army and police training has advanced, and Canada even forced the resignation of a corrupt police chief in Zhari district. Patience is key, as General Champoux has argued: "This has been a shaping year,'' he said, "I think next year will be a decisive year."

But we’ve heard this before. The Canadians have a lot of terrain to cover and a low density of force -- is it realistic to expect the ANA and ANP to hold this area on its own? Can this week’s gains be anything more than ephemeral without additional resources or a new approach?

Canadian Forces Regain Part of Strategic Area in Southern Afghanistan KABUL, Sept. 14, by David Rohde — Canadian forces this week regained control of roughly half of a strategic area outside of the southern city of Kandahar that fell to the Taliban in August, according to Afghan and Canadian officials…Seven hundred Canadian troops, backed by airstrikes and Leopard tanks, met little resistance from Taliban fighters…The Taliban generally have avoided direct clashes with heavily armed NATO forces and instead attacked lightly armed Afghan police forces or carried out suicide and roadside bomb attacks. MORE

Image: Tête de Méduse by Rubens

Don Rumsfeld, microlender to Afghanistan?

Donald Rumsfeld's first major interview since leaving office, on the newsstands in GQ next month, dubs Afghanistan "a big success" and announces, among other things, that he's starting a foundation that will focus on post-graduate fellowships, a lecture series, post-Soviet reform, and -- you guessed it -- microlending in Afghanistan.

"The third thing is, we're interested in microenterprise. Most of the poor countries of the world—I shouldn't say most—a number of the poorer countries of the world have corrupt governments, and so when nations help nations, a lot of that money doesn't end up going to the people; it gets stuck in graft and corruption." He explains that before he came back to government, he worked on microloans with some outfit doing work in India and was impressed by it. He wants to do it in Afghanistan.

Interesting: Rumsfeld has discovered that graft and corruption are an impediment to Afghanistan's future. Has it crossed his mind, even fleetingly, that the policies he pushed so hard for -- a light engagement, the empowerment of warlords, an allergy to statebuilding and rule of law programs -- permitted the culture of impunity that allows Afghanistan's kleptocrats to flourish?  Am I being too harsh here?

Below is another excerpt from the interview (about the Pentagon and its limitations...) MORE

Afghanistan's "land mafia"

A 200 word piece today by the BBC highlights an important trend and leaves us wanting more details. The emergence of the so-called "land mafia" (a term that probably makes it sound more centrally organized than it us...) has broad repercussions, especially since Afghanistan lacks enforceable, consistent land rights. Multiple land registries allow well-connected strongmen to stake claims with impunity, and the lack of a functioning legal system leaves victims with no recourse.

The lack of security vis a vis land and property rights remains one of the major impediments to investment in Afghanistan. This briefly received some attention in 2003 when refugees streamed home -- only to find someone else there. It's still a big issue today, but the last serious work I've seen on this is the AREU's 2003 report ( Land Rights in Crisis). Sounds to me like a prize-winning expose just waiting for the right journalist...

Powerful 'grab Afghanistan land' By Stephanie Irvine (BBC)  Sept 6: The Afghan urban development minister says land is being appropriated illegally by powerful individuals at a rate of two sq km (0.8 sq miles) a day. Former military commanders, members of parliament and senior officials are seizing land and then selling it on illegally, says Yousaf Pashthun.

Image: Urban Development Minister Mohammad Yousaf Pashthun. BBC.

Firefight at a drug lab in Daychopan, Zabul

The AP provides today one of the first reports I've heard of fighting at a drug lab. The report says the guards were "suspected Taliban" but I wonder how accurate this is...Wish there were more detail on this raid.

In the southern Zabul province, Afghan and coalition troops clashed with insurgents in Daychopan district Sunday, killing four suspected Taliban and wounding four others, said Fazel Bari, the Daychopan district chief.

Also Sunday, Afghan and coalition troops destroyed a heroin laboratory after battling Taliban fighters guarding the facility, a separate coalition statement said. The lab in Helmand contained large amounts of opium-processing chemicals as well as weapons, insurgent propaganda and explosive materials, it said.

Map: BBC.

Comments on the South Korean hostage situation

The following are comments I made to a South Korean reporter covering the hostage crisis. If you have additional insights for him -- or corrections for me -- drop me an email and I will pass them along.

1. What is the security situation in Afghanistan as a whole?

It very much depends on the region. Several provinces in the south and southeast (e.g. Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, Ghazni) are quite dangerous and have become more so. But in the rest of the country, especially in the north and the west and in major cities such as Kabul, is fairly safe. Afghans and foreigners living and working there must take precautions, but are not at risk in the same way that aid workers in Kandahar would be.

After incidents like these, the international community must reconsider where and how it operates. The OECD has estimated that fully half of all development assistance has been spent in four of the most dangerous provinces in the south. It is extremely difficult and expensive to do development work in this environment. A decision was made to concentrate development work in these contentious areas in order to “win hearts and minds,” but it’s not clear that this approach is working. On the other hand, there are many stable regions in Afghanistan that are languishing from a lack of attention. So a wiser approach, especially in light of these recent kidnappings, is to pick some of the low-hanging fruit that is currently rotting on the vine. MORE

"Cops or Robbers?" AREU's must-read report on police reform

Donors are finally realizing the importance of police reform. Unfortunately, some of the response has been to throw money at the problem--the latest infusion of funding, for example, focuses on training and equipment, as if the police problem were primarily a technocratic challenge rather than a political one.

Andrew Wilder, research director at Tuft's Feinstein Center, is the author the AREU's remarkable new report on the topic entitled "Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police". He argues that there is still no consensus about the role of police, and too little appreciation that the Ministry of the Interior is part of the problem. The paper highlights five challenges. Donors will need to:

USIP event on civil society

USIP has posted a report from their June 21 panel on civil society in Afghanistan, which featured George Devendorf (director of Public Affairs for Mercy Corps), Tilly Reed (chief of party in Afghanistan for Counterpart International) and Scott Worden (USIP program officer with Rule of Law). The summary is available here.

Tom Perriello: Comments on Security

With news of another major suicide bomb attack in the South making headlines, I wanted to pass along an unofficial summary of a dozen or so interviews with security experts from various Embassies, UN offices, NGOs, and the Afghan government.

Overall, most security experts agree that the insurgency has shifted its emphasis from the bolder frontal attacks on international forces that we saw in summer 2006 to asymmetric tactics, i.e. “shoot and scoot” operations, suicide bombings, and IEDs. This is a regression for the insurgency, and NATO and OEF operations have driven much of this shift. Most analysts credit the successful targeting of mid-level insurgent leaders (top leaders assumed to be safely in Quetta) with hindering Taliban operations. MORE

Rule of law conference nets $360 m in new money

Last week's Rome conference on the rule of law was largely overshadowed by discussions of civilian casualties, but it resulted in some good news: a major boost to the beleaguered sector. Overall, donors pledged $360 m in new funds (over four or five years...) for training judges, building prisons and courtrooms, etc.

The new funds are on top of the $50m already designated for legal sector reform (but I've seen no indication as to whether donors may be reprogramming the new funds from other funding areas...) As of last week, officials would not break down the contributions by country, but this week the US announced its pledge of $15 m. Before the conference the European Union announced that it was readying ~$270 m in pledges, so that's where the bulk of funding is coming from. Please drop a comment if you have more details on what happened in Rome and who has pledged what...

Tom Perriello: Amnesty Update

I want to make a brief amendment to my earlier post about the national amnesty bill based on two recent meetings. One was with a leading Afghan law professor and another was with one of a top government official on Parliamentary affairs. Both have insisted that the national amnesty act was merely a Parliamentary Declaration rather than a law. They both cited the same definitive proof – under the Afghan Constitution a law can only originate and be drafted by the taqnin within the ministry of justice. Otherwise the motion is just a Declaration.

Tom Perriello: Two Views from Qandahar

Qandahar is a lot to take in on a short trip. I had forgotten how much cleaner and wider the streets are than in Kabul. And that the city comes to life in the evening for those two magical hours before the onset of darkness. New development is visible everywhere and statistically trends are headed up from 8 months ago inside the city.

Yet the mood is grim. People talk about corruption that stretches from petty police bribes to drug dealing at the highest levels of provincial Government. While people remain solidly anti-insurgency, a deep fissure has appeared here between the people and government that was a mere crack in 2005.

The logical link between enabling corrupt warlords and undermining our own counter-insurgency efforts is crucial to understand. A corrupt government does not make people pro-insurgency. It simply means people no longer have a dog in the fight. Between a corrupt government (who demand payoffs) or the Taliban and other anti-government forces (who offer handouts), you follow the path of least resistance and try to stay out of the way. MORE

Tom Perriello: Lessons from the Amnesty Fight

In many ways, the political showdown this spring over the national amnesty bill serves as a Rorschach test -- observers will see proof of whatever broader view they have about Afghanistan.

The accomodationist/engagement camp points to the rally at the National Stadium (and the near evacuation of UNAMA personnel it triggered) as proof of what they have been saying all along -- a call for justice will upset the delicate balance of Afghan politics. Talk of transitional justice is as naïve as it is dangerous, and should be shelved until further notice.

Alternatively, the accountability crowd sees in this showdown proof that the warlords have much more bark than bite. They point to the fact that despite claims to swarm the streets of Kabul with 250,000 people, the entire United Front produced fewer than 20,000 protesters. Further, these “protesters” were motivated primarily by the free lunch and 50 afghanis.

Then there is the populist account that has shown up in a surprising number of interviews with Afghans: namely, that the amnesty bill was driven by the United States. The logic goes that this is another example of the U.S. protecting its close allies, which include some of the most notorious warlords. The argument continues that the U.S. is also far from eager for a zealous prosecutor to dig into its own complicity in war crimes past or present. Many Afghans remain strongly in favor of aggressive prosecutions, but are increasingly convinced that neither Karzai nor the international community will ever permit these to happen.

Before analyzing the validity of and lessons from these arguments, it is worth noting a few places where these different accounts generally agree:  MORE

Tom Perriello: Update on APPA (and the complete terms of reference)

 

A few quick updates and notes about my last post on the Advisory Panel on Presidential Appointments:

   

1. President Karzai has not yet signed the final APPA terms of reference. There is no indication yet that this amounts to more than a change of schedule but will keep people posted.
2. The final version of the Terms of Reference can be viewed here
3. Lots of people deserve credit for the APPA, but I wanted to offer particular praise to Javier Leon-Diaz and Richard Bennett of the UNAMA Human Rights Division who have been relentless in keeping this on track.

More to follow shortly. (Continue below for the Terms of Reference...)

Tom Perriello: A Big Step Forward… Maybe

Ask Afghans to single out the biggest challenge facing their country, and corruption will almost certainly be the first answer. Today, they may get some rare good news on that front, as President Karzai is scheduled to give his final approval for the Advisory Panel for Presidential Appointments (APPA). According to the final draft of its terms of reference (which I hope to post shortly), this panel would vet executive appointees for certain senior posts on three criteria: corruption, competence, and culpability for past atrocities. Among others, no future Governors, Deputy Ministers, chiefs of police, or chiefs of security will be able to get appointed without clearance from this five-member panel.

First, the good news. As I mentioned in the last post, top diplomats and Afghan civil society leaders have been putting serious political capital behind this. As the call for transitional justice has shifted, at least temporarily, into a focus on vetting, this panel has become a top priority. Despite this, just a few weeks ago, it seemed the year-long fight to establish the APPA was lost. At other moments, it looked like the panel might have the power to advise on, but not block, an appointment. Most think that Karzai’s Chief of Staff, Omar Daoudzai, had been actively working to undermine or at least weaken the panel. Given these hurdles, the establishment of the APPA is a laudable success.

Relevant donors and partners met on Monday, and it looks like the Asia Foundation will provide much-needed technical support to the Panel and its Secretariat. The Canadians are set to fund the Panel for the coming year (any readers who have good relations with the Canadian Embassy might want to drop them a line on this).

On the downside, some players are skeptical that this panel will have the courage or inclination to disagree with Karzai, or that the President would even honor its decisions. People ask why this should produce results any different from the vetting (or disastrous lack thereof) during parliamentary elections. Critics will note that the current structure has the APPA answering directly to the Chief of Staff. While advocates hope to increase its independence, including making it an independent line item in future Executive budgets, this certainly underscores the influence Daoudzai will be able to wield over the panel.

One of the biggest questions is where the Americans stand. So far, the US Embassy has given rhetorical support to the APPA and has been following quite closely the last rounds of negotiations. But they have not put serious diplomatic pressure behind this. As one senior diplomat said, this panel will have exactly zero influence unless the US--and particularly the US military, not the Embassy–-sees it as a useful tool for marginalizing the worst individuals. For the US, other priorities are a distant second to security, and little recognition exists of any causal link between the insurgency and corruption. Security experts here note that the ranks of the insurgency are being filled as much by villagers fed up with corruption as by those we would traditionally call Talibs.

One hope, even among the cynics, is that President Karzai is supporting this panel to give himself political cover for not appointing certain cronies. The logic is that he can avoid empowering certain actors with the explanation that his hands are tied.

Speaking of Karzai’s cronies, people in the development community have taken to a shorthand for such folks – Friends of Karzai, or FOKers (as in Meet the Fockers).

No one is arguing that corruption has been solved, but it looks like Afghans and the international community now have a potentially powerful new tool for addressing it. The key will be to ensure that the panel has the financial and diplomatic support to succeed. For now though, the generally deflated justice crowd has a victory to celebrate.

NOTE: If for any reason the President does not sign off on this today, I will repost on that. Please keep comments or questions coming at tom@avaaz.org.

Tom Perriello is a Fellow of the Century Foundation currently in Afghanistan researching the intersection of justice and security.

Tom Perriello: First Impressions

This is Tom Perriello's first post. He says that "if you have questions, comments or suggestions for this mission, feel free to contact me at tom@avaaz.org."

First Impressions a Second Time:
Initial Thoughts on Justice and Security from Kabul
As I left New York on Sunday, international headlines about Afghanistan suggested a scary scene of escalating violence and rising anti-American sentiment. I have only been in Afghanistan for three days, but my initial conversations with leaders in Kabul (and a number of interviews with Afghanistan experts before leaving) suggest an environment defined less by anxiety about security than by a dull resignation to watching a nation slowly slide backwards. Initial meetings with both Afghans and members of the international community betray a malaise of declining hope, lack of clear direction or mandate for the international community, lack of political will from the Karzai government, and rapidly shrinking expectations.

 

This is a shift from the last time I was here in late 2005 for two months following the Parliamentary elections. At that time, I was conducting a national survey on the relationship between justice and security, essentially asking people how the country should address atrocities from the past 30 years, and what impact this would have on national security. In addition to “person on the street” interviews, we met with opinion leaders in each province, including government officials and newly elected PMs, “warlords,” NGO leaders, journalists, academics, women leaders, and former and current combatants. A team of 65 Afghans and internationals conducted consultations with over 2000 indidivuals as part of this survey, and I oversaw interviews with leaders from Kabul, Wardak, Gardez, Kandahar, Helmand, and Bamiyan.

 

The survey indicated two distinct schools of thoughts, and my initial interviews this time suggest that those divisions remain in place, though a bit less stark...MORE

Four steps to reduce civilian casualties

Today Rick Inderfurth has a piece today arguing that civilian casualties are "rising to the top of the list" of woes in Afghanistan and setting out four steps to reduce them. Let's take a look:

First, the and NATO should publicly adopt the goal of "zero innocent civilian casualties," as recommended a year ago by retired General Barry McCaffrey...to accomplish this, military tactics must change to limit casualties even where this means, in McCaffrey's words, "Taliban units escape destruction by hiding among the people."

So this would essentially be an oath to 'first do no harm'...Such a declaration would be valuable, as long as it was actually observed.

Easier said than done--especially since the current command would tell you they are doing everything possible to avoid civilian deaths. It's clearly not working. McCaffrey, in a June memo (worth reading in its entirety), has some insights into how this approach