Holbrooke on Bush's "ineffective" counter-narcotics plan

Former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke tackles the thorny issue of the Bush administration’s counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan -– calling the billion-dollar-per-year plan the “single most ineffective program in the history of American foreign policy.” According to him, in addition to wasting money, the policy only strengthens the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As most of the poppy crops destroyed are in the insecure south, it pushes penniless farmers with no other options into the arms and influences of the Taliban. Meanwhile, little effort is made to tackle the drug lords and corrupt government officials who enable the trafficking trade.

Holbrooke recommends first boosting security, providing free agricultural support to farmers and building access roads to markets to ensure successful alternate livelihoods, before launching on a complete poppy eradication plan in insecure areas.

New Report on the ‘Forgotten War’

The European Council on Foreign Relations has a new report out calling for U.S. and European governments to “overhaul their strategies and strike a 'grand bargain' to stabilise the country.” Significantly, it urges enticing moderates into the fold of governance and legitimacy through money and other incentives.

There will be no stability in Afghanistan unless “moderate” insurgents embrace constitutionalism and enter democratic politics. Since the Bonn Agreement in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the coalition has supported the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alliance, which brought together the main Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara groupings. For obvious reasons it had no significant links to the Pashtuns who make up 42% of Afghanistan’s population.22 After 2001, despite Karzai’s Pashtun background, Pashtun tribal leaders were largely excluded from government and have been ever since. Many have thus aligned themselves with the resurgent Taliban. The coalition and the Afghan government must work to convince them that they can pursue their interests democratically.

There have already been signs that this is at least possible. Though President Karzai’s overtures to reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were rebuffed, the Taliban, while insisting on a number of conditions, have been receptive to the idea of negotiations as proposed within Karzai's "Peace Jirga". The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently gave his backing to these negotiations, again with conditions attached, but the US administration remains sceptical.

Political agreements - like the failed Musa Qala deal in 2006 overseen by the then ISAF commander, General David Richards – should aim to isolate the “hard-core”, many of whom are foreigners, from more moderate, indigenous groups. Such political agreements would also help avoid the violent tactics that may have won NATO military victories last year but cost vital public support because of high civilian casualties.

An effective policy in the short term would be to identify insurgent leaders willing to cut a deal. The coalition could then operate a system of “divide and rule”, whereby intransigent insurgents would see their erstwhile comrades rewarded with a package of financial and other incentives which add up to a better deal than that offered by the Taliban. (emphasis added by editor).

The report urges European governments to send more troops to Afghanistan, eliminate or reduce the national caveats on their troops, and reverse their “underperformance” by increasing reconstruction aid. On the flip side, the report pushes the U.S. to shift its combat strategy to a more political one and abandon its counter-narcotics plans of aerial spraying or buying up opium crops. It recommends the U.S. shift the onus of the problem onto traffickers and concentrate on arresting and prosecuting drug lords and their governmental supporters.

Gates irks NATO allies

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has irked NATO allies after telling the LA Times that European allies do not know how to fight insurgencies, often using inappropriate tactics and overly forceful airstrikes, which could be helping the Taliban’s cause. Ironically, as The Guardian points out, this argument is often used by British defense officials to attack American military operations.

This episode stirs up latent tensions and disagreements on how best to fight the burgeoning Taliban insurgency and keep the NATO mission afloat. NATO officials have in the past blamed insufficient U.S. troops at the beginning of the 2001 invasion for the current Taliban resurgence.

Paddy Ashdown to be new UN Rep

It’s official. Paddy Ashdown, the former EU-UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, has accepted the post as the new UN envoy to Afghanistan, according to a source quoted by Reuters. The UN Security Council is expected to approve and publicly announce this on Monday. Ashdown's biggest challenge will be coordinating and reconciling military and civilian efforts from all the various countries involved in Afghan reconstruction and security, while ensuring that the Afghan government is not left behind in these efforts. See Afghanistan Watch’s earlier post on this.

More troops to Afghanistan

The Pentagon has asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates for 3,000 more troops to be sent to Afghanistan, to counter a potential Taliban spring offensive.

Gates has in the past criticized NATO members for not providing more combat troops and equipment and has said that 7,500 additional troops are required to fulfill all command requirements. If approved, this infusion of American troops would indicate that the U.S. is agreeing to shoulder some of the extra troop burden. William H. McMichael of the Army Times writes:

If Gates decides to approve the new request, the troops — a Marine Air-Ground Task Force and a battalion that would focus on the training of Afghan army and police units — would be in place by April and spend seven months operating in southern Afghanistan, the area most vexed by Taliban attacks. It would be a “one-time-only” deployment and the troops, who would be assigned to Regional Command South, would not be replaced by additional U.S. forces, (Gates spokesman Geoff) Morrell said.

Morrell also said that troops would not be drawn from Iraq.

Jan. 15 update: 3,200 Marines are being told to prepare to be sent to Afghanistan, according to The Associated Press. Secretary Robert Gates is expected to sign the formal “one-time, seven-month” deployment orders soon.

Blast from the past

President of the Afghanistan Foreign Press Association Vanni Cappelli writes about an American diplomat raising questions about the threat of the Pakistani military – almost 40 years ago. Cappelli digs up a 1970 New York Times op-ed by Chester Bowles who predicted that Pakistani military would be the strategic threat of the future, not the then-burning Vietnam.

Afghans killed “needlessly”

A few U.S. Marines shot and killed 19 Afghan civilians “needlessly” after a suicide bomb struck their convoy in March, a former member of the Marines unit testified at a military court yesterday.

Nathaniel Travers testified that only a few gunners fired until the captain ordered the firing to stop. None of the marines were seriously injured in the suicide blast, which killed one bystander.

This testimony is interesting because the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has earlier claimed that the marines had in fact used “indiscriminate and excessive force” in shooting into the crowd after the attack.

Shortly after the shootings, an army commander apologized and paid condolence money to families of the victims, but this apology was later denounced by senior Marine officials as premature. This was one of a spate of civilian casualty incidents last spring that elicited severe condemnation from the Afghan government and international observers.

Bagram holds more than twice as many as Guantanamo

The secretive American detention center at Bagram base now holds more than twice as many prisoners as Guantanamo Bay, according to a New York Times report. Despite American efforts to shut down the base prison and transfer detainees to Afghan facilities and oversight, the number of prisoners has continued to grow as Guantanamo stopped taking in detainees.

The Afghan facility can only hold half the people that it was initially designed for, and construction has been slowed down by security and legal issues. Meanwhile human rights groups say treatment of detainees at Bagram, which was formerly abysmal culminating with the beating deaths of two detainees, has improved overall, but overcrowding complaints persist.

New covert US push in Pakistan?

The US is considering sending the CIA on more aggressive, covert missions into the chaotic tribal regions of Pakistan. The New York Times article quotes anonymous senior administration sources saying that the possible missions would be very secretive but would involve CIA cooperation with Special Operations forces. These options are being discussed in response to intelligence reports that see new Taliban efforts to destabilize the Pakistani government. (Also see the earlier Afghanistan Watch post on this)

Blogger “Charlie” who writes for the respected “Abu Muqawama” counterinsurgency blog thinks that Pakistan lacks two conditions that could make these missions successful:

1) A welcoming and cooperative government, whose armed forces take the lead in ground operations.
2) Little in the way of media coverage or Pentagon/Foggy Bottom meddling.

Bhutto assassination reverberates across Afghanistan

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto last week continues to ring across Afghanistan, as American officials worry that it heralds the rise of a more virulent extremism against the Pakistani government that could undermine the Afghan mission. It could also damage the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two neighbors, and hurt efforts to fight cross-border terrorism.

State to cut 10% of diplomatic posts worldwide

Citing strains from Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has announced it will cut diplomatic posts by 10% next year. State has had trouble filling 250 foreign service jobs in Iraq and another 100 "high priority" jobs in Afghanistan. It has finally brought these embassies to 100% occupancy -- but at the cost of leaving other posts vacant.  Shortfalls result because State's operating expenses come out of the supplemental, but the correlated increase in personnel costs must come out of State's regular budget. 

Ironically, the most vocal supporter of boosting State's regular budget has been none other than Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. On Nov. 26, he noted that "funding for nonmilitary foreign affairs programs . . . remains disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military. . . . The total foreign affairs budget request for the State Department . . . is less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone."

We've repeatedly highlighted this disparity, and argued that it is deeply undercutting our chances of success in Afghanistan. America is engaged in a "struggle of ideas" that it cannot afford to lose. Amidst a half trillion dollars in military spending this year, does it make any sense to cut critical (and cheap) diplomats? MORE

U.S. to Cut 10 Percent of Diplomatic Posts Next Year By Karen DeYoung (WP) Thursday, Dec 13: Diplomatic posts at the State Department and U.S. embassies worldwide will be cut by 10 percent next year because of heavy staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan, Director General Harry Thomas informed the foreign service yesterday.

Video: Interview with Gen. McNeill, Rashid, MacDonald

Yesterday, the NewsHour with Jim Leherer ran a good segment on Afghanistan featuring commentary by Gen. Dan McNeill, Ahmed Rashid, and Norine MacDonald (from Senlis Council). The transcript, along with streaming video, is available here.

Center on Public Integrity updates its contractor database

The Center for Public Integrity has just updated its Windfalls of War report, an investigation of US contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The original report, published in 2003, won the George Polk Award for journalism. It took six months to complete and involved a research team of 20 (along with  73 Freedom of Information Requests!)

The updated report, which lists the top 100 contractors, has some striking findings:

• "U.S. government contracts for work in Iraq and Afghanistan have grown more than 50 percent annually, from $11 billion in 2004 to almost $17 billion in 2005 and more than $25 billion in 2006."
• "Iraq remains the clear priority of the U.S. government, the Center's research shows, with more than seven times as many contracting dollars designated for spending there as for Afghanistan."
• "Of the $13 billion awarded through cost-plus contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan for 2004 to 2006, 30 percent was awarded through simple cost-plus, fixed-fee arrangements that offer no incentives for performance or cost savings."

The Center for Public Integrity website includes a search engine that crawls hundreds of budget documents, including reports, audits, testimony, project site inspections and correspondence. Unfortunately, it is prohibitively difficult to disaggregate spending in Afghanistan from that in Iraq in the current format (this is, in part, a function of the way many of these expenses are deliberately melded in budget documents.) I have contacted the folks at CPI, and will see if we can compile a list of the top contractors (and contracts) in Afghanistan.

Quoteboard

"I'm not in the business of turning down jobs I haven't been offered."
  - Paddy Ashdown

"I can put a guy out on a ridge with an AK-47 and have him take a couple of shots. The Americans will shoot back with their big guns and disrupt the whole valley...Being an insurgent would be so easy."
  - Sgt. Jacob Stockdill

"All you have to do is not screw up, and, even if you do, you just blame it on the Americans."
  - Capt. Chris Rowe
MORE

Ashdown headed to Kabul as "super-envoy"?

According to new reports, Paddy Ashdown, the former EU-UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been offered a newly created position in Kabul as a "super envoy" that would head Afghanistan efforts by NATO, the UN, and perhaps the EU as well.

According to a NATO diplomat quoted yesterday in the Financial Times, “Ashdown’s name seems to be the only one in play. I understand that Karzai is comfortable with that and it seems as if the ball is now in Ashdown’s court.” Other names floated for the position have included Joschka Fischer and Hikmet Cetin, former foreign ministers of Germany and Turkey.

Ashdown's name has been bandied about since June, but he was reluctant to consider the job unless he had the endorsement of the United States. Then recently the dual-hatted position was championed by Nicholas Burns, the number three man in the US State Dept. There remains disagreement over the nature of the role, according to Karzai spokesman Hamayun Hamidzada, who notes in The Scotsman that "Britain wants a Kabul-based envoy, who would co-ordinate people here, and also in the capitals. The US thinks you need a roving envoy going from capital to capital." 

Will Ashdown accept? In June, he said there was the need for such a post:  "My view, for what it is worth, is that there needs to be a single figure out there pulling all the strands together. At the moment there is little or no co-ordination and the country is starting to work against itself." 

The change could greatly improve coordination and elevate the status of the UN in Afghanistan. It would require a tremendously skilled  manager and coordinator to make it all work -- something Ashdown was able to do quite well in Bosnia. In a WSJ op-ed last month, Hans Binnendijk argued that "a new, high-profile European High Representative under U.N. auspices should be appointed to pull together the diverse national contributions in Afghanistan and to coordinate military and economic approaches into a comprehensive and coherent whole. Paddy Ashdown provides a good example with his work in Bosnia. Such a High Representative could also help convince European publics to stick with the Afghan effort." The challenge will be coordinating with the US and with the Afghan government, which as a sovereign state would never grant Ashdown the level of authority he had in Bosnia.

Photo: Paddy Ashdown (aka Jeremy John Durham Ashdown, Baron Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon...) 

Thinking like an insurgent: the Army's new academy

The Wall St Journal has a front page, 2,300 word piece this morning on the U.S. Army's "Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy", which was established this April to improve tactics. Last year the Army unveiled a new counterinsurgency doctrine, but its dissemination has been slow; when one of its authors, Lt. Col. John Nagl went to Afghanistan he saw "uneven understanding of counterinsurgency principles."

Capt. Dan Helmer, the 26-year old Rhode Scholar who set up the 'school' in six weeks notes that "We're trying to win an argument that supporting the government is worth risking your life for." That's a tough sell right now, and requires an approach which is 80% military and 20% political, according to Helmer. 

The Army says they've made great progress this year in giving troops Afghanistan-specific training before deployment, but current deployment patterns aren't providing enough time for learning. "There isn't enough time between being told that they're going and getting them through the training," says Lou Gelling, deputy commander of the Army's battle command training program. "That's the reality of it." Sounds like a lot of the training right now is supplemental, not comprehensive: five day courses for 60 soldiers at a time in a makeshift classroom.

As usual, one of the central problems ties back to Afghanistan's status as America's "second war":

The counterinsurgency training sometimes seems targeted more toward Iraq, according to Capt. Helmer and Col. Nagl. Of the 90 men under Col. Nagl's command, almost all are Iraq veterans and just one has served in Afghanistan. Even Capt. Helmer's orders to Afghanistan included the mistaken, but telling, instruction to take a course in Arabic -- a language spoken in Iraq, but not in Afghanistan.

The article is subscriber only content, but here are a few excerpts:

In Counterinsurgency Class, Soldiers Think Like Taliban, Wall Street Journal, By MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS, Nov 30, KABUL:A natural-born insurgent, Sgt. First Class Jacob Stockdill was brimming with malicious suggestions when a group of American soldiers and Afghan security men sat down last month to plot their own defeat. MORE

Classified proposal: enlist Pakistan's tribes against AQ

US military officials confirmed this weekend that a special operations plan is in the works to arm and empower Pakistani tribal leaders against foreign extremists. The proposal is modeled on efforts in Anbar province, Iraq, where Sunni sheiks were enlisted to turn local Iraqis against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.

The Times notes that "Some other elements of the campaign have been approved in principle by the Americans and Pakistanis and await financing, like $350 million over several years to help train and equip the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force that now has about 85,000 members and is recruited from border tribes" but adds that "the classified proposal to enlist tribal leaders is new."

The story also notes that a group of Pakistan experts convened in March thought the proposal had its merits, but that successes 'would be difficult to achieve, particularly in the north (Bajaur) and south (North and South Waziristam.' Not only has the tribal leadership been eviscerated in these regions, but there is a great skepticism about working with the United States and the Pakistani army. This seems to me the great -- and perhaps insurmountable -- challenge with such an approach...

Gordon Adams on the Pentagon-Pakistan "slush fund"

Gordon Adams has a great post on Democracy Arsenal which takes a closer look at Pentagon payments to Pakistan (which are only now coming under scrutiny in congress). Here's a clip (Note: there's more on DoD's usurpation of roles once performed by State in Adam's Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article...):

The Los Angeles Times of November 18, 2007 reports that the Pentagon is looking into Coalition Support payments to Pakistan (of which $5.3 b have been made to date), because documentation of the Pakistani spending supposedly being reimbursed is too thin...One unnamed official, who tracks these payments, told the LA Times: “"Backdoor subsidies is what it can look like to some more skeptical observers, because there hasn't been good oversight and the amounts involved have been so great.  There is suspicion that it's a slush fund."

No kidding! Count me a “skeptical observer.”  So now the Pentagon, which has no expertise at making foreign assistance payments directly to other governments or at tracking them after they are made, are going to play catch-up ball with this program. MORE

Sarah Chayes on Arghandab, the Taliban, and GoA meddling

Sarah Chayes has a piece today in the Washington Post in which she recalls, from her front row seat, the Taliban incursion into Arghandab in the wake of Mullah Naqib's heart attack.

Her verdict is deeply troubling: despite a successful coalition counterattack, the Taliban operation  "was a deft, successful psychological operations action":

It said that, despite the likelihood that they would attack after the death of Mullah Naqib, no obstacle was thrown up to oppose them, and they were able to walk into the district. The targeting of the mullah's house was a deliberate affront. It said: "You see, o men of no honor? You can't even protect his house. You are nothing now." The sum of these messages was aimed at the ordinary people who are the prize in any insurgency: Our encroachment is inevitable, the Taliban said. You should align yourselves with the inevitable.

Equally troubling is the Government of Afghanistan's response. Immediately after Mullah Naqib's death, President Karzai, along with his two brothers and the governor of Kandahar, "interfered in the recent selection of a new elder, sidelining a man who had been Mullah Naqib's deputy during the anti-Soviet jihad." "If anyone knew how to fight the Taliban in Arghandab, it was he," argues Chayes, "And yet the government's machinations were plainly aimed at shutting him out" in favor of a more pliable replacement, the untried son of Mullah Naqib. Their goal, she implies, is to ram through an alluring -- but dangerously flawed  -- reconciliation with the Taliban.

A Mullah Dies, and War Comes Knocking, By Sarah Chayes, Nov 18, KANDAHAR: Wednesday, Oct. 31: I woke to the sound of artillery thudding -- like the beat of a heavy heart. It was Afghan army batteries firing into Arghandab, at new Taliban positions there. Through several nights, I had been listening, my ears pricking like a dog's, to the faint popping of gunfire, the clattering of helicopters, the whine of personnel carriers speeding along the roads, falling asleep only when the morning call to prayer rang out in the pre-dawn chill.

I can't explain how this felt, the penetration of war to this crucial part of Kandahar, where I have lived for six years. Arghandab district, with its riot of tangled fruit trees, is the lung of Kandahar province; its meandering, stone-studded river is the artery of the whole region. Arghandab is shade and water, and mud-walled orchards, and mulberries and apricots, and pomegranates the size of grapefruits hanging from the willowy branches. MORE

World Policy Journal piece

Below is an excerpt from a piece I wrote for this month's World Policy Journal. In it I argue that a too-narrow focus on counterinsurgency operations has undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The challenge today is recalibrating our approach to combine the right combination of military and non-military tools. You can download the full article here.

Buying Time in Afghanistan By Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Fall 2007:   Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo each other, but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public show no appetite for a return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. MORE

Musharraf says he'll step down this month

Hot off the wires...of course, we'll believe it when we see it. Note his indication that emergency rule will continue through January elections.

Pakistan leader to quit army this month By ZARAR KHAN, Associated Press Writer, 12 minutes ago: RAWALPINDI, Pakistan - President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said Wednesday he expects to step down as army chief by the end of November and begin a new presidential term as a civilian, warning that Pakistan risked chaos if he gave into opposition demands to resign.

In an interview with The Associated Press, he accused former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, currently under house arrest, of fueling political turmoil and rejected Western pressure to quickly lift emergency rule, which he indicated was likely to continue through the January elections.

"All those who are blunt enough to tell me to my face what the reality is, all of them think, yes, it will lead the country to chaos if I do not handle the political environment now with me remaining as the president," he said at his army office.

The U.S.-backed general had originally planned to quit as chief of the powerful army by Thursday, when his presidential mandate and the term of the current parliament expire, but he said he was forced to delay the restoration of civilian rule until a court ruling on his recent re-election.

He said the exact timing would depend on the Supreme Court — which he purged of independent-minded judges when he suspended the constitution on Nov. 3 — but expected it to happen within this month. MORE

Pickering, Hills and Abramowitz on Pakistan

Three of America's most respected former diplomats weigh in on Pakistan today in the Washington Post. They argue the Pentagon must step up, and leverage aid to secure elections under a neutral caretaker government. Also pose an interesting analogy to the Philippines...

The Answer in Pakistan by Thomas R. Pickering, Carla Hills and Morton Abramowitz, Nov 13: Every day that Gen. Pervez Musharraf refuses to reverse his imposition of martial law and restore Pakistan's constitution brings another round of disturbing reports...The Bush administration's aims of securing support for the "war on terror" and stability for a nuclear power will continue to be right, but as a nation of 160 million people rapidly frays under repression, it will only become more obvious that military dictatorship is not the answer.

This realization is already settling in. Many in the Bush administration and Congress have been sending clear messages of disapproval to Musharraf. The Pentagon, however, has been more ambiguous, and it is unclear whether military aid will continue as if nothing happened on Nov. 3. The United States must go beyond verbal condemnations and show with actions that it believes Musharraf is on the wrong track. If there is a recent analogy to what is happening in Pakistan, it is the Philippines of Ferdinand Marcos in late 1985 (though the stakes are much higher today)....MORE

Quoteboard

“There is a question why the provincial officials were not with their parliamentarian guests. And it is a question why there was shooting after the explosion.”

- Burhanuddin Rabbani,  leader of the United National Front.

“This time there should be consequences. We should stop delivery of any further F-16s to Pakistan and cut off all other U.S. assistance until the state of emergency is lifted.”

- Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY), member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

“It is dangerous to stand up to a military dictatorship, but more dangerous not to.”

- Benazir Bhutto, former Pakistan Prime Minister

“This is going to be a very short-lived emergency,”

- Tariq Azim Khan, Pakistani deputy information minister

Update: Congress and Pakistan

CQ has an update to its story yesterday, with statements from Leahy, Kerry, and Biden (and a non-statement by Lantos...)

Chorus of Calls to Halt Aid to Pakistan Getting Louder on Capitol Hill By Colby Itkowitz, CQ Staff Calls on Capitol Hill to cut aid to Pakistan grew Wednesday, as the Bush administration defended its policy of maintaining close ties with President Pervez Musharraf despite his declaration of emergency rule. ...President Bush, personally weighing in on the Pakistan crisis for the first time since Musharraf declared emergency rule Nov. 3, telephoned the Pakistani leader Wednesday for what Bush called a “frank discussion.” “And my message was that we believe strongly in elections and that you ought to have elections soon, and you need to take off your uniform,” Bush said.

Murmurs in Congress on cutting aid to Pakistan

The administration this year requested $800m in aid to Pakistan. Pres. Musharraf has since announced emergency rule, postponed elections, and cracked down on protesters -- but there have been no ultimatums from the administration and no sign that funds will be cut.

In testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee this afternoon, Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte argued that aid should stay, arguing that Pakistan"cutting these programs would send a negative signal to the people of Pakistan"

Some in Congress see things differently -- which is why Senator Biden (chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) received a call on Tuesday. It was Musharraf on the line, urging him not to cut off the aid. Biden has said that  Pakistan"I told President Musharraf how critical it is for relations between our two countries that elections go forward as planned in January...That he follow through on his commitment to take off his uniform and that he restore the rule of law to Pakistan." MORE

WPR piece on private security contractors

Below is a piece I wrote, published today in the World Politics Review (an online foreign policy daily.)

Private Military Contractors in Afghanistan, Carl Robichaud | 30 Oct 2007

After the Sept. 16 Blackwater scandal, which drew unprecedented attention to the role played by private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq, these firms have increasingly come under scrutiny in other theaters of war, such as Afghanistan. But while efforts in Afghanistan to rein in PSCs seem to parallel those in Iraq, they are driven by different dynamics -- and have very different implications. MORE 

Karzai's primetime appeal: curtail the airstrikes

President Karzai made a primetime appearance on CBS's 60 Minutes this Sunday to call for a rollback of airstrikes in Afghanistan.

When 60 Minutes asked whether Karzai had directly requested that President George W. Bush end the airstrikes he said "Absolutely. Oh, yes, in clear words."  He implied that his appearance on 60 Minutes was part of an attempt to go public now that direct conversations have failed to get results: "I want to repeat that, alternatives to the use of air force. And I will speak for it again through your media."

"You're demanding that?" - Pelley (in reference to a rollback of airstrikes)
"Absolutely," - Karzai.

• Watch the video

The rest of the piece is worth watching, if only because it is the first time a camera team was permitted into the Combined Air Operations Center, America's high-tech command post situated in an undisclosed Persian Gulf country (Qatar?) It is a scene that is both surreal and yet somehow mundane: walls lined with massive monitors, people seated at rows of desks with computers. It is here that decisions are made on each airstrike in Afghanistan and Iraq -- decisions that will mean life or death for people hundreds or thousands of miles away. MORE

NATO leases out? Helicopters to be rented...

In an unprecedented move, NATO this weekend approved money to lease cargo helicopters for the alliance's transport needs --  a move made necessary because members of the alliance again refused to provide airlift out of their own military assets.

The diplomats were careful not to assign blame, but Canada's Globe and Mail notes that  "Italy, Spain and France are among the Western European countries with large numbers of big, modern helicopters protected by sophisticated anti-missile defences and flown by highly trained crews." Canada, which has relied upon it allies' helicopters to support its operations in Kandahar, would stand the most to gain from a boost in transport capacity.

The airlift shortfall has long been an issue, and came to a head this summer when the US extended the tour of a helicopter unit in Kandahar until the end of the year. The helicopters -- which may be leased from Ukraine and Russia -- will mostly fill this gap and permit the coalition's other helicopters to transport troops and evacuate the wounded.

Some argue that having additional airlift will make coalition troops safer, since many of the casualties in Afghanistan have come from roadside bombs. However, using helicopters is often just as risky: since 2001, 18 helicopters have gone down in Afghanistan, resulting in 110 deaths. So it should come as no surprise that many NATO allies are reluctant to risk their airmen.

The alternatives, however, come at a high cost, both in Euros and credibility. According to the Globe and Mail:

The cost of chartering large helicopters is expected to be very high. At standard commercial rates, an Mi-17 - the civilian version of the widely used and rugged Russian workhorse capable of lifting four tonnes - could exceed $100,000 a week, yet fly far less than the punishing days endured by U.S., British and Dutch crews. Given the high costs of maintenance and the premium civilian pilots can be expected to demand for risking their lives, the cost could easily soar. A flock of 20 Mi-17s or a smaller number of the even larger Mi-26s, might cost more than $100-million a year, one industry source said.

Secretary Robert Gates resigned himself to the move, even if his frustration showed in responding to reporters that "it's not the best option. It may be the only option." (More excerpts from his transcript below...) MORE

Image: Troops board a CH-47 Chinook helicopter in Daychopan district on their way back to Kandahar Army Air Field on Sept. 4, 2003. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Kyle Davis.

A softer, cuddlier Blackwater

On Monday, the Times reported that Blackwater changed its logo "from macho to corporate." A company spokesmen says the decision was taken long before the Sept 17 incident. Sure...

As the Times reports:

The rifle-scope crosshairs so obvious in the old Blackwater logo have been reduced to a set of horizontal elipses that bracket, but no longer enclose, the paw print, which has also changed to more closely resemble an actual bear-paw imprint. The original Blackwater logo had thick white serif lettering draped over the crosshairs on a menacing black field. The new logo separates the image and the letters, which now appear in buttoned-down sans-serif black and slightly italicized on a white field.

Wired's Danger Room is not impressed, but has taken on some of the hard work for Blackwater. Readers have created six options for Blackwater's new look. Go weigh in on your favorite...

 

A look inside the Asia Foundation survey

The Asia Foundation released it's third survey of the Afghan people today. Polling in Afghanistan should by no means be seen as dispositive, but this data can provide insights unavailable elsewhere (especially compared with prior baseline surveys by the Asia Foundation in 2004 and 2006). Here's a look inside...

Predictably, media reports framed the poll as a referendum on security (see AFP: “Security fears up sharply among Afghans: survey”) It’s true that pessimism about security rose among Afghans--with 32 percent citing security as their top concern (up from 22 percent last year.)

But the picture is more complicated, since security concerns vary significantly by region and two thirds of Afghans felt that security in their area was good. Moreover, among those who believe the country is headed in the right direction, good security is cited as the second most important reason (34%) after development.

So the Survey paints a nuanced picture and provides some fascinating data on everything from support for traditional institutions (such as Shuras and Jirga) to democracy and women’s rights. A few trends worth noting:

Right Direction / Wrong Direction:

• People are still optimistic, even if there was a slight decline in those who said the country was headed in the right direction (from 44 percent to 42 percent).
• Three-quarters of Afghans continue to assess government performance positively (i.e. either strongly (25%) or somewhat strongly (55%).)
• Afghans continue to espouse confidence in national security forces (both army and police) as well as in traditional institutions such as Shuras and Jirgas. However, “less than half of the respondents had confidence in the government's justice system, political parties and local militias.”
•  Corruption is an issue for many Afghans, but it is not clear that it has grown more acute. Some poll questions suggest an increase in perceptions of corruption while others suggest a decrease.
  

Security:

• Among people who felt the country was going in the wrong direction, security was cited as the top reason. This may seem unsurprising, until you realize that even in last year’s survey security was only rarely mentioned as a reason for a “wrong direction” response.
• On the other hand, among those who said the country was going in the right direction, good security was cited as the second biggest reason (34%).
• Perceptions of security varied greatly by region. Nationwide, “sixty-six percent of the respondents felt that security in their area was good or quite good, and 50 percent said they rarely or never feared for their own or their family's safety. Eighty-two percent said no one in their family had been a victim of any crime or violence during the last one year.” 

Reconstruction:

• Last year, respondents cited “rebuilding of the country” as only the fourth most important reason why the country was headed in the right direction; this year it became the most important reason for believing so (39%). It’s not clear whether people feel reconstruction is going better, or that the other trends they cited as reasons for optimism last year (security, peace, disarmament) are simply going worse. MORE
  

The story behind the "crackdown" on PSCs...

Cracking down on illicit private military contractors (aka private security contractors) in Afghanistan may well be in order, but is that what's really happening?

Barnett Rubin writes on Informed Comment that "Word on the street is that rather than a sincere "crackdown" on private security firms, the government's actions are more similar to its counter-narcotics actions: use of the government by one criminal group to suppress its competitors."

In response, a "well-informed friend in Kabul" argues that this was not a crackdown (the arrests comprised 100 employees in an industry of 10,000) and suggests instead that "some competitors closely linked to the President are trying to (a) extract bribes from the PSCs for not being shut down arbitrarily and (b) eliminate rivals."

This Kabul reader offers some more insights which suggest a) the indispensability of PSCs for certain roles and b) the difference between Afghan and foreign-led PSCs, and C) the political nature of this "crackdown":

The real challenge to the government is the fact that the Ministry of Interior does not have the capacity to replace the protection guaranteed by the private companies outside of Kabul. While there might be enough room in the police to replace some guards inside the capital, capacity and morale of the police are insufficient to take on the task of guarding let's say Kajaki dam in Helmand....
 
Pointing to international contractors and their problems is deflecting attention from the biggest problem - the Afghan PSCs. In foreign firms the foot soldiers might come from an illegal armed group, but the command and logistics elements are all foreign and will collapse in crisis or not lend them easily to factional agendas. The Afghan firms unify the foot soldiers with C2 [command and control] from one faction and are therefore much more dangerous - best example provided by Khawar of Jurat.
 
Nobody so far has questioned the PSCs owned by illustrious people such as [names of relatives of current or past ministers]. Nobody has looked into the firms operating under the control of local warlords [names of former top provincial officials] in the East and South either.

Draft GoA rules for private security contractors

The Associated Press obtained a draft of the policy being discussed by the Government of Afghanistan on security contractors. The document must receive approval from the Cabinet before entering into effect. It notes that "the GOA (government of Afghanistan) has allowed for limited PSC operations and activities. However, increasingly, the absence of targeted regulation ... in parallel with unstable security environment has generated an unfortunate and nearly anarchical PSC market with a long series of security problems and criminal activities." Here are the highlights:

Extensive reliance of PSCs (private security companies), risks deepening the current state of instability in at least 4 ways: MORE

Marines seek transfer from Iraq to Afghanistan

What should we make of yesterday's news that the Marines have requested a shift from Iraq to Afghanistan? ("Marines Press to Remove Their Forces From Iraq, (NYT) Oct 11)

Noah Schactman of "The Danger Room" (Wired) posts some perspectives:

• Air Force officer John Noonan: "it makes sense from an air war perspective. The Marines have self-contained air wings, Harriers, Cobras, Hornets, etc that should fill the Afghan mission nicely. That leaves the Air Force to support the Army in Iraq."
• The LA Times " portrays the Marines' proposal in a much different light": the Corps is arguing that since combat is winding down in Anbar they are eager to take on Afghanistan, where combat is escalating.
• Schactman himself observes that "The shift would also allow the Marines to "declare victory" in Anbar, while things are calm there.   If the province starts to unravel later... well, hey, that was the Army's fault."
• Click below to read the Times article...MORE

Photo: U.S. Marines (3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment) in Sept 2004 preparing for a Chinook insertion to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Today there are no major Marine deployments in Afghanistan. Photo by Lance Cpl. Justin M. Mason

The joyride of Blackwater 61

The recent spotlight on Blackwater and contractor accountability led Der Spiegel to print the transcript of a 2004 Blackwater transport flight in Afghanistan. The crew diverted their mission into a joyride through a canyon which ended badly. It gives a sense of the rules and beliefs some of these guys are operating under. It's morbid -- and completely transfixing -- reading.

The Transcript of the Deadly Flight Der Spiegel 10/06/2007: A newly released transcript shows how Blackwater pilots in Afghanistan took their plane on a joyride and died in a crash. On November 27, 2004, transport flight Blackwater 61, a turboprop CASA 212-CC, crashed in the mountains of Afghanistan. The plane was operated by Presidential Airways, a subsidiary of the private security company Blackwater, also operating as Blackwater Aviation under contract for the United States Department of Defense. The crew had left their regular flight route for "fun" to fly through a canyon, at the end of which they crashed into a rock wall. The words of the pilots reveal in stunning detail the cynicism of a war between audacity and folly, where men reach the edge of reason.

What follows are excerpts from the cockpit voice recorder transcript, as provided by the National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB), with the voices of pilot Noel English, co-pilot Loren Hammer and flight mechanic Melvin Rowe. Also on board were US Army soldiers Lieutenant Colonel Michael McMahon, Chief Warrant Officer Travis Grogan and Specialist Harley Miller. Miller -- who had almost missed the flight -- was the only one to survive the crash, but he froze to death before the search teams could find him.

Korb and Wadhams: Five steps

Larry Korb and Caroline Wadhams argue today in a Newsday op-ed that "the United States and NATO must increase troop levels by at least 20,000" in Afghanistan. This rise in troop levels is part of a five-point plan that includes bolstering reconstruction assistance, focusing on rule of law, and reforming U.S. aid channels to Pakistan. The steps they sketch out will be supported by a more comprehensive report in the coming months -- keep your eyes peeled ...

U.S.

must put more focus on Afghan insurgency, Oct 9, 2007: Sunday marked the sixth anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaida....But the mission in Afghanistan is going alarmingly awry, and the United States must refocus and re-energize its policy. The administration and Congress cannot allow the sinking ship of Iraq to take Afghanistan down with it...

To achieve our security objectives, the United States, and especially Congress, must provide increased funds, attention and manpower - both civilian and military. U.S. leaders must also engage the American people, as they may become increasingly pessimistic about U.S. involvement in the Muslim world as a result of the war in Iraq. There are five concrete steps Congress and the administration should pursue immediately. MORE

Have PhD in Anthropology, will travel...

I was surprised to find this piece had climbed to the second most emailed article in the New York Times today, but perhaps I shouldn't have been. Interesting, well-reported, and counterintuitive.

• Video

It's odd to find that a field so synonymous with The Academy has become a coveted commodity (much to the chagrin of certain professors, cited in the article, who seem philosophically averse to using their discipline for anything pragmatic...)

Can you imagine all the Anthropology majors emailing their parents to say "I told you so?" And can you imagine what better shape we'd be today if we entered Afghanistan with a modicum of understanding of its cultural context? The Army seems to now appreciate the importance of these skills, but it's a steep learning curve. (One could also question whether the Army is the right institution to be delivering governance and services...)

Anthropologists help U.S. Army in Afghanistan and Iraq, By David Rohde, Oct 4 (NYT):  SHABAK VALLEY, Afghanistan: In this isolated Taliban stronghold in eastern Afghanistan, American paratroopers are fielding what they consider a crucial new weapon in counterinsurgency operations here: a demure civilian anthropologist named Tracy.

Tracy, who asked that her surname not be used for security reasons, is a member of the first-ever Human Terrain Team, an experimental Pentagon program that assigns anthropologists and other social scientists to American combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they act as cultural advisers and suggest ways to win local support without using military force.

Colonel Martin Schweitzer, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division unit working with anthropologists here, said the unit's combat operations had been reduced by 60 percent since the anthropologists arrived this spring. He said the focus had shifted from combat to improving security, health care and education for the population.

"We're looking at this from a human perspective, from a social scientist's perspective," he said. "We're not focused on the enemy. We're focused on bringing governance down to the people."

Last month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates authorized a $40 million expansion of the program, which will assign teams of anthropologists and social scientists to each of the 26 American combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, military officials are scrambling to find more scholars willing to deploy to the front lines to interpret tribal structures and explain cultural differences. MORE

Part II of the Rubin/Marshall talk

TPMtv with Barnett Rubin

Barnett Rubin, in a video interview with Joshua Micah Marshall

A Chat with Barnett Rubin, Part I: A few weeks ago Dr. Barnett Rubin, one of the world's premier Afghanistan experts at NYU, created a stir with a series of blog posts about signs the Bush administration might be gearing up for a military campaign against Iran. Last week I interviewed Rubin about the Bush administration's war talk against Iran and I asked him, Is there really any evidence that Iran is helping arm the Taliban, as the Bush administration keeps claiming?